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ABSTRACT 
KIRSTEN M. BEATTIE: From the Wires to Wireless: 
How Mass Communications Technologies Have Affected the Libel/Slander Distinction, 
Single Publication, and Liability in Defamation Law 
 
(Under the direction of Dr. Ruth Walden) 
 
    This research examined how courts have addressed the application of defamation law to 
new mass communications technologies—the telegraph, radio, and television—to 
contextualize the current application to the Internet. Three areas of defamation law were 
examined—the libel/slander distinction, the single publication rule, and liability. Through 
analyzing federal and state court cases, as well as relevant statutes, this thesis attempted to 
determine the extent to which our current approach to applying defamation law to the 
Internet fits into a historical pattern. Among the findings were that the application of the 
libel/slander distinction and the single publication rule to the Internet is consistent with 
common law developments that have arisen from other technologies; that for each 
technology, courts initially struggled to determine the appropriate liability to apply; and that 
statutes historically have played an integral role in the common law approach to liability for 
technologies.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
    The growth of the Internet in recent years has revolutionized communications, allowing 
messages to reach global audiences within a matter of seconds. At its best, the Internet 
fulfills free expression ideals, serving “as a First Amendment fantasyland where freedom of 
expression [can] reach its zenith.”1 At its worst, the Internet abets the dissemination of 
obscene or libelous content. One author noted that “whether it be through ‘gripe sites,’ live 
chat rooms or Internet bulletin boards . . . . [i]ndividuals can instantly publish gossip, 
accusations, opinions, complaints or misinformation to a global audience.”2 The recent 
growth in Web content generated by individual users, such as blogs and social networking 
sites, prompted Time magazine in its annual Person of the Year issue to name “You” as its 
choice: “[F]or seizing the reigns of the global media, for founding and framing the new 
digital democracy, for working for nothing and beating the pros at their own game, Time’s 
Person of the Year for 2006 is you.”3 
    The ease of access to the Internet—and the number of people taking advantage of it, as 
Time’s decoration of the world’s citizen-publishers suggests—has raised some concerns 
                                                 
1 David L. Hudson, Jr., The Blogosphere and the Law: Blogs and the First Amendment, 11 NEXUS J. OP. 129, 
129 (2006). 
 
2 Nicole B. Cásarez, Dealing with Cybersmear: How to Protect Your Organization from Online Defamation, 47 
PUB. REL. Q. 40, 40 (2002). 
 
3 Lev Grossman, TIME Person of the Year: You, TIME, Dec. 25, 2006, at 41. 
 
about defamation on the Internet. Defamation law seeks to balance an individual’s interest in 
a good reputation with the right to free speech.4 A communication is considered defamatory 
if “it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the 
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”5 Defamation 
involves the intentional or negligent publication or utterance to an unprivileged third party of 
a false statement regarding another that causes harm to the defamed person’s reputation.6 
Traditional mass media, like newspapers and broadcast stations, are typically businesses with 
the mechanisms and procedures in place to protect themselves from defamation claims. This 
is not necessarily the case with those who communicate via the Internet. 
    While the World Wide Web has been accessible for more than a decade, it is the shift in 
content providers from businesses to individuals that led Time magazine to dub the modern 
Internet “Web 2.0,” a user-driven forum: 
        If the Web’s first coming was all about grafting old businesses onto a new medium 
(pet food! on the Internet!), Web 2.0 is all about empowering individual consumers. It’s 
not enough to find that obscure old movie; now you can make your own film, distribute 
it worldwide and find out what people think almost instantly.7 
 
The instant nature of Web publication coupled with the ease of access has been noted as a 
significant difference from traditional mass media: “Forwarding an e-mail requires only a 
few keystrokes; copying to a Web page or a newsgroup only a few clicks of the mouse. In the 
                                                 
4 RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., THE RIGHT TO SPEAK ILL: DEFAMATION, REPUTATION AND FREE SPEECH 17 
(2006). 
 
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). 
 
6 Id. § 558. Under current defamation law, the plaintiff has to prove that the content was published to a non-
privileged third party; that the plaintiff was identified by the publication; that the content was false; that the 
content was capable of defamatory meaning; that the defendant acted with some level of fault, either negligence 
or actual malice; and that the publication caused harm or damages.  
 
7 Jeff Howe, Your Web, Your Way, TIME, Dec. 25, 2006, at 60. 
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traditional mass media, before a charge is aired or printed, it typically must pass the 
inspection of several levels of editors.”8 The lack of systematic editorial discretion is likely a 
factor in the number of lawsuits filed over online defamation; according to a recent article in 
USA Today, in the last two years, more than 50 libel lawsuits resulting from postings on 
blogs and message boards have been filed.9 
    While the nature of the technology of the Internet plays a role in the relative ease of 
posting potentially defamatory content online, Congress also has contributed statutorily 
through its passage of section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, part of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.10 Section 230 essentially guarantees all Internet service 
providers (ISPs) and users immunity from liability for defamatory content posted, but not 
produced, by the service providers or users, regardless of whether they filter or block 
content.11 Some believe this provision allows unacceptable leeway for ISPs to overlook 
potentially libelous content on their sites, and many have called for revisions to the CDA 
itself or to court interpretations of the CDA.12 Concerns over liability are also reflected in 
discussions of how publication on the Internet should be treated—for example, is each 
                                                 
8 Michael Hadley, Note, The Gertz Doctrine and Internet Defamation, 84 VA. L. REV. 477, 505 (1998). 
 
9 Laura Parker, Courts are Asked to Crack Down on Bloggers, Websites: Those Attacked Online are Filing 
Libel Lawsuits, USA TODAY, Oct. 3, 2006, at 1A. 
 
10 Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2004).  
 
11 Id. 
 
12 See generally Hudson, supra note 1, at 129; Aaron Perzanowski, Comment, Relative Access to Corrective 
Speech: A New Test for Requiring Actual Malice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 833 (2006); Melissa A. Troiano, Comment, 
The New Journalism? Why Traditional Defamation Laws Should Apply to Internet Blogs, 55 AM. U.L. REV. 
1447 (2006). 
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instance in which someone views defamatory content on a Web site considered to be a 
separate instance of publication for the purposes of a defamation action?13 
    In addressing the question of how to approach regulating defamation on the Internet, many 
authors have alluded to the value of drawing from past experience with new technologies, 
such as the telegraph, radio, and television.14 Most of these articles contain at most a few 
paragraphs describing how the regulation of a particular technology was handled. This thesis 
expands upon that previous research and attempts to contextualize the current treatment of 
defamation on the Internet by the courts through examining how the courts have adapted 
defamation law to other mass communication technologies. 
    Specifically, this thesis examines the extent to which the application and adaptation of 
defamation law to the Internet mirrors developments in defamation law that resulted from the 
growth of several mass communication technologies commonly analogized to the Internet—
the telegraph, radio, and television. Through an analysis of defamation cases in which courts 
addressed the impact of the technology in question, the goal of this thesis is to evaluate the 
extent to which the courts’ application of defamation law to the Internet fits into a historical 
                                                 
13 See generally James P. Jenal, When Is a User Not a “User”? Finding the Proper Role for Republication 
Liability on the Internet, 24 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 453 (2004); Odelia Braun, Comment, Internet Publications and 
Defamation: Why the Single Publication Rule Should Not Apply, 32 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 325 (2002); 
Sapna Kumar, Comment, Website Libel and the Single Publication Rule, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 639 (2003); Lori A. 
Wood, Note, Cyber-Defamation and the Single Publication Rule, 81 B.U. L. REV. 895 (2001). 
 
14 JoAnne Holman & Michael A. McGregor, The Internet as Commons: The Issue of Access, 10 COMM. L. & 
POL’Y 267, 279 (2005) (discussing the development of law for the telegraph and telephone); Keith Siver, Good 
Samaritans in Cyberspace, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 4 (1997) (arguing courts have attempted to 
use comparisons between media); Jae Hong Lee, Note, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v. Rosenthal: Defamation 
Liability for Third-Party Content on the Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 469 (2004) (arguing that the 
same questions arise with new media); Douglas B. Luftman, Note, Defamation Liability for On-Line Services: 
The Sky is Not Falling, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1071 (1997) (arguing that, like the telephone and broadcast 
media, the Internet raises issues of editorial control and liability); Philip H. Miller, Note, New Technology, Old 
Problem: Determining the First Amendment Status of Electronic Information Services, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1147 (1993) (arguing that new media inevitably face comparisons to newspapers); Troiano, supra note 12, at 
1451 (arguing the Internet has reached the point in its growth where it should be regulated). 
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pattern. While relevant statutes, such as the Communications Decency Act, offer context for 
court decisions, case law serves as the primary focus to identify situations in which the 
technology in question factored into the court’s decision. The analysis sought to identify 
trends in how technological advancements have affected three areas of defamation law that 
have previously shown themselves susceptible to one technological advancement, the 
printing press—the libel/slander distinction, single publication, and liability.15  
    Part II of this chapter provides context for this research by providing a brief look at some 
of the developments in the libel/slander distinction, single publication, and liability in 
defamation law resulting from the printing press to provide historical context for the effects 
technological developments in mass communication can have on defamation law. Part III 
shifts to a present day focus on the Internet and examines relevant scholarly research that has 
contributed to the study of online defamation, including attempts to analogize the Internet 
and the telegraph, radio, and television. Finally, Part IV details the methodology and poses 
the research questions for the thesis. 
 
 
Part II: The Impact of the Printing Press on Publication, Liability, and Jurisdiction 
    This section of the chapter provides background for the thesis through a discussion of how 
another mass communication technology—the printing press—affected defamation law.  
Areas of defamation that naturally were affected included whether the publication was oral or 
written; how many times a defamation was published for the purposes of a defamation 
action; and who could be held liable and under what standards. This section discusses the 
impact of the printing press generally before concluding with a justification for why the 
                                                 
15 Part II examines facets of the libel/slander distinction, the single publication rule, and liability that will be 
examined in this thesis and offers a justification for their inclusion in this proposed study. 
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libel/slander distinction, single publication, and liability are three key areas that have been 
affected by mass communication technologies. 
    The printing press revolutionized mass communication by increasing both the potential 
audience for and longevity of a defamatory publication. 
        With the invention of the printing press, “communications technology” changed 
dramatically. Before the invention, people could communicate only orally or by 
handwriting, methods that were slow, inaccurate and confined. . . . [T]he printing press 
made it possible to mass produce writings (including criticisms of government) and 
disseminate them widely . . . .16 
 
It was the growth in the access to and prevalence of the printed word that led to the pivotal 
distinction in defamation law between libel, or written defamation, and slander, spoken 
defamation.17 Prior to the invention, the courts in England viewed slander with a certain 
amount of leniency,18 but the printing press gave communications the potential to linger and 
reach a wider audience, thus increasing the likelihood of damage by libel. 
   The split of defamation into slander and libel held significant implications for liability as 
applied by the courts in assessing damages. Specifically, “[l]ibel applied to publications in 
permanent form, while slander applied to transient publications such as spoken words. The 
difference could be significant because financial damage must be shown in many cases of 
slander, while it need not be shown for libel.”19 Slander may be seen as a “lesser” wrong 
because it is less likely to linger and reach as wide an audience in the same way as libel. One 
                                                 
16 WEAVER ET AL., supra note 4, at 5. 
 
17 See Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 546, 547 
(1903). 
 
18 Id. at 559. “The conditions and the habits of thought prevailing in early society afford some explanation why 
it was not imperatively necessary to provide legal redress for slanders and insults of such a nature as to injure 
the character or hurt the sensibility, unless they were also such as to result in legal damage to the person against 
whom they were directed.” Id. 
 
19 WEAVER ET AL., supra note 4, at 18. 
 
 6
early twentieth century scholar characterized the distinction between the two as a matter of 
tort versus crime: “Libel is a crime as well a tort; slander of a private individual may be a tort 
but is no crime. Any written words which injure one’s reputation are libelous; but many 
words which would be actionable if written are not actionable if merely spoken.”20  
    In current defamation law, part of determining what damages can be claimed by a plaintiff 
goes beyond the actual mode of the publication to the reach and character of the defamatory 
content itself. Under modern common law, “[t]he area of dissemination, the deliberate and 
premeditated character of its publication and the persistence of the defamation are factors to 
be considered in determining whether a publication is a libel rather than a slander.”21 The 
development of the printing press, therefore, was instrumental in shaping the modern 
defamation distinction between whether a publication is considered a libel or a slander. 
    In defamation common law, publication requires only the dissemination of a defamatory 
message to one other person: “Publication of defamatory matter is its communication 
intentionally or by a negligent act to one other than the person defamed.”22 Furthermore, 
“One who intentionally and unreasonably fails to remove defamatory matter that he knows to 
be exhibited on land or chattels in his possession or under his control is subject to liability for 
its continued publication.”23 Therefore, one who is responsible for transmitting a defamatory 
message or for failing to remove information that is under one’s control is liable as the 
publisher of that message. As further improvements in technology advanced the rapid and 
widespread dissemination of the written word, questions arose that challenged traditional 
                                                 
20 Veeder, supra note 18, at 571. 
 
21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977). 
 
22 Id. § 577.  
 
23 Id. 
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notions of who could be liable as a publisher: The publication and distribution of 
newspapers, books, and periodicals, for example, raised questions of who could be held 
liable for publication and what constituted an act of publication.  
    In response to these questions, the categories of publisher, republisher, and distributor 
emerged. A publisher is the original source of the defamatory content; a person who repeats a 
defamatory statement is considered to have become a republisher of the defamation and, 
therefore, is as liable as the original publisher, a rule known as the republication doctrine.24 
In addition to publishers and republishers, common law recognizes the category of 
distributors of defamatory content. 
    Distributors are entities such as bookstores and newsstands that have no editorial control 
over the content of the material they distribute. Distributors are liable only if they know or 
have reason to know that the material they are transmitting is defamatory.25 The Restatement 
of Torts describes the distributor’s role with the following example: 
        The vendor or lender is not liable, if there are no facts or circumstances known to him 
which would suggest to him, as a reasonable man, that a particular book contains matter 
which upon inspection, he would recognize as defamatory. Thus, when the books of a 
reputable author or the publications of a reputable publishing house are offered for sale, 
rent or free circulation, he is not required to examine them to discover whether they 
contain anything of a defamatory character. If, however, a particular author or a 
particular publisher has frequently published notoriously sensational or scandalous 
books, a shop or library that offers to the public such literature may take the risk of 
becoming liable to any one who may be defamed by them.26 
 
Therefore, publishers are those who have editorial control over content, and distributors 
simply aid in the dissemination of published content. In addition to considerations of who 
                                                 
24 Id. § 578. 
 
25 Id. § 581. 
 
26 Id. § 581. 
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may be held liable for the dissemination of defamatory content, the dissemination of the 
publication itself is taken into account. 
    As suggested by the republication doctrine, under common law, each separate publication 
of a defamatory statement to a new audience is considered a separate cause of action.27 
However, under this approach, each copy of a newspaper could be considered a separate 
publication and, therefore, a separate cause of action. The single publication rule served as a 
way to ease the burden of liability on a publisher such as a newspaper or, eventually, a 
broadcast station, by ensuring that the statute of limitations could not be renewed each time 
someone viewed a copy of a newspaper, for example.28 Under this rule, copies of a 
newspaper or a single radio or television broadcast constitutes one publication, regardless of 
the number of people who receive that publication; however, separate editions of a 
newspaper or separate broadcasts constitute new, separate publications.29 More explicitly, the 
Restatement of Torts states: 
    [I]f the same defamatory statement is published in the morning and evening editions 
of a newspaper, each edition is a separate single publication and there are two causes of 
action. The same is true of a rebroadcast of the defamation over radio or television or a 
second run of a motion picture on the same evening. In these cases the publication 
reaches a new group and the repetition justifies a new cause of action.30 
 
                                                 
27 Id. § 577A.  
 
28 Id. at cmt. b.  
An exceptional rule, sometimes called the ‘single publication rule,’ is applied in cases where the same 
communication is heard at the same time by two or more persons. In order to avoid multiplicity of actions 
and undue harassment of the defendant by repeated suits by new individuals, as well as excessive 
damages that might have been recovered in numerous separate suits, the communication to the entire 
group is treated as one publication, giving rise to only one cause of action. Id. 
 
29 Id. § 577A. 
 
30 Id. at cmt. d. 
 
 9
The intent of the publisher to reach a new and separate audience may be used to determine 
whether the publication will be considered a distinct publication under the single publication 
rule.31  
    This brief examination of some of the effects of the printing press on defamation law 
suggests the potential influence of the development of other mass communication 
technologies, including the telegraph, radio, television, and Internet. The common theme 
among the changes wrought by the printing press is that the ability to disseminate more 
information to a wider audience over a greater period of time increases the potential harm to 
reputation caused by defamation. Three areas of defamation, in particular, that have adapted 
in response to improved communications technologies are the libel/slander distinction, the 
single publication rule, and liability. 
    In this thesis, the discussion of the libel/slander distinction focuses on cases in which 
courts decided which form of defamation—oral or written—should apply to each of the 
technologies addressed in this research. Second, for each technology, cases are examined in 
which courts addressed whether and how to apply the single publication rule. Finally, the 
liability analysis focuses on who can be held legally accountable for publication of a 
defamation, especially the question of who is a publisher, republisher, or distributor of 
defamatory content. 
    The next section of this chapter provides a brief overview of the development of the 
telegraph, radio, television, and the Internet. It then discusses previous research that has 
addressed the libel/slander distinction, single publication, and liability relevant to Internet 
defamation, incorporating authors’ attempts to analogize to other mass communications 
                                                 
31 Id. 
 
 10
technologies. The review of literature illustrates the opportunity for this thesis to both add to 
and synthesize previous research through examining historical trends in the courts’ responses 
to new mass communications technologies, leading to an analysis of the extent to which the 
courts’ current approach to regulating Internet defamation fits a historical pattern. 
 
 
Part III: New Mass Communications Technologies: Same Product, Different Package? 
    This section examines the scholarly literature that has addressed defamation law and the 
Internet, highlighting both what authors have written about online publication and liability 
issues and their attempts to analogize to other technologies. To contextualize the relevant 
literature on libel and the Internet, this section starts with a brief look at the development of 
the telegraph, radio, television, and Internet, leading into a discussion of various positions 
authors have taken in response to the Internet as a new technology. The section concludes by 
summarizing previous literature, leading to a justification for the research undertaken for this 
thesis. 
    While defamation law for the printed word, such as books, magazines, and newspapers, 
has had more than five centuries to develop, the electric dissemination of information is a 
phenomenon dating back a little more than a century to the mid- to late-1800s. The 
technology behind the telegraph took more than a decade to develop and refine, but by 1850 
it had become an accepted mode of communication.32 The telegraph ultimately 
revolutionized the news industry with its ability to send messages quickly and across long 
                                                 
32 LT.-COL. CHETWODE CRAWLEY, FROM TELEGRAPHY TO TELEVISION: THE STORY OF ELECTRICAL 
COMMUNICATIONS 47 (1931). 
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distances.33 One author noted the role the telegraph once played in news gathering: “The 
telegraph companies were, in the beginning, news agencies. Operator-managers were 
expected to ascertain facts when requested, and even to gather and send out news of events in 
their own towns important enough to interest the rest of the country.”34  
    As telegraph technology developed and became wireless, transmitting sounds through 
airwaves instead of wires, the path opened for the radio to arrive on the scene in the early 
1920s. Like the wireless telegraph, the radio relied on transmitting sounds through 
airwaves.35 Another development in telegraph technology—the ability to transmit pictures 
via telegraph36—soon combined with sound technologies to produce the television by 
1930.37 
    Several decades passed before the Internet arrived on the scene. The Internet initially w
a military initiative called ARPANET, meant to facilitate military communications.
as 
ough 
38 In 
1970, the first electronic message was sent from one machine to another, a development that 
eventually led to the Internet as we know it today.39 As interest in the Internet grew thr
the early 1980s, the military decided to split ARPANET into a military network and a 
                                                 
33 See ALVIN F. HARLOW, HISTORY OF BROADCASTING: RADIO TO TELEVISION: OLD WIRES AND NEW WAVES 
terling ed., 1971) (1936). 
 JOHN NAUGHTON, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FUTURE: FROM RADIO DAYS TO INTERNET YEARS IN A LIFETIME 
0. 
(Christopher S
 
34 Id. at 175. 
 
35 Id. at 475-76. 
 
36 CRAWLEY, supra note 32, at 171. 
 
37
178 (2000). 
 
38 Id. at 116. 
 
39 Id. at 147-5
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civilian Internet network.40 The World Wide Web went public in 1991, and by 1993, the 
Web became the dominant use of the Internet over e-mail, which had previously been the 
 
red 
eings 
se 
e current approach to 
t. In a 
                                                
primary function of the Internet.41 
      Much of the scholarship reacting to the Internet suggests a sense of awe at the 
possibilities presented by this new medium, although authors vary in their assessment of 
whether the Internet surpasses or equals previous technological developments. Legal scholar
Russell L. Weaver falls into the former category, arguing that “[d]espite the significance of 
broadcast communication, it pales in comparison to the technological explosion that occur
at the end of the twentieth century.”42 In a book detailing the history of the Internet, John 
Naughton argues the latter: “The Internet is one of the most remarkable things human b
have ever made. In terms of its impact on society, it ranks with print, the railways, the 
telegraph, the automobile, electric power, and television.”43 Other authors heralded the ea
of access to the Internet as an opportunity to “enable us to behave as if free exchange of 
information really does exist.”44 As previously discussed, however, th
the application of defamation law to the Internet has raised concerns. 
    A heated debate has arisen over the best way to apply defamation law to the Interne
1995 article, legal scholar Lawrence Lessig urged patience, expressing his belief that 
 
 Russell L. Weaver, Speech and Technology, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 703, 703 (2006). Weaver also discussed 
 cell phone and satellite technologies. 
 
40 Id. at 167. 
 
41 Id. at 150. 
 
24
the development and improvement of
 
43 NAUGHTON, supra note 37, at 21. 
 
44 Holman & McGregor, supra note 14, at 288. 
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common law would be the best approach to regulating the Internet.45 Because the Internet 
was such a new and unknown technology, it needed “a way to pace any process of 
regulation—a way to let the experience catch up with the technology, a way to give
ordinary language a chance to evolve, and a way to encourage new languages where the old
gives out.”
 the 
 
In 
n 
e of 
 
ow 
tered by excessive regulation: “The Internet and other interactive 
                                                
46 Rather than immediate statutory regulation, Lessig argued that “what 
recommends the common law to cyberspace is not its efficiency, but its inefficiency.”47  
other words, it could be better to allow the law to evolve naturally through a series of cases i
different courts to arrive at a common law, rather than simply imposing a statutory law. 
    As it was, common law had very little opportunity to develop before the 1996 passag
the Communications Decency Act, passed as part of the Telecommunications Act.48 Instead
of allowing common law to accumulate to suggest a direction for regulation, Congress 
adopted a model intended to foster speech on the Internet while limiting the distribution of 
objectionable or inappropriate materials.49 In the Act, Congress declared its intent to all
the Internet to develop unfet
computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of 
government regulation.”50  
 
rence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1744 (1995). 
133-43 (1996) (codified in 
attered sections of 47 U.S.C.). The CDA comprised Title V (501-509) of the Telecommunications Act of 
 the CDA in response to courts having applied common-law principles to Internet Service 
 the first online defamation cases. These cases will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
45 Law
 
46 Id. 
 
47 Id. at 1745. 
 
48 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 56, 
sc
1996. Id. A more in-depth analysis of this legislation will occur in Chapter 4. 
 
49 Congress enacted
Providers in some of
 
50 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
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23 vice and user liability. The section states:  
lisher or speaker. No provider or user of an interactive computer 
   
          (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of 
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material 
 
a 
 
is has meant that content that is re-posted by a service 
f clear 
ive interpretations of who is 
                                                
 The portions of the CDA relating to indecency were struck down in 1997,51 but section 
0 still governs interactive computer ser
    (1) Treatment of pub
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider. 
    (2) Civil liability. No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held 
liable on account of-- 
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
is constitutionally protected.52 
The term “interactive computer service” is defined as “any information service, system, or 
access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to 
computer server.”53 An “information content provider” is defined as “any person or entity
that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information 
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”54 Therefore, no 
provider or user can be treated as a publisher of information provided by an information 
content provider. For the Internet, th
provider or a user from some third-party content provider is immune from liability, even if 
the content is false and defamatory. 
    In spite of the provision’s good intentions to encourage filtering of inappropriate content 
on the Internet, instead the focus has largely been on the provision’s exemption of both users 
and interactive computer services from liability, even for defamatory content. Lack o
definition of terms such as “user,” combined with courts’ expans
 
51 Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). 
 Id. § 230(f)(2). 
 Id. §  230(f)(3). 
 
52
 
53
 
54
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immune under section 230,55 has led authors to criticize the CDA for failing to hold 
publishers or distributors of defamatory content accountable.56   
    While the application of section 230 has drawn a great deal of attention in the legal and 
academic communities, as will be discussed below, publication is an area that has received 
relatively limited attention from scholars.57 The libel/slander distinction has not drawn any 
discussion, likely because the distinction between the two has eroded. As the Restatement of 
Torts notes, “In modern times, with the discovery of new methods of communication, m
courts have condemned the distinction as harsh and unjust.”
any 
re 
he 
di
 
formation is 
m  
ap
n 
t—multiplicity of actions, undue harassment of defendants, possible 
excess recoveries of plaintiffs through multiple suits, unnecessary depletion of judicial 
                                              
58 In spite of the lack of literatu
addressing the libel/slander distinction as applied to the Internet, the very fact that t
stinction has eroded in the last century bears investigation, particularly to determine the 
impact of new technologies, including broadcast, on the erosion of the distinction. 
Whether and when to apply the single publication rule to the publication of defamatory
content via the Internet has produced some debate. The application of the single publication 
rule to the Internet focuses on the initial publication so that only when the in
odified would it be considered a separate publication.59 One author noted the logic behind
plying the single publication rule to defamatory postings on the Internet: 
    Publications on general access sites pose the very problems that the single publicatio
rule seeks to preven
   
 See generally Andrea L Julian, Freedom of Libel: How an Expansive Interpretation of § 230 Affects the 
 Wood, supra note 13, at 896 (noting that personal jurisdiction and third-party liability have dominated cyber-
 § 568 cmt b (1977).  
55 See Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 
56
Defamation Victim in the Ninth Circuit, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 509 (2004). 
 
57
law literature.) 
 
58 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
 
59  Wood, supra note 13, at 895. 
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resources, and unnecessary exposure of the court system to stale claims in which the 
loss of memory.60
evidence may have been lost, and witnesses may have died, disappeared, or suffered a 
 
 
n 
a publisher has sustained maximum 
 
e 
                                                
Generally, though, authors have disagreed with courts’ applications of the single publicatio
rule to the Internet. 
     Those who disagree typically focus on the perceived impact of online defamation. One 
student author argued: “The Internet is more like a television, radio, or motion picture 
exhibition, which gives material a renewed impact each time it is broadcast, or each time the 
defamatory material is accessed. This repeat impact justifies its exclusion from the single 
publication rule.”61 The author further contended that each time a defamatory 
communication is accessed on the Internet, it reaches a new audience, “making a new 
opportunity for injury, and should warrant a new cause of action.”62 Information can be 
removed quickly and easily from a Web page, but, “[i]f 
liability when he first publishes, he has no motivation to limit the harm.”63 Therefore, the
author concluded, the single publication rule should not apply to the Internet. 
    Another author focused on the potential harms suffered by the victims of defamatory 
postings on the Internet, which she argued were heightened by applying the single 
publication rule: “[I]n implementing this rule, courts have skewed the single publication rul
to favor publishers by broadly defining when publication on the Web occurs and narrowing 
 
.P. Putnam’s Sons, 81 N.E.2d 48 (N.Y. 1948)).  
a note 13, at 331. 
60 Id. at 913 (citing Gregoire v. G
 
61 Braun, supr
 
62 Id. at 332. 
 
63 Id. at 333. 
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the circumstances when republication can be found. As a result, courts have unnecessarily 
diminished the opportunity for libel victims to be compensated.”64  
    Another major issue concerning the application of defamation to the Internet is who can be 
held liable for defamatory content, which remained a question in the literature even after the
passage of the Communications Decency Act. In 1997 Douglas Luftman wrote, “Just as th
pioneers of previously emerging media—like the telephone, broadcast television, and cab
television—confronted fundamental First Amendment and defamation issues that have c
to define their very nature, commercial on-line services also face similar issues of editoria
control and defamation liability.”
 
e 
le 
ome 
l 
 becoming 
f 
ers, 
arge 
transmitted defamatory messages, eventually settling on what is essentially a distributor 
                                              
65 In particular, Luftman was concerned with where the 
boundary would be drawn between ISPs exercising editorial control and ISPs
publishers. Luftman ultimately argued that, “as long as on-line services do not have the 
technical capability to exert comprehensive editorial control over a continuous stream o
electronic messages,”66 on-line services should be treated as distributors and not publish
liable only when they have knowledge that a communication is defamatory. 
    Our current perception of the nature of Internet technology—rapid dissemination of a l
number of messages that makes it difficult, if not impossible, to monitor the content of 
each—resembles our view of the telegraph in its earlier years.67 The courts struggled to 
determine what standard of defamation liability should apply to telegraph operators who 
   
a note 13, at 640. 
088. 
64 Kumar, supr
 
65 Luftman, supra note 14, at 1
 
66 Id. at 1099. 
 
67 Lee, supra note 14, at 486. 
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model.68 With the development of the radio and television, an author noted that the “co
were initially distracted by the new technology” but eve
urts 
ntually focused on the speech itself.69 
telegraph, 
ers, 
 content. The 
hich 
 A 
n 
 laws as traditional print media for third-party 
   
Another author drew a similar conclusion, noting, “The courts had difficulty fitting 
radio, and television into the traditional defamation framework because their technical 
workings initially confounded the legal community.”70 
    Discussions of whether to apply publisher, republisher, or distributor liability to 
transmitters of defamatory messages, like newspaper editors and broadcast station produc
typically focus on people whose jobs include the responsibility of monitoring
Internet, however, may provide a unique challenge, as some authors have suggested, in that 
the users or consumers of the medium are also the transmitters, editors, and producers of 
Internet content and, therefore, not liable for third-party defamatory content. 
    One area of Internet defamation that has attracted particular attention is the extent to w
bloggers, as Internet users, should be held liable as publishers, republishers, or distributors.
key question in this debate is who is included in the definition of a “provider or user of a
interactive computer service.”71 One author argued that bloggers, as users of interactive 
computer services and, therefore, potentially immune from liability for posting third-party 
defamation under section 230, should not be exempt from liability. “Because blogs are 
growing in number and resemble traditional print media more and more every day, bloggers 
should have to adhere to the same defamation
                                              
68 The liability for telegraph companies will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
 
at 1465. 
69 Lee, supra note 14, at 487. 
 
70 Troiano, supra note 12, 
 
71 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
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po vid 
Hu the medium of the communication 
 like telephone users. Just like some telephone 
users are journalists and some are not, the same thing with bloggers. The medium 
performing. . . . There should be a functional analysis in addition to or instead of the 
 
 on 
ting 
 
lance between protection of reputation and protection 
                                              
stings.”72 Writing generally about First Amendment rights for bloggers, author Da
dson proposed that the function of the blogger and not 
should determine how the law should apply: 
       Bloggers is a vague, amorphous term
doesn’t answer the question. It has more to do with the function that the person is 
current analysis of what medium you are writing in.73  
Similarly, another author wrote that the application of defamation law should not “turn
the technology involved.”74 
    Those who argue that there should be greater liability for those who post third-party 
defamation tend to resort to arguments that Congress did not intend for the CDA to be 
interpreted to absolve ISPs or users of liability so completely. Lawyer James P. Jenal 
contended, “As the Conference Committee made clear in their report, the purpose of gran
immunity was to protect from liability those who had taken affirmative steps to restrict 
access to objectionable material—not to shelter those who deliberately disseminated it.”75
One author suggested that the courts have greatly misconstrued congressional intent, writing 
that “the courts have  expanded § 230 beyond what was intended by Congress, ignoring 
traditional libel law and tipping the ba
   
 L. Del Medico, Comment, Are Talebearers Really as Bad as Talemakers?: Rethinking Republisher 
iability in an Information Age, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1409, 1412 (2004). 
72 Troiano, supra  note 12, at 1463. 
 
73 Hudson, supra note 1, at 131. 
 
74 Jennifer
L
 
75 Jenal, supra note 13, at 469 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996)). 
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of speech even further in the direction of the latter.”76 In spite of the critics of the courts’ 
interpretations of the CDA, some see the freedom from liability as a benefit provided by the 
courts, which “have created a breathing space for mass information providers, free of this 
specter of unlimited tort liability.”77   
    Another criticism of ISP and user immunity for posting third-party defamatory content is 
that the immunity, combined with the ease of posting anonymous defamatory speech on the 
Internet, may foster defamatory speech on the Internet. Author Emily Fritts painted a bleak 
picture of the potential harms that could be caused by the ease of posting anonymous Internet 
ay 
tory 
 
utors, and those who had an active role in generating and 
                                                
defamation: “Empowered by the Internet, an anonymous speaker of defamatory material m
hide behind his screen name, pay little if any cost, and freely disseminate information to the 
masses.”78 Because it is so easy to post on the Internet, Fritts argued, greater potential exists 
for people to publish without thought for consequences.79  
    A theme in literature addressing liability for Internet defamation reflects the desire for 
there to be consequences for those who knowingly post or allow to remain posted defama
content. Author Andrea Julian pointed out discrepancies in the consequences resulting from
online defamation versus print defamation: “By providing immunity for such traditionally 
liable actors as publishers, distrib
disseminating the content, a defamation defendant may be liable in the brick and mortar 
 
 
5 
(2005).   
 Joel Rothstein Wolfson, Electronic Mass Information Providers and Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) 
asts a Long Shadow, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 67, 69 (1997). 
ra note 8, at 506. 
76 Emily K. Fritts, Note, Internet Libel and the Communications Decency Act: How the Courts Erroneously
Interpreted Congressional Intent with Regard to Liability of Internet Service Providers, 93 KY. L.J. 765, 77
 
77
of Torts: The First Amendment C
 
78 Fritts, supra note 76, at 784. 
 
79 Hadley, sup
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world while completely escaping liability in cyberspace.”80 Julian concluded that ISPs and
Web page operators should be treated as distributors and held liable after receiving notice of 
allegedly defamatory content.
 
nline and print defamation reflects, in addition to attempts to 
r all 
co  
revious section, developed in reaction to the printing press. Phillip Miller referred to the 
comparison as the “fundamental First Amendment struggle that has shaped the development 
of other ‘emerging’ media—including telephone, radio, broadcast television, and, more 
recently, cable television.”  
        More specifically, at some point in their development, most of these media have 
publishers—the fullest freedom from regulation afforded by the First Amendment’s 
 
or 
efamation via the Internet, Julian’s article contended, has surpassed the freedoms 
    ine 
to ioned the extent to which it is 
possible to analogize the Internet to other technologies. Author Keith Siver argued that it is 
                                                
81 
    As Julian’s comparison of o
analogize new technologies to one another, whether implicit or explicit, the standard fo
mparisons is that of the print model of defamation law, which was, as discussed in the
p
82
sought to secure the sort of “full” First Amendment protection that is afforded to print 
proscriptions against government restrictions on free speech and freedom of the press.83 
Miller suggested that different media have had varying degrees of success in claiming the 
same level of First Amendment protection as print media. The immunity from liability f
third-party d
granted to print media. 
In addition to debates over the application of traditional publication and liability doctr
 the realm of Internet defamation, scholars have also quest
 
80 Julian, supra note 55, at 530. 
 
er, supra note 14, at 1147. 
81 Id. at 534. 
 
82 Mill
 
83 Id.  
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impossible to draw a direct analogy between the Internet and any other communication 
medium: 
        Since the advent of the telegraph, courts and legislators have tended to treat each new 
communications technology like the existing technology that it most closely resembles. 
 
ne student author did not argue that direct analogies may be drawn between new mass 
communications technologies but, instead, suggested that there are great similarities between 
different technologies in their developmental phases: 
        Although every new medium presents new challenges for society and the law, closer 
 
and unique in its infancy soon reveals, during adolescence, some of the same pimples 
 
thors are right in their assertions—the telegraph, radio, television, 
ogress in 
r 
In the case of online service providers, initial attempts at regulating by analogy have 
been especially problematic, perhaps because it is not immediately clear which 
communications technology is most closely analogous.84 
O
inspection uncovers a rather unflattering truth: a medium that appears completely fresh
and warts that have plagued other young media in the past.85 
It seems likely that both au
and Internet each reflected new technological developments that distinguished each from the 
technologies that came before it. However, even dating back to the printing press, pr
the ability to disseminate more messages to a wider audience with a greater potential for 
those messages to linger has forced the courts to grapple with how to apply existing libel law 
to each new technology.  
    A review of the literature concerning the Internet and defamation law, particularly the 
single publication rule and liability, reveals two important findings. First, there is a 
substantial amount of literature critical of the current approach to applying defamation law to 
the Internet. Specifically, the trend seems to be for authors to suggest there should be highe
standards of liability—resulting in greater protection for victims—in cases involving 
                                                 
84 Siver, supra note 14, at 4. 
 
85 Lee, supra note 14, at 469. 
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defamation on the Internet. Arguments in favor of not applying the single publication rule t
the Internet and opposed to the current court interpretations of the CDA reflect that desire for
more accountability for defamatory content on the Internet. Second, altho
o 
 
ugh several authors 
 the 
w 
 
ng 
 law in 
onse to technological developments can provide insight into our current approach to 
defamation on the Internet. ing needlessly that there 
A and the 
inning to grasp? 
cuses on how courts have approached the 
have drawn some comparisons between the Internet and other technologies, including
telegraph, radio, and television, many of these comparisons are either limited to a specific 
argument the author is making or are general references to approaching the regulation of ne
technologies. No article was found that had as its sole purpose contextualizing the courts’
current approaches to applying defamation law to the Internet through an analysis of courts’ 
previous approaches with then-new mass communications technologies. 
    Based on these findings, it is worth taking an in-depth look at how the courts have 
approached applying defamation law to then-new mass communication technologies. Bei
able to establish what trends, if any, have characterized the evolution of defamation
resp
 Are we simply repeating history, panick
is too much freedom to defame on the Internet at the expense of private individuals’ 
reputations? Or, in the light of the history of law and old technologies, do the CD
courts’ subsequent rulings seem to indicate that we have allowed too much freedom, too 
quickly, to a technology the possibilities of which we are just beg
     
Research Questions and Methodology 
    In analyzing how the development of new mass communications technologies has 
affected defamation law, this thesis fo
 24
libel/slander distinction, the single publication rule, and liability both historically, with the
telegraph, radio and television, and at present, with the Internet. 
 
nology—to the telegraph, 
 to 
 courts addressed the issue of who can be held liable for defamation 
ssues of 
n whether the technology in question 
factored into the courts’ decisions. Cases were found through searching contemporary law 
    Five specific research questions are: 
1) How have courts addressed the application of the libel/slander distinction—that is, 
how have courts decided which should apply to each tech
radio, television, and Internet? 
2) How have courts addressed whether and how to apply the single publication rule
publication via the telegraph, radio, television, and Internet? 
3) How have
transmitted via the telegraph, radio, television, and Internet, that is, the question of 
who qualifies as a publisher, republisher, or distributor? 
4) What trends have emerged in the approaches the courts have taken in applying the 
libel/slander distinction, the single publication rule, and who can held liable, as 
defined above, in defamation actions involving the telegraph, radio, television, and 
Internet? 
5) To what extent does the application of libel law to the Internet fit a historical trend of 
applying libel law to new communications technologies? 
    The methodology of this thesis is critical analysis of court opinions addressing i
the libel/slander distinction, the single publication rule, and liability in cases involving 
defamation transmitted by the telegraph, radio, television, and Internet. Federal and state 
cases are examined; they were selected based o
review articles concerning each technology and topic, which were found on Hein Online; 
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through case citations in the Second Restatement of Torts; through consulting the 
American Jurisprudence database on Westlaw; and through case searches on Westlaw
The thesis is organized into chapters reflecting the research questions, with questions fo
and five addressed in the concluding chapter. 
    There are limitations to the proposed research. First, technology is just one factor of 
many that has affected the development of libel law. This thesis does not address all 
changes or developments in libel law, simply those that via case analysis can be tied to 
technological developments. Furthermore, case law still represents just a slice of the lega
reactions to new technologies: As demonstrated in this chapter in the discussion of the 
CDA, statutes have played an important role in the courts’ applications of defamation law 
to new technologies. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to thoroughly examine both
.86 
ur 
l 
 
 
 it 
 
.  
 state 
ng a snowball method, with 
ific 
statutory and common law developments in libel that arose in reaction to technological
developments, some statutes are discussed as they arise in court opinions. Furthermore,
is hoped that court opinions can offer a rich source of information as many court opinions
cite, in addition to statutes, relevant scholarly literature and other contemporary writings
    In addition, it is beyond the scope of this project to examine every federal and
court case to determine whether technology was a factor in the ruling. In an attempt to 
choose the most representative cases, cases were selected usi
law review articles serving as the first source of relevant case law. Cases cited in those 
identified from articles were then used to find more relevant cases. The Second 
Restatement of Torts also served as a source of case law and, as indicated above, spec
search terms were used in the Westlaw electronic database. 
                                                 
86 Searches involved the name of each technology and terms related to the topic. More precise methods are 
noted in the beginning of each substantive chapter. 
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    Finally, none of the elements of defamation functions in isolation in the case law. For 
example, determining whether defamatory content is libel or slander typically is the fir
step in determining the liability of a party and, more so, the damages that need to be 
proved by the plaintiff. The single publication rule plays a major role in determining wh
the sta
st 
en 
tute of limitations runs for a publication. Liability is deeply intertwined with fault 
 
 
 
rrow view of these three issues within the much larger field of defamation 
ion as it has been addressed 
stributor. 
  Chapter V provides an analysis of the trends evident in court responses to developments 
 mass communications technologies and current approaches to applying defamation law 
to the Internet. It then discusses the extent to which application of libel law to the Internet 
for defamatory communications. Yet, in this thesis, the libel/slander distinction, the single
publication rule, and who may be held liable are separated out for the purposes of the
analysis. Thus, the cases provided for analysis here and the analysis itself comprise a
relatively na
law.  
    Chapter II of this thesis examines the libel/slander distinct
by the courts. Specifically, cases were selected for analysis in which the courts were 
required to decide whether publication via a particular technology involved libel or 
slander. 
    Chapter III examines cases in which the courts decided whether the single publication 
rule should apply to a particular technology and, if so, how. 
    Chapter IV examines liability as it has been addressed by the courts. Specifically, cases 
were examined to determine who may be held liable for defamation via a particular 
technology either as a publisher, republisher, or di
  
in
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fits a historical pattern. The implications of the findings for future technologies are 
iscussed, as are possibilities for future research. 
 
d
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CHAPTER II 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES: BLURRING THE LINE BETWEEN LIBEL AND SLANDER 
 
    The libel/slander distinction, as discussed previously, is one area of defamation law that 
was affected by the earliest innovation in mass communications technologies—the prin
press. The increased prevalence of the printed word led the courts to distinguish between 
spoken defamation, or slander, and written defamation, or libel. Slander, as a less permanent 
form of publication, is seen as a lesser tort than libel, which has a greater ability to linger and 
reach a wider audience.
 
ting 
etween the two, most notably pointing out the somewhat arbitrary nature of the 
defamation, slander and libel. Oral defamation is tortious if the words spoken fall within 
 
damages. Written defamation is actionable per se. For two centuries and a half the 
ere 
form. Yet no respectable authority has ever attempted to justify the distinction on 
ry of new methods of communication, 
many courts have condemned the distinction as harsh and unjust.2 
 
A ch 
pr
                                                
1 The Restatement of Torts provides some additional insight into the 
difference b
distinction, particularly in modern times. 
    It is impossible to define and difficult to describe with precision the two forms of 
a limited class of cases in which the words are actionable per se, or if they cause special
common law has treated the tort of defamation in two different ways on a basis of m
principle; and in modern times, with the discove
key point raised by this section of the Restatement is the element of damages, whi
oved to be an issue in several cases included in this analysis.  
 
1 See Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 546, 547 
ENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 cmt. b (1977). 
(1903). 
 
2 RESTATEM
 
    
laintiff in certain defamation actions—namely, cases involving libel and slander per se. The 
Restatement lists four categories of slander that are actionable without proof of special 
damages on behalf of the plaintiff: speech that “imputes to the other (a) a criminal offense, 
(b) a loathsome disease, (c) matter incompatible with his business, trade profession, or office, 
or (d) serious sexual misconduct.”  The Restatement states, “One who is liable for either a 
slander actionable per se or a libel is also liable for any special harm legally caused by the 
defamatory publication.”  The difference between a defamatory communication being 
considered slander versus slander per se or libel could be crucial, as a plaintiff needed to 
prove special damages in a slander case but damages are presumed in the latter categories of 
defamation. As will be revealed in the case analysis, some courts took the burden of proving 
special damages into consideration when deciding whether to classify the defamation as libel 
or slander. 
    The development of new mass communications technologies certainly complicated the 
issue. The telegraph, radio, and television all used sound technologies to transmit messages, 
but did that mean that defamation transmitted via those technologies should be treated as 
slander? One author, writing in 1956, noted the difficulty courts faced in applying the 
distinction based on the oral nature of the speech: 
    The original distinction between libel and slander was usually easy to apply. . . . But 
as new methods of communication were developed, the distinction, as well as its 
tatements may be as 
tentially harmful as the most widely distributed writings since they can be 
 Under traditional common-law defamation principles, damages were presumed for a
p
3
4
purported logical bases, became difficult to maintain. Today, oral s
po
                                                 
3 Id. § 570. 
 
4 Id. § 622. 
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communicated to equally large audiences and can be put in permanent form as, for 
5
 
example, on phonograph records.  
The same author called upon the courts to do away with the distinction, arguing, “Judges 
need not sit back and await the legislative fiat abolishing the distinction between the two 
forms. Despite the usual cries of ‘judicial legislation,’ the judiciary should reappraise the 
existing rules in the light of the new methods of mass communication.”  Several years later, 
another author suggested the inevitability that the doctrine would need to adapt, noting that 
“the classic distinction between libel and slander is being shunted into legal oblivion by the 
conceptual challenge of radio and television.”  For those technologies, courts gained some 
guidance in 1977 when the Second Restatement of Torts noted, “Broadcasting of defamatory 
matter by means of radio or television is libel, whether or not it is read from a manuscript.”8 
    How did the courts react? The purpose of this chapter is to examine how, in cases 
involving each of those technologies and the Internet—which has the ability to transmit 
audio and visual content—courts have addressed the question of whether defamation 
transmitted via the telegraph, radio, television, and Internet should be treated as slander or as 
libel. The distinction between libel and slander has not played a prominent role in Internet 
cases, as will be discussed later in this chapter. In spite of that, an examination of how courts 
have applied a traditional defamation principle—distinguishing between libel and slander—
                                                
6
7
 
5 E.E.M. Television Defamation—Libel or Slander? 42 VA. L. REV. 64, 74 (1956). 
 
3, 73 (1967) (“Perhaps a more appropriate title for this article would be: ‘Enter the Defamacast,’ Exit the 
 legal 
6 Id.  
 
7 Albert E. Harum, Broadcast Defamation: A Reformation of the Common Law Concepts, 21 FED. COMM. B. J. 
7
Libel-Slander Distinctions,’ because the classic distinction between libel and slander is being shunted into
oblivion by the conceptual challenge of radio and television.”) 
 
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568A (1977). 
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may offer insight into courts’ current approaches to applying other areas of defamation law t
the Internet. 
     This section of the
o 
 analysis focuses on state and federal court cases9 that addressed 
wh ogy 
in
tel d 
the court to determine whether the defamation in question constituted libel or slander. The 
cases are arranged chronologically within each technology to track developments in the 
application of defamation law to new mass communications technologies. As the analysis 
reveals, courts have varied in their approaches to applying libel or slander to defamation 
transmitted via new technologies. 
 
Telegraph 
    The only telegraph case located by this study that explicitly addressed whether defamation 
transmitted via telegraph constituted libel or slander was decided by the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota in 1898. In an earlier decision in Peterson v. Western Union Telegraph Co. in 
1896, the state supreme court had held that the transmission of an allegedly defamatory 
message by a telegraph operator in New Ulm to another telegraph operator in St. Paul 
constituted publication; furthermore, the court held that the message in question was 
       
ether an alleged defamation should be considered libel or slander based on the technol
 question.10 Most of the discussion focuses on broadcast defamation—via radio or 
evision—although one telegraph case and one Internet case each were found that require
                                          
ommon-law principles can vary from state to state, and federal courts typically apply the applicable state 
oping common-law principles, 
cluding those that address the application of traditional defamation law to new communications technologies.  
 Cases were found through examining cases cited in contemporary law review articles; the Restatement 
d) of Torts, particularly § 568A on broadcast defamation; the American Jurisprudence Database, 
articularly 50 Am. Jur. 2d § 10; and through Westlaw searches using the Terms and Connectors feature 
9 C
law. This suggests the integral role that state courts have played in devel
in
 
10
(Secon
p
including slander, defamation, radio, television, broadcast, and Internet. 
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libelous.11 In the 1898 appeal, Western Union attempted to claim that, because the message 
was transmitted via sounds over the telegraph wires, the alleged defamation should be 
onsidered slander.  
    The fact affirmatively appears on the second trial that the message was transmitted 
over the wires by sound, and the point is now made that the mode of communication 
alleged materiality of the point lies in the facts that, as defendant claims, the words 
corporation cannot be liable for slander.  
The court was not swayed by the defendant’s argument, contending that, regardless of 
whether the message was transmitted by “sounds representing letters, or dots or dashes 
representing the same thing,”  the purpose and the result were the same: A written message 
was transmitted by one telegraph operator to another to reproduce that written message, 
“which he could read and understand as effectually as if the original had been placed in his 
po
    communication sent via the telegraph would 
in 
 
amation transmitted via the telegraph to be libel. While the court, with relative 
he 
c
was oral, and not written, and therefore there was no publication of a libel . . . . The 
complained of were not actionable in themselves unless published in writing, and that a 
12
 
13
ssession.”14  
 In Peterson, the court ruled that a defamatory
be considered libel and not slander.15 Therefore, while an aspect of the technology of the 
telegraph—transmitting messages via sounds—became an issue for the court to consider 
this case, the court focused on the format of the message itself, rather than the technology, in
finding def
ease, dismissed the claim that telegraph transmissions were slander because, in essence, t
                                                 
11 67 N.W. 646 (Minn. 1896). 
o., 74 N.W. 1022, 1022 (Minn. 1898). 
 
12 Peterson v. W. Union Tel. C
 
13 Id. 
 
14 Id. 
 
15 The court’s determination of liability in this case will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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message consisted of written words,  the technology of the radio transmitted oral, rather than
written, messages to an audience. 
 
Radio 
  The Supreme Court of Nebraska decided one of the first cases that considered whether radio 
defamation would be considered libel or slander. Sorenson v. Wood arose from an alleged 
defamation via radio that smeared the reputation of a political candidate.
 
llegedly defamatory 
t: 
before God and man that he would uphold the law justly and honestly. His promises to 
irreligious libertine, a mad man and a fool.  
A representative of KFAB Radio Broadcasting “introduced and vouched for Wood, was 
present and heard him read the article,”  which included several other allegations about 
Sorenson’s character and fitness for office. Sorenson filed an action against both Wood and 
KFAB.   
    In Sorenson, the court considered whether a defamatory statement that was originally 
written but read aloud for transmission over the radio constituted libel or slander. Justice 
                               
16 The evening 
before the Nebraska primary election in 1930, Richard F. Wood made a
statements about C. A. Sorenson, a candidate for reelection as state attorney general, that 
were broadcast via radio by KFAB Broadcasting Company in Lincoln. Wood read from an 
article that he had written prior to the broadcast, which included the following statemen
    In his (the plaintiff’s) acceptance of the attorney general’s office he took an oath 
man are for naught and his oath to God is sacrilege, for he is a nonbeliever, an 
17
 
18
19
                  
 243 N.W. 82 (Neb. 1932). 
 Id. at 83. 
 Id. 
19 Id. 
 
16
 
17
 
18
 
The trial had awarded Sorenson one dollar in damages from Wood and found in favor of KFAB. 
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Goss, writing for the court, emphasized the fact that Wood read from a written docum
publishing the defamatory statements and used that circumstance to support the court’s 
holding that the publication was a libel, not a slander. “We think there is nothing 
fundamentally new in the applicable law. . . . There can be and is little dispute that the 
written words charged and published constitute libel rather than slander.”
ent in 
 
d off confiscated home brewing equipment during Prohibition, 
its 
f, 
   
20  Comparing radio
publication to newspaper publication, Gross contended, “There is no legal reason why one 
should be favored over another nor why a broadcasting station should be granted special 
favors as against one who may be a victim of a libelous publication.”21 
    In a 1933 case, Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., which involved allegations broadcast over the 
radio that a sheriff auctione
the supreme court of Washington assumed the broadcast in question was slander, even 
though it was read from a script. 22 William Castner, who ran a local newspaper titled Public 
Opinion dedicated to anti-Prohibition causes, purchased air time from the radio station KHQ, 
run by Louis Wasmer, Inc., to advertise his publication. Castner submitted a typewritten 
script to the station’s announcer, Charles Lantry, with the understanding that Lantry could 
edit or alter the script as he chose before reading the script on the air. Lantry made some ed
and broadcast the script, which included allegations that G. G. Miles, the Spokane sherif
“recently auctioned off its stock of confiscated stills, home brewing equipment and 
moonshiners accessories to the highest bidders.”23  
                                              
Id. at 85. 20 
t 86.  
e! Arresting some moonshiner and confiscating his outfit then turn around and sell it to 
someone else at a great discount so they can start up cheap. Seems like a queer proposition but perhaps 
 
21 Id. a
 
22 20 P.2d 847 (Wash. 1933). 
 
23 Id. at 848. The broadcast continued: 
What a spectacl
 35
    In addressing the libel/slander distinction, the court simply assumed the allegedly 
defamatory broadcast was slander. Justice Main wrote for the court that, while there was 
of 
 
ly 
 words, 
imply 
 due 
 accused plaintiff Robert Coffey of being an ex-convict who had served 
time in prison.26 While discussing the liability of the broadcast station for the defamatory 
transmission, the court compared radio stations to newspapers. Judge Otis wrote for the 
 latter prints the libel on paper and broadcasts it to the reading world. The owner 
 radio station ‘prints’ the libel on a different medium just as widely or even more 
              
discussion in the briefs over whether the broadcast constituted libel or slander, the court 
would not decide that issue: “[I]n so far as this case this case is concerned, it is immaterial. 
We shall assume that the words spoken, if they are actionable, must come within the rule 
slander.”24 Finding that the allegations were untrue, the broadcast was held to be slanderous
per se. This case marked a departure from Sorenson: While both cases involved alleged
defamatory material read from scripts and broadcast over the radio, the Sorenson court held 
that the defamation was libel, whereas the Miles court simply assumed that, as spoken
the broadcast was slander. 
    In a 1934 case involving defamation via radio, Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting,25 a 
Missouri federal district court did not directly address the libel/slander distinction but s
treated the defamation as libel. In this case, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4
to its focus on the station’s liability, KMBC radio station in Kansas City, Mo., broadcast a 
statement that falsely
court, “The
of the
                                                                                                                                         
 
 Id. 
 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1934). 
 Id. at 889. “The substance of the defamation was that the plaintiff was an ex-convict who had served time in 
nitentiary.” Id. 
the county needs the money. . . . But if the government sees no harm in collecting income taxes from 
bootleggers the sheriff can scarcely be blamed for selling moonshine still equipment. Id. 
24
 
25
 
26
the pe
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widely ‘read.’”27 To the court, whether the defamation was scripted ahead of time or
from extemporaneous speech, the defamation still constituted libel.
 resulted 
 
he 
th the resultant widespread dissemination of the libelous article.”30  
nsider 
 
e radio broadcast 
wa
28 
   The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ducked the question in Weglein v. Golder in 1936.29 In 
Weglein, there were two instances of publication—one in which a transcript of an allegedly
defamatory speech concerning a political candidate was delivered to newspapers and t
second in which the transcript was read over the air. The court held that, in spite of the fact 
that the newspapers never published the speech, “this delivery of it to the papers was a 
technical publication of the alleged libel. In addition, the speech was read by the defendant 
over the radio, wi
    The supreme court said that the lower court had not erred in instructing the jury to co
only the libel claim and denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial. The supreme court
noted that the defendant, the appellant, suffered no harm as a result of the trial judge’s 
instruction because the change to the filing “eliminated one possible ground of recovery 
against him.”31 Thus, the state high court was not required to decide if th
s libel or slander. 
                                                 
27 Id. at 890. 
28 Id.  
the station] and that nothing in it is questionable; I assume a sudden utterance by him of defamatory 
words not included in the manuscript, an utterance so quickly made as to render impossible its preventi
 
In my thought . . . I assume even that [the publisher of the defamation] has submitted a manuscript [to 
on; 
I assume, in short, a complete absence of the slightest negligence on the part of the owner of the station. 
Pa. 1935) (per curiam). 
Id. 
 
29 177 A. 47 (
 
30 Id. at 48. 
 
31 Id. 
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    The Supreme Court of New York County in 1937 considered whether an alleged 
defamation via radio constituted libel or slander in Locke v. Gibbons.32 Reporter Charles 
Locke prepared a script for a radio broadcast by station WLW concerning recent flooding in 
 
at 
m as 
 of whether radio broadcast of a 
de
pr e 
in
ecause it involved ad lib speech rather than speech read from a script.  
    Since the words complained in this action were not contained in the script, it is not 
Sorenson case . . . the defamatory matter is read from a prepared manuscript. . . . The 
at all, must be considered as slander.  
Justice Pecora, therefore, emphasized the extemporaneous nature of the speech over its 
potential effects in determining that it was a slander. While Locke ultimately was unable to 
cify the exact defamatory phrases or words and failing to prove 
                                              
the Ohio Valley. Locke alleged that Floyd Gibbons, during the course of broadcasting the
story, added his own statements that Locke alleged were “for the purpose of creating 
melodramatic situations and falsely indicating that sensational happenings were occurring 
and around the actual scene of the broadcasts.”33 Locke further charged that the statements 
resulted in damage to his reputation as an accurate news reporter and loss of work for hi
a radio reporter. 
    The court’s opinion focused largely on the question
famation should be considered libel or slander. Referring to both the “relatively novel 
oposition” of determining whether libel or slander should apply and “the comparativ
fancy of the radio industry,”34 Justice Pecora differentiated this case from Sorenson 
b
necessary to decide whether a different ruling would follow in a case where, as in the 
extemporaneous interpolations by the defendant in this case, if actionable as defamation 
35
 
prevail for failing to spe
   
 Id. at 189. 
32 299 N.Y.S. 188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937), aff’d mem., 2 N.Y.S. 2d 1015 (App. Div. 1938). 
 
33
 
34 Id. at 190. 
 
35 Id. at 193. 
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special damages, a necessary component in a slander case, this case treated defamation
transmitted via radio differently based on whether the speech was read from a written sc
or whether the speech was extemporaneous. 
    A case decided by the Oregon Supreme Court in 1938, Irwin v. Ashurst, involved the 
placement of microphones in a courtroom during a murder trial that were used to broadcast 
the proceedings.
 
ript 
 
ile the court never resolved the libel/slander 
qu
re
rites a speech of a defamatory nature and, after committing 
e same to memory, speaks over the air without referring to his manuscript. Would 
matter over the air ordinarily does not know whether or not the speaker is reading from 
effect is concerned?  
Therefore, while the court did not offer guidance by deciding whether the broadcast should 
be treated as libel or slander, it did offer an argument critical of maintaining the distinction 
ether the content was scripted, instead focusing on the potential effects 
                                       
36 Josephine Irwin, who had testified during the proceedings, alleged that 
Judge Edward B. Ashurst and others had conspired to defame her by allowing microphones
to be present during the proceedings.37 Wh
estion,38 it questioned the soundness of the logic behind the distinction between speech 
ad from a manuscript and extemporaneous speech: 
    Assume that a person w
th
such broadcast be held slander and not libel? The person who hears the defamatory 
a manuscript. Furthermore, what difference does it make to such person, so far as the 
39
 
for radio based on wh
of the defamation. 
          
36 74 
 
37 T
co
 
38 
de . 
P.2d 1127 (Or. 1938). 
his case is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4 as the liability of the radio station for broadcasting the 
ntent was a key issue. 
74 P.2d at 1130. “In the instant case it is not necessary to a decision to determine whether the alleged 
famatory matter constitutes libel or slander. Hence, the question will be reserved.” Id
 
39 Id. at 1129. 
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    An extemporaneous remark again served as the focal point in a 1939 Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court case involving whether radio defamation should be considered libel o
slander. In Summit Hotel Company v. National Broadcasting Co.,
r 
o a 
hould 
 well 
hat it may be said to be still in a 
state of development and experimentation. It was not conceived nor dreamed of when 
aspects entirely different from those attending the publication of a libel or slander as the 
 
 between broadcast and print defamation, 
pa
tw se it 
possessed traits of both libel and slander but was different from each.   
40  the court sought 
ultimately to determine the liability of a broadcast station that had rented out its facilities t
guest broadcaster who deviated from the prepared script and uttered an allegedly defamatory 
remark about the Summit Hotel.41 In addressing whether the extemporaneous remark s
be treated as libel or slander, Justice Kephart argued that radio defamation did not fit
into traditional notions of libel or slander. 
    Radio broadcasting presents a new problem, so new t
the law of libel and slander was being formulated. Publication by radio has physical 
law understands them.42  
The court was not satisfied by comparisons drawn
rticularly those comparisons that presented radio defamation as the more harmful of the 
o.43 Instead, the court viewed radio defamation as a “distinct form of action” becau
 44
                                                 
 
41 The facts of the case will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, as the major issue in Summit was determining 
the liability of a broadcasting station that rents out its facilities. The analysis in this chapter focuses on the 
treatment of the libel/slander distinction by the court.  
40 8 A.2d 302 (Pa. 1939). 
 
42 Summit Hotel, 8 A.2d. at 310. 
 
43 Id.  
When the radio sound reaches the human ear it is the spoken words. It is urged that the radio gives to it 
a power for harm even greater than the printing press gives to the printed word, but this conclusion does 
ermanency . . . or the traditional belief in the veracity of the printed word. . . . 
Newspaper defamations possess possibilities for real harm far greater than defamations by radio, as they 
 permanent, continuing records, which, through circulation, are constantly republished. The 
radio word is quickly spoken and, generally, as quickly forgotten. Because of the differences in the power 
he stations from which it is sent, it may receive widely varying circulation. Id. 
[T]he pleader need not lay his cause either in slander or in libel . . . as defamation by radio possesses 
any attributes of both libel and slander, but differs from each.” Id. 
not consider the factor of p
constitute
of t
 
44 Id. “
m
 40
    In a case with few facts given, the New York Court of Appeals in Hartmann v. Winchell in
1947 determined that defama
 
tory content read from a script and broadcast via radio 
co r 
wh
significance and we hold that the defendant’s defamatory utterance was libel, not slander.”  
 
. 
form of the spoken words. . . and with no hint of the existence of a writing, there is a 
features of radio broadcasting, would, by traditional standards, constitute slander rather 
 
m 
permanence of form. Focusing on the damage rather than whether the message was scripted 
                                                                                                                                                    
nstituted libel, not slander.45 In a brief opinion, Judge Thacher wrote that it didn’t matte
ether the audience knew the material was written: “Visibility of the writing is without 
46
Judge Thacher acknowledged the debate over whether all radio defamation should be
considered libel “because of the potentially harmful and widespread effects of such 
defamation” but refused to address that broader question since the existence of a written 
script was sufficient to categorize this as a case of libel.47 
    Judge Fuld, in a concurring opinion, agreed with the outcome but not with the rationale
Fuld contended that, under traditional libel doctrine, defamation read from a script and 
broadcast via radio would be considered slander: 
    Where, as here, the contents of a defamatory writing reach a third person only in the 
publication of words, not of writing, which, considered apart from the distinctive 
than libel.48 
Fuld went on to note that the traditional distinction between libel and slander originated fro
the belief that libel caused greater damage to the plaintiff through its widespread reach and 
   
 73 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1947). 
 
45
 
46 Id. at 32. 
 
47 Id. 
 
48 Id. 
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or not, he argued, required courts to treat radio defamation as libel based on the widespread 
reach of radio broadcasts.49  
    Since the element of damage is, historically, the basis of the common-law action for 
medi
defamation, and since it is as reasonable to presume damage from the nature of the 
um employed when a slander is broadcast by radio as when published by writing, 
both logic and policy point the conclusion that defamation by radio should be actionable 
 
W
pe h the majority agreed, that the existence of a 
e 
which is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, 
t via 
 a 
                                                
per se.50 
hile all the judges agreed that the broadcast defamation in this case was libel, two 
rspectives were presented—one, with whic
written script made this a case of libel, and the other was that radio defamation should b
treated as libel, actionable per se, based on the harms caused.51 
    The libel/slander question was one of several addressed by a New Jersey trial court in 
1950 in Kelly v. Hoffman.52 In this case, 
Arthur Hoffman, managing editor of a newspaper, wrote an editorial and then broadcast i
a radio station. The editorial alleged that Lloyd Kelly, deputy to the mayor of Trenton, was 
engaged in underhanded tactics, including threats, to arrange the transfer of the police 
department’s contract for vehicles from Chevrolet to Ford dealerships, motivated by Kelly’s 
own recent purchase of a Ford.53 The court noted, “The words published were defamatory 
per se as they imputed directly and by innuendos malfeasance on the part of the plaintiff as
 
50 Id. (citations omitted). 
 
51 The majority opinion, written by Judge Thacher, was joined by five other judges; Judge Fuld was the sole 
justice signed on to the concurring opinion. 
 
 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1950). 
49 Id. at 34.  
 
52 74 A.2d 922
 
53 Id. at 923. 
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public official of the City of Trenton.”54 One question before the New Jersey Superior Court 
was whether the trial court should have instructed the jury not to consider the defamation as 
i 
 
et, beyond noting that the trial court had dismissed that defense and upholding those 
instructions to the jury, the superior court did not suggest whether the defamation should be 
treated as libel or as another “hybrid” form of defamation. Instead, as noted above, the court 
viewed the words as defamatory per se. 
    Taking a similar approach to the Hoffman court, in the 1954 case Niehoff v. Congress 
Square Hotel Co., the Supreme Court of Maine held that it was not necessary to distinguish 
between libel and slander in radio defamation, but instead was sufficient to determine 
55
on l 
be s, 
Sa d at the 
 to his business and an indictment by a grand 
                                              
slander, as the defense argued it should be treated due to its oral nature. The superior court 
noted: 
    As to the defense that the broadcast was oral and thus not libel, the court dismissed 
that defense also, charging that in this type of action the medium of publication is not 
important, that such form of action, called “radio defamation” for convenience, is Su
generis, in that it partakes of some, but not all, of the fundamentals of both of the 
common law actions of libel and slander. 
Y
whether the words were actionable.  William Niehoff, an assistant attorney general, alleged 
that Congress Square Hotel Co. libeled him through a defamatory radio broadcast aired on 
e of its radio stations, WCSH. The broadcast detailed the account of a witness in a tria
ing prosecuted by Niehoff. In the broadcast, narrated by an unidentified party, the witnes
hagian, alleged that he testified to committing a crime that he had not committe
behest of Niehoff, which resulted in injury
   
 
55 
 
54 Id. at 924. 
103 A.2d 219 (Me. 1954). 
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jury.56 Niehoff alleged that he had been libeled by the accusation that he had committed “the 
heinous crime of subornation of perjury.”57  
 
treated the action as an action for libel, in the view that we take of this case we are not 
whether read from a script or not, constitute in the strict legal sense slander, libel, or a 
applied to libel.  
The court noted that there was no indication in the present case whether the defamation 
originated in a manuscript or extemporaneous speech and that, furthermore, the words used 
in the broadcast were not actionable per se.  In explanation, the court said, “[The words] 
neither charge the commission of the crime of subornation of perjury nor do they charge the 
commission of any other crime. Nor do they accuse the plaintiff of misconduct in his office 
as an attorney-at-law.”  In this case, then, the Maine Supreme Court held that the 
    Addressing the issue of whether the defamation should be considered libel or slander, the
court stated its view that the distinction was irrelevant. 
    Although the plaintiff in his declaration refers to the publication as libelous and has 
called upon to now determine whether defamation by words spoken over the radio, 
special form of defamation, liability for which his to be measured by the standards 
58
 
59
60
                                                 
56 Id. at 220. The specifics of the case, including the identity and role of the people mentioned, are unclear. T
text of the defamatory content as indicated in the opinion includes:  
Sahagian was a key witness in the Research Committee’s hearing and later in the Portland trial. He told 
he 
me that he had not wanted to admit on the stand of the Portland trial that he had committed a crime since 
he had not committed any. However, he said he was urged to do so by. . . Assistant Attorney General 
William H. Niehoff. . . . Largely on the basis of [Sahagian’s] testimony at Portland his wine company has 
been suspended from further business with the State Liquor Commission. Sahagian feels this is definitely 
unfair, since he did not commit any crime at all but was just gathering evidence with which to combat 
corruption in Maine. . . . [Sahagian said] “I have been made to be the goat here. They wanted me to admit 
 
 Id.  
 Id. 
 Id. at 221. “Measured by the standards applicable in either libel or slander, the words set forth in the two 
 in the amended declaration are not per se defamatory.” Id. 
 falsity of the testimony which it is alleged by these words he instigated Sahagian to give, 
or if his acts were performed in good faith on his part, the words were not defamatory as accusing the 
a crime in Portland, then they wanted to bring me back to Augusta and convict me here.” Id.  
57
 
58
 
59
counts
 
60 Id. at 222.  
Every act alleged to have been done by the plaintiff by these words might be true, yet if the plaintiff did 
not know of the
 44
libel/slander distinction was not an issue because the words themselves were not defamatory 
per se and, therefore, were not actionable. 
    One year later, the Connecticut Supreme Court faced the question head-on and held that 
defamation read from a script and broadcast via radio constituted libel in Charles Parker Co. 
v. 
Cr  N. 
De , 
De amous 
fir f production and is up for sale. How many jobs will 
gain 
 statement from a prepared manuscript, during which he said, “I stand by what I said 
hat it 
ourt 
                                                                                                                                                      
Silver City Crystal Co.61 The Charles Parker Company alleged libel against Silver City 
ystal Company, which operated radio station WMMW in Meriden, Conn., and Joseph
Paola, a candidate for mayor of Meriden. In a political speech broadcast from WMMW
Paola suggested that the Parker Company was in financial trouble, saying, “This f
m is now ninety per cent out o
disappear? The staggering total of one thousand.”62 After the Parker Company gave notice to 
Silver City Crystal that the broadcast contained false information, DePaolo went on air a
to read a
in yesterday’s radio broadcast.”63 
    In deciding whether the defamation should be treated as libel or slander, the court noted 
that the distinction between the two forms of defamation had existed for years and t
approved the distinction.64 Deliberately writing and then reading defamatory words, the c
 
plaintiff of the commission of any crime or of any misconduct in his office as an attorney-at-law, nor were 
 spoken and defamatory words printed and published has 
revailed for many years. We have been urged to disregard it as an anachronism. The reasons for it appeal to us 
they capable of holding him up to hatred, ridicule, or contempt. Id. 
 
61 116 A.2d 440 (Conn. 1955). 
 
62 Id. at 442. 
 
63 Id. 
 
64 Id. at 443. “A distinction between defamatory words
p
as still valid.” Id. 
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argued, was far more serious than simply speaking defamatory words.65 The court found th
defamation in this case to constitute libel, viewing the circumstances simply as an extension 
of a common-law principle—that reading aloud printed defamation in the pres
e 
ence of others 
or passage. Having been reduced to permanent form and published, the written or 
reading of defamatory words from a prepared manuscript to a group of people within the 
 a 
prepared manuscript to be broadcast by the facilities of a radio station. The latter simply 
dissemination beyond the ordinary limits of the human voice. The law of libel is 
 
 
ble 
principle.67 In 1979, the high court of Alabama addressed a radio defamation case, First 
: 
   
may be treated as libel—to radio technology.  
     The basis of the distinction between libel and slander is the written or printed word 
printed word has greater capabilities of harm. We can see no difference between the 
presence of the reader, which constitutes libel, and reading defamatory words from
carries the defamatory words farther because the defamer has used a medium for 
applicable to the case at bar. 
The supreme court, then, applied a traditional common-law principle to the radio, resulting in
a finding that defamation read from a script and broadcast by radio should be treated as 
libel.66  
    Cases involving radio defamation seemed to lapse until the late 1970s, and no via
explanation was found for that lapse. In the meantime, however, the Second Restatement of 
Torts in 1977 declared broadcast defamation to be libel, and later cases reflect that 
Independent Baptist Church v. Southerland.68 The court noted that this particular case was 
the first in which the court would decide whether the broadcast constituted libel or slander
                                              
Id. “If one deliberately commits defamatory words to writing or printing and then publishes by reading the
ud or by circulating co
65 m 
alo pies, as in a newspaper, to others, the offense is much more serious and the result 
uch more permanent than if the words were simply spoken.” Id. 
66 T  
spe bly 
up
NT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568A (1977). 
m
 
he court found that the statements were not libelous per se, a decision it bolstered by citing political free
ech concerns: “Courts must be careful not to permit the law of libel and slander to encroach unwarranta
on the field of free public debate.” Id. at 445. 
 
67 RESTATEME
 
68 373 So. 2d 647 (Ala. 1979). 
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“This is a case of first impression for our jurisdiction. A similar case has been decided bu
this precise issue was not before the Court because the parties themselves considered the case
as one involving slander, and so the case was reviewed from that premise.”
t 
 
 
ere 
radio 
urt noted the challenges posed by applying traditional defamation law 
 at that 
r 
69 
    In Southerland, the state supreme court affirmed a county circuit court ruling that radio 
defamation constitutes libel rather than slander. The court opinion recited few facts other
than the bare essentials that a pastor taped a series of sermons at an Arab station, which w
then broadcast by the station.70 More than fifty years after the proliferation of 
technology, the co
principles to new technologies, suggesting the libel/slander issue was far from decided
point: “The expansion of communication technology has also enlarged the opportunities fo
dissemination of defamatory material, bringing with them difficulties in applying the original 
conceptions to contemporary innovations. These difficulties have led to divergent views.”71  
    In the court opinion, Judge Beatty quoted substantial sections from Judge Fuld’s 
concurring opinion in Hartmann,72 previously discussed, emphasizing the harms caused by 
the widespread dissemination of radio defamation, before concluding that “if the statements 
                                                 
69 Id. at 647-48. In 1970, the Alabama Supreme Court heard a radio defamation case, Brown v. WRMA 
Br he 
co r; 
it s
It is plaintiff's position that his complaint is an action for slander. Defendant W.R.M.A. Broadcasting 
Company accepts this position though it points out that radio broadcasts have been held to be libel. Since 
this issue is not directly presented to us on this appeal, we need not consider whether the action is libel or 
 appeal, we consider the action to be slander, as the parties do. Id. at 541 
(citations omitted).  
 Southerland, 373 So. 2d  at 647. 
ecessary to recite only the facts essential to our decision. These 
are the defendant Bailey, as pastor of the defendant church, taped a series of sermons at an Arab radio 
0 (N.Y. 1947). 
oadcasting Company, 238 So. 2d 540 (Ala. 1970). The case has not been included for analysis because, as t
urt noted in the quote above, there was not a question of whether the defamation constituted libel or slande
imply was treated as slander. In that case, the court noted: 
slander. For the purposes of this
 
70
    For the purposes of this opinion it is n
station, and each of these tapes was later broadcast over the airwaves by the station. Id. 
 
71 Id. at 648. 
 
72 73 N.E.2d 3
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wh  the 
pinion, Judge Beatty cited the Restatement of Torts, writing, “We are persuaded. . . that the 
rule within our jurisdiction should accord with § 568A of the Restatement as it applies to 
radio broadcasts. Accordingly, if the statements which were broadcast were defamatory they 
would constitute libel.”  When confronted with the issue, then, the Alabama high court 
chose to treat radio defamation as libel; by focusing on the potential harms, the approach 
taken by this court made it irrelevant whether the defamation was scripted or 
extemporaneous. 
    Radio defamation was once again treated as libel by a New York Court in 1984 in 
Matherson v. Marchello, a case in which a rock group defamed Robert Matherson and his 
wife, Carolyn E. Matherson, during a live interview.  During the interview, members of the 
band “The Good Rats” suggested that they had sexual relations with Carolyn Matherson and 
that Robert Matherson had engaged in homosexual acts.  The trial court had “in effect 
dismissed their complaint for failure to state a cause of action.”  In this case, the Mathersons 
sought compensatory and punitive damages. The appellate court addressed whether the 
plaintiffs needed to show special damages, noting: 
    In large measure, this turns on which branch of the law of defamation is involved. As 
ich were broadcast were defamatory they would constitute libel.”73 In concluding
o
74
75
76
77
a result of historical accident, which, though not sensibly defensible today, is so well 
                                                 
73 Southerland, 373 So. 2d at 650. 
 100 A.D.2d 233 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). 
 Id. at 234. Among the quotes from the transcript are, “One of us used to fool around with his wife. He wasn’t 
uch,” and “I don’t think it was his wife that he got so upset about, I think it was when somebody 
arted messing around with his boyfriend that he really freaked out. Really.” Id. 
 
74 Id. 
 
75
 
76
into that too m
st
 
77 Id. at 233. 
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settled as to be beyond our ability to uproot it, there is a schism between the law 
78
 
79
80
81
82
governing slander and the law governing libel.  
Whereas in libel, special damages would not need to be shown,  in a slander case, unless the 
defamation is slanderous per se, special damages would need to be shown.  The court noted 
that the distinction between libel and slander had blurred “[w]ith the advent of mass 
communication.”  In spite of that blurring, the court held that broadcast defamation—by 
radio or by television—should be treated as libel, citing the “vast and far-flung audiences 
reached by the broadcasting media today” as increasing the harm of the oral means of 
communication found in radio and television. As did the court in Southerland, the appellate 
court cited the Restatement of Torts  and, therefore, held that broadcast defamation, 
regardless of whether scripted or extemporaneous, constituted libel83 due to the potential 
harms caused by the widespread dissemination of broadcasts. 
    In a 2000 case, McLaughlin v. Rosanio, Bailets & Talamo, Inc., a New Jersey appellate 
court criticized a lower court’s application of slander per se to an allegedly defamatory 
didate commercial, arguing that the category of defamation was inappropriate 
                                              
political can
   
ing in libel need not plead or prove special damages if the defamatory statement 
ends to expose the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induce an evil opinion of him 
minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive him of their friendly intercourse in society.’” Id. (citing 
inaldi v. Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 42 N.Y.2d. 369, 379, quoting from Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper 
; and (4) 
at impute unchastity [sic] to a woman.” Id. (citations omitted)) 
81 Id. 
 
82 
 
83 B tion was libel, not slander, special damages did not need to be shown in this case. The 
ourt also found that the words were clearly libelous on their face. Id. at 241. 
78 Id. at 235. 
 
79 Id. at 236. “[A] plaintiff su
‘t
in the 
R
Pub. Corp., 242 N.Y. 208, 211-212). 
 
80 Id. Slander per se includes “[a]llegations (1) that the plaintiff committed a crime; (2) that tend to injure the 
plaintiff in his or her trade, business or profession; (3) that plaintiff has contracted a loathsome disease
th
 
at 239. 
Id. at 240. 
ecause the defama
c
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an f 
Ca
Si lin, 
th  
mily when plaintiff was a member of the State Police.”86 Rosanio, Bailets & Talamo, Inc., 
claimed that the commercial was protected political speech and filed a motion for summary 
judgment, while McLaughlin “cross-moved for partial summary judgment.”  The motion 
judge held that the defamation was slanderous per se,  meaning that McLaughlin did not 
need to prove actual damages and, therefore, granted plaintiff’s partial summary judgment 
motion.  
    The appellate court expressed its disapproval of the slander per se doctrine and suggested 
that it might be time to eliminate that category of defamation, a task it left to the state high 
court.   
                      
d outdated.84 Michael McLaughlin, a police officer and Democratic candidate for sheriff o
mden County, alleged that a commercial run by his Republican opponent, William J. 
mon, injured his reputation. 85 The commercial “accus[ed] plaintiff Michael McLaugh
e Democratic candidate, of having leaked confidential information to the Scarfo crime
fa
87
88
89
90
                           
.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000). 
 
 
ted to 
a reporter, resulting in a newspaper story that revealed confidential information about the State Police 
87 Id. 
 
88 
cri
inc
jud lander per se in this case imputed that plaintiff had committed a criminal offense. 
The motion judge determined that: (1) the radio ad was “slander per se” and thus plaintiff need not 
 damages; and (2) whether defendants were motivated by “actual malice” in defaming 
plaintiff, a public figure, was a disputed question of fact that must be decided by a jury. Accordingly, the 
d partial summary judgment to plaintiff on the question of whether the statement constituted 
slander per se. Id. 
 Id. at 1076.  
84 751 A.2d 1066 (N
 
85 Id. at 1068. Defendant Rosanio, Bailets & Talamo, Inc., was Simon’s media consultant for the campaign.
86 Id. “The commercial referred to an interview that plaintiff, while still a State Police detective, had gran
investigation of Scarfo.” Id. 
 
Id. at 1072. “Four kinds of statements qualify as slander per se: accusing another (1) of having committed a 
minal offense, (2) of having a loathsome disease, (3) of engaging in conduct or having a condition or trait 
ompatible with his or her business, (4) of having engaged in serious sexual misconduct.” Id. The motion 
ge held that the s
 
89 Id. at 1069.  
prove actual
judge grante
 
90
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    This damage element of a prima facie case of defamation is waived if the statement is 
We decline to apply the slander per se doctrine here. The doctrine has been “severely 
expanded to cover a statement, such as the one here, which should be categorized as 
been granted on the ground that plaintiff failed to establish any reputational injury or 
91
  
92
slander per se, because damage to reputation is presumed to flow from such statements. 
criticized” as allowing compensation when there is no injury. Thus, it should not be 
libel, rather than slander. Consequently, the motion for summary judgment should have 
other special damages.  
The court argued that, “since this was a radio broadcast as opposed to an in-person verbal 
exchange, it was more akin to a libel than to a slander.”  Furthermore, the court said, “We 
are of the view that slander per se is on its last legs in New Jersey, and may no longer be a 
viable jurisprudential basis for awarding damages when there is no demonstrable harm.”93 
Instead, a uniform approach to libel and slander that required proof of actual reputational 
injury should be taken, the court held. In reaching its decision, the New Jersey court noted 
the “consensus elsewhere. . . that radio and television should be categorized as libel,” citing 
the Restatement of Torts.  Thus, this recent New Jersey case notes the eroding distinction 
between the two forms of defamation, insisting instead that radio defamation should be 
treated as libel. 
    The radio cases presented thus far demonstrate the different approaches courts took in 
pplying traditional distinctions between libel and slander to radio defamation in cases 
ts in 1977, which stated that broadcast 
94
a
decided prior to the revision of the Restatement of Tor
                                                                                                                                                       
The [New Jersey Supreme] Court may well decide that this is the time and case to eliminate the slan
per se categories. We
der 
 leave that question for the Supreme Court to ponder. . . .Hence there was no need to 
apply the slander per se exception to the general rule that a plaintiff must prove actual reputational injury. 
ement dictates against invoking the presumption 
of damages. Id. 
 Id. at 1069. 
At the very least, the hybrid nature of the defamatory stat
 
91
 
92 Id. at 1076. 
 
93 Id. at 1075. 
 
94 Id. at 1076. 
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defamation was libel.95 Prior to that, som ted defamatory broadcasts read from 
ngs. 
a television constituted libel or slander, a question intensified by the addition of 
                                                
e courts trea
scripts as libel96 while extemporaneous defamatory broadcasts were viewed as slander.97 One 
court did not decide whether the defamation in question was libel or slander but, for the 
purposes of the case, treated it as slander.98 Two courts ducked the issue since it was not 
necessary for the decision.99 Finally, several courts viewed radio defamation as a distinct 
form of action that combined elements of libel and slander.100  
    The post-Second Restatement cases have consistently held in line with the Restatement 
that, regardless of whether the defamation was scripted or extemporaneous, it should be 
classified as libel.101 Those cases have also explicitly cited the Restatement in their holdi
A similar trend was reflected by courts faced with determining whether defamation 
transmitted vi
images to the sounds transmitted via the radio. 
 
 
 
 
, aff’d mem., 2 N.Y.S. 2d 1015 (App. Div. 1938). See 
lso Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co, 116 A.2d 440 (Conn. 1955); Hartmann v. Winchell, 73 
50); Summit Hotel Co. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 8 A.2d 302 (Pa. 1939). 
ndent Baptist Church v. Southerland, 373 So. 2d 647 (Ala. 1979); McLaughlin v. Rosanio, 
ailets & Talamo, Inc., 751 A.2d 1066 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000); Matherson v. Marchello, 100 A.D.2d 
95 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568A (1977). 
 
96 Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co, 116 A.2d 440 (Conn. 1955); Sorenson v. Wood, 243 N.W. 82 
(Neb. 1932); Hartmann v. Winchell, 73 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1947). 
 
97 Locke v. Gibbons, 299 N.Y.S. 188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937)
a
N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1947). 
 
98 Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 20 P.2d 847 (Wash. 1933). 
 
99 Irwin v. Ashurst, 74 P.2d 1127 (Or. 1938); Weglein v. Golder, 177 A. 47 (Pa. 1935) (per curiam). 
 
100 Niehoff v. Cong. Square Hotel Co., 103 A.2d 219 (Me. 1954); Kelly v. Hoffmann, 74 A.2d 922 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. 19
 
101 First Indepe
B
233 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). 
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Television 
    By the time the courts heard their first television cases, the issue of defamation transm
via the combination of sound and images presented by television technology had already 
been addressed in the context of motion pictures. In two early motion picture cases, Mer
Sociological Research Film Corp.
itted 
le v. 
d 
 
 of the 
   
de  
Bentley, appeared on the television show Meet the Press and made statements alleging that 
William R. Remington, an economist and U.S. government employee, was a Communist 
                                                
102 and Brown v. Paramount Publix Corp,103 New York 
state courts held that defamation by motion picture constituted libel. The Brown court note
the novelty of applying libel law to motion pictures: “This is a comparatively new form of
libel. It is not accomplished by the printed word, but by the somewhat recent invention
talking motion picture.”104 The precedent set by these cases, that defamation via motion 
picture was libel, served as a starting point for courts that addressed television cases 
specifically.  
 A U.S. district court in New York in 1949 heard one of the first cases to deal with 
famation broadcast by television. In Remington v. Bentley,105 the defendant, Elizabeth
 
102152 N.Y.S. 829 (Supt. Ct. 1915) (per curiam). A film titled The Inside of the White Slave Traffic showed 
several shots of the business of August Merle in the context of showing actual locations where white slave 
trading occurred. The court addressed whether the alleged defamation was directed toward Merle himself or his 
ng that it was directed toward the plaintiff’s business and, as such, the plaintiff needed to show 
speci but, 
ins
 
103 n of 
the tte. Brown alleged that the 
lm depicted her maliciously as “illiterate, unkempt, slovenly, neglectful, and low-grade . . . as poor-white-
table, untidy product of the hills, without decent care for her daughter.” Id. at 546. The court 
eld that the motion picture was capable of being and was actually libelous. Again, the court never questioned 
 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). 
business, holdi
al damages to prevail. The court never discussed whether the defamation could be treated as slander 
tead, treated the defamation as libel without question.  
 270 N.Y.S. 544 (App. Div. 1934). A motion picture titled An American Tragedy portrayed a reproductio
 murder of Grace Brown, daughter of plaintiff Minerva Brown, by Chester Gille
fi
trash, and a disrepu
h
whether the defamation was libel, but it did note, “This is a comparatively new form of libel. It is not 
accomplished with the printed word, but by the somewhat recent invention of the talking motion picture.” Id. at 
547. 
 
104 Id. at 547. 
 
105 88 F. Supp.
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sympathizer.106 Bentley’s comments also were broadcast over the radio. The court named
three categories of slander that were actionable per se—that is, without showing special 
damages—those that “impute[] a crime, a loathsome disease,
 
 or some conduct, condition, or 
ch are 
us speech 
 treat 
expression, and I feel that the additional factor of pictorial representation along with the 
ts adds no more to the form of defamation than would the circumstance of a 
great audience in a stadium or the like listening to the spoken word.110 
                                                
trait tending to injure another in his trade or professions.”107 The court held that calling 
someone, particularly a government official, a Communist, fell into the third category, and 
thus the words were slanderous per se.108 The common law applied by the court was that 
“[s]lander is tortious if the oral defamation falls within certain classes of cases whi
actionable per se or if it causes special damage, while libel is actionable by itself.”109  
    Following precedent from earlier radio broadcast cases involving extemporaneo
and rejecting the precedent set in the motion picture cases, the court chose in this case to
defamation via television as slander.  
    I accept the [radio] analogy to the extent that it applies to extemporaneous oral 
statemen
 
 
106 Id. at 167.  
tiff, an economist by profession has been, since May, 1940, an 
employee of the United States Government in various capacities; that in assuming his positions he was 
 Id. at 169. 
8 Id. at 170. “[T]he complaint as heretofore indicated, charges that the defendant Bentley’s statements have 
  injured and damaged the plaintiff  in his employment and profession. A slanderous statement affecting 
ne in this respect has always been actionable per se.”  Id. 
9 Id. at 168. 
The complaint alleges that the plain
required to, and did take an oath that he did not belong to any organization which advocated the 
overthrow of the Government by force and violence; that the Attorney General in the United States has 
consistently ruled that that the Communist Party was such an organization. Id. 
 
710
 
10
greatly
o
 
10
 
110 Id. at 169. 
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In this first case involving defamation via television, then, in spite of the technology 
might have been deemed to add impact to defamation through pictorial representations, the 
court held that the defamation constituted slander, not libel. 
    In 1954, a New York trial court decided Landau v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
that 
112 In 
he 
hat he had been defamed by being identified as the fictional 
n of 
er 
111 
resulting from an alleged defamation broadcast during a fictional show, The Easy Way.
the show, a newspaper photographer sought to “annihilate a bookmaking ring,” which led 
him to an office of the ringleader. 113 “On the glass panel of a door leading to [the 
ringleader’s] private room was the legend ‘Credit Consultant, Inc.’”114 Harry Landau, t
plaintiff in this case, was a bill collector who operated a business named “Credit 
Consultants.” Landau felt t
ringleader character and, therefore, “delineated as a villain, a criminal, and a gangster.”115 
The court considered whether a fictional depiction on television would be considered libel or 
slander.116 
    In Landau, the court relied both on the motion picture precedents and previous holdings 
that broadcast defamation read from a script constituted libel. “It is held that if defamatio
the plaintiff resulted from this television presentation, an action in libel would be the prop
                                                 
111 128 N.Y
 
.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1954). 
112 Justice Frank, writing for the court, described the scope of the alleged defamation as reaching millions of 
viewers. “The number of people who saw this program, televised as it was on a major network, cannot be 
accurately estimated. Since ownership of television sets in this country is epidemic, the fair inference is that it 
 millions.” Id. at 256. 
tely held that Landau was not identified, there was no intention or express malice to libel 
him, 
 
was viewed by
 
113 Id. 
 
114 Id. 
 
115 Id. 
 
116 The court ultima
and Landau’s reputation was not maligned. Id. at 259. 
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re
co ess 
lik
semblance. Addressing whether Landau had been identified, Justice Frank argued that there 
was no actual resemblance between Landau and the character nor between the offices 
depicted nor between Landau’s and the fictional character’s names.  A radio defamation, 
on the other hand, may have allowed more room for imagination to bridge the gap between 
Landau and the fictional character. Landau, therefore, represents both a case in which 
television defamation was deemed libel and in which the nature of the technology served to 
rebut a defamation claim. 
    A U.S. district court in Kentucky viewed television defamation as libel in a 1957 case, 
Gearhart v. WSAZ, Inc.  Writing for the court, Judge Swinford provided a detailed account 
of the facts of the case. Distilled, the facts show that Calvin Gearhart, elected Boyd County 
attorney, ran on a reform platform and pledged the “vigorous prosecution of persons engaged 
in gambling, bootlegging, and vice.”  In April 1955, WSAZ broadcast news segments 
alleging that Gearhart had consorted with criminals and knowingly allowed witnesses to 
testify under false names in his zeal to crack down on crime,  summarized by the court as 
fo
   
medy.”117 However, in addressing the elements of the defamation claim, the court 
ntended that the technology of the television, providing visual images, actually made it l
ely that Landau would be associated with the fictional criminal if there was no actual 
re
118
119
120
121
llows: 
                                              
117 Id. at 257. 
8 Id. at 259. 
9 150 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Ky. 1957). 
0 Id. at 105. 
1 Id. at 105-106. 
 news broadcast and telecast, from a manuscript, among other things said: “A 
 
11
 
11
 
12
 
12
On April 12, 13, and 14, 1955, on five different occasions, the defendant, throughout this three-day 
period, on its regular
 56
    [T]he defendant went on the air. . . and on five different occasions in a period of three 
was guilty of corrupt, unethical, and criminal practices as an attorney and an official of 
organization and planning of a vicious and corrupt political machine for the purpose 
122
 
days, in lengthy broadcasts, sent forth, as news, the fact that it was said that the plaintiff 
Boyd County; that he collaborated with known criminals and law violators in the 
of 
exploiting his constituency and corrupting his community.  
While the bulk of the opinion focuses on jurisdictional and fault issues, at the end of the 
opinion, Judge Swinford tacked on a notice that television defamation was libelous, writing, 
“The question has not been raised so I assume there is no dispute, but I might point out that 
the dissemination of defamatory remarks by television is libel rather than slander.”  
Swinford pointed out that the libelous broadcast in question was read from notes but did not 
indicate whether extemporaneous speech might be considered slander. 
    In that same year, a New York state trial court held that defamation broadcast via 
television constituted libel, regardless of whether it was read from a prepared manuscript. In 
Shor v. Billingsley,  Sherman Billingsley, who hosted “The Stork Club Show,” allegedly 
libeled Bernard Shor, a restaurant owner, when he told a guest on the television program, “I 
wish I had as much money as he [Shor] owes.”125 The court did not see how the statement 
o ously but focused instead on whether “a telecast not read from a 
repared script sounds in libel or in slander.”126 Justice Hecht chose to follow Judge Fuld’s 
 
123
124
c uld be construed innocu
p
                                                                                                                                                      
hart have been brought before the 
Ke nd 
 
122
 
3 Id. at 112. 
957). 
t 478. 
 
126
oth
politically explosive storm is brewing in Catlettsburg, Kentucky, and in the center is the young Boyd 
County Attorney, Calvin Gearhart. Charges against the 33 year old Gear
ntucky State Bar Association in accusing him of having permitted a witness to testify before the gra
jury under a false name with full knowledge that it was a false name.” Id. 
 Id. at 108. 
12
 
124 158 N.Y.S.2d. 476 (Sup. Ct. 1
 
125 Id. a
 Id. at 479. “This precise question has not been passed upon by our appellate courts, nor apparently in any 
er jurisdiction.” Id. 
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concurring opinion in Hartmann v. Winchell.127 Thus, in spite of the defendant’s argu
that “the application of the law o
ments 
f libel to broadcasting or telecasting without a scrip [sic] 
d 
f two trucking corporations, 
de g 
ab
Un
nderson had been fired for stealing truck parts132 and accused Anderson of falsely testifying 
 
must be made (if at all) by the legislature rather than the courts,”128 the court held that 
broadcast defamation did not need to be scripted to constitute libel. As had Judge Fuld in 
Hartmann, Judge Hecht focused on the potential harms that could result from the widesprea
dissemination of broadcast defamation. 
    As occurred in some radio cases, some courts avoided making a distinction, instead 
examining whether the television broadcast was defamatory per se. In a 1962 case decided 
by the Eight Circuit, Riss v. Anderson,129 Richard Riss, owner o
famed a former employee, Ardith Anderson,130 who had testified before a Senate hearin
out a questionable contract between Riss’s company and Jimmy Hoffa’s Teamsters 
ion.131 Riss later appeared on a television show, “Insight,” during which he alleged that 
A
                                                                                                                                                      
128 158 N.Y.S.2d at 486. 
 
129 304 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1962). 
 
130 d reached a settlement agreement with Rissin that discontinued his employment after a dispute 
rose regarding who was responsible for providing new tires for a truck owned by one Riss’s companies, leased 
-
operator under agreements by which Transport leased to him a motor vehicle tractor and he, in turn, 
ompany. A dispute arose at that time as to Anderson’s obligation to provide new tires 
for the vehicle and as to his right to use for that purpose a reserve fund built up by deductions from Riss 
’s payments under its lease. Id. at 190. 
nderson testified “that the contract applied to him but that he did not vote on it and did not have 
an op
 
132
 is the man that claimed he was sick and was not working on his truck. We told him to bring us a 
doctor’s certificate to prove he was sick, or to bring the truck in. Instead of that he went down to the 
 
127 73 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1947). 
 
 Anderson ha
a
to Anderson, who, in turn, leased the truck to Riss’s other company. 
Anderson had been a driver for Riss since March 1955. In early 1959 he was working as an owner
leased it to Riss & C
& Company
 
131 Id. at 191. A
portunity to vote on it.” Id. 
 Id.  
Mr. Anderson is one of the two gentlemen that has been discharged from our company. Mr. Anderson, 
I believe,
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before the Senate committee.133 Anderson alleged that he had been libeled by Riss’s 
comments during the program. 
    The court turned to the question of whether the broadcast had been libelous or slande
Neither party had attempted to categorize th
rous. 
e comments as either libel or slander, but the trial 
ts were 
an extent have done, to review and wrestle with the historical development of the law of 
and odd results of the decided cases, or to make this case one of significance on the 
defamation.  
The Eighth Circuit relied on the principles of Missouri law, of which it said, “There can be 
no dispute at this date that in Missouri defamation (whether technically it is characterized as 
libel or as slander) in the form of falsely accusing another of an indictable crime is actionable 
          
court had “held that the publication by way of tape and subsequent broadcast, to the extent 
that it was untruthful, constituted libel.”134 Riss attempted to argue that if his statemen
actionable at all, they were not slanderous per se, therefore requiring Anderson to prove 
actual damages; Anderson claimed the statements were libelous or, at least, slanderous per se 
so that damages were presumed.135 The appellate court wrote: 
    We conclude that on the facts of this case, it is not necessary for us, as the parties to 
defamation and its twin torts of libel and slander, or to note the logical inconsistencies 
question of the impact of television upon the old and established principles of the law of 
136
 
                                                                                                                                             
 
133 Id. at 191-92. “I don’t know if Mr. Anderson was in our employ at the time that was made or not, but if he 
 fact that he did not get a chance to vote on [the contract] he is certainly mistaken.” Id. 
, 
n of slander; (b) whether the legal result is to be any different when, 
although extemporaneous, the program is taped or otherwise recorded before or upon the broadcast. Id. at 
garage and took a lot of parts off of his truck. We ordered him to replace them. He didn’t do it, so we let 
him go. Id. 
testified to the
 
134 Id. at 193. 
 
135 Id. at 195. 
 
136 Id. at 195.  
Specifically, we feel that we need not consider (a) as a matter of apparent first impression in Missouri
whether television remarks, made essentially extemporaneously and admittedly without a script, lead in 
the direction of libel or in the directio
195-96. 
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pe
wa able per se. In so finding, the Eighth 
y 
 
eau had 
ether 
lem is 
ial shown on television should be classified as a libel, a slander or 
and commercial radio less than forty years ago. Thus both media represent new factual 
                                                
r se.”137 Therefore, in this case, it was not necessary to determine whether the defamation 
s libel or slander because it was found to be action
Circuit affirmed the trial court judgment for the plaintiff against Riss for $2,000 actual 
damages and $8,000 punitive damages.138  
    That same year, 1962, the Georgia Court of Appeals established an entirely new categor
of broadcast defamation called “defamacast.” In American Broadcasting-Paramount 
Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson,139 E.L. Simpson filed a defamation action following the broadcast
of an episode of The Untouchables, which implied that officers of the U.S. Prison Bur
accepted bribes to help legendary gangster Al Capone escape imprisonment.140 Judge 
Eberhardt, writing for the Georgia Court of Appeals, viewed the crux of the case as wh
the alleged defamation constituted libel or slander. “Perhaps the most perplexing prob
whether defamatory mater
in some third category.”141  
    As was the case in Summit Hotel, the court in Simpson contended that television 
defamation represented elements of both libel and slander in a new technology and should 
therefore be treated as such. 
    Commercial television began during the latter part of the decade beginning in 1940 
situations with respect to defamation, and we have pointed out . . .  some of the 
 
 
138 Id. at 190. 
 
139 126 S.E.2d 873 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962). 
0 Id. at 874-75. Although the show was fictional, the plaintiff argued that it appeared and was presented as if it 
n factual: “It is alleged that ‘The Untouchables’ has ‘since its inception, been calculated to 
onvey, and has conveyed, to television viewers . . . the impression that the program is an authentic and factual 
tual events.’” Id. at 874. 
137 Id. at 194. 
 
14
could have bee
c
portrayal of ac
 
141 Id. at 876. 
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difficulties that the courts have had in reconciling this type of defamation with the 
cannot realistically be solved by resort thereto.
traditional libel-slander dichotomy. In truth, these new media pose new problems which 
 
atute, the court said, 
de e 
str
tec
pplying an existing one. 
    That same year, the Supreme Court of North Carolina decided a television defamation 
ase, Greer v. Skyway Broadcasting Co.145 Edward Greer alleged that Skyway Broadcasting 
an l 
an
 she identified him as the perpetrator. . . . She failed to identify 
   
142 
The court’s solution was the creation of the category “defamacast,” which is actionable per 
se, a development it supported by citing a Georgia statute that referred only to defamation 
and did not distinguish between libel and slander.143 Regarding the st
“The legislature recognized this new category in 1949 with the enactment of Code Ann. § 
105-712. It is significant that the statute refers to ‘defamatory statements’ rather than ‘libel’ 
or ‘slander.’”144 The court continued its analysis of the defamation claim based on its 
famacast doctrine, as will be discussed in a later chapter. Georgia’s defamacast reflects th
uggles of a court to apply traditional defamation doctrine to a new communications 
hnology and represents a bold attempt to create a new doctrine, rather than simply 
a
c
d B.P. Justice, constable in Mills River Township in Henderson County, conspired to libe
d slander him. Justice invited Skyway Broadcasting to film him bringing in Greer on 
charges of rape and robbery: “While the plaintiff, Justice, the officers and Skyway’s camera 
operators were in the city hall, the alleged victim was brought in, and was told by Justice to 
look at plaintiff, and say if
                                              
 Id. at 878. 
 Id. at 879. 
 Id. at 880. 
142
 
143
 
144
 
145 124 S.E.2d 98 (N.C. 1962). 
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him.”146 Greer alleged that Skyway knowingly broadcast three news segments showing 
images of him in handcuffs, which falsely reported that the victim had identified him,147 and 
that “[b]oth defendants willfully and deliberately libeled and slandered plaintiff, because both 
. 
an 
be committed by defamatory words broadcast by radio, although it has been intimated 
Any written or spoken words or pictures falsely imputing that a person is guilty of the 
turpitude.  
defendants knew the alleged victim had failed to identify the plaintiff, and knew there was no 
evidence to support the charges of rape and robbery against him.”148 
    While the state high court addressed the defendants’ claim of a “clear and fatal misjoinder 
of parties and causes of actions,”149 it also noted that the defamation was actionable per se
Regarding whether television defamation constituted libel or slander, the court stated:  
    Libel can be committed by defamatory pictures. Libel, and it would seem slander, c
that the distinctions between libel and slander are inapplicable to radio broadcasting. 
crime of rape or robbery are actionable per se, because theses crimes involve moral 
150
 
                                                 
 
147
146 Id. at 99. 
 Id.  
Skyway. . . showed pictures of plaintiff in handcuffs and in the custody of Justice and the officers, and 
its newscaster broadcast that plaintiff had been arrested for rape and robbery, and had been positively 
identified by the victim, but still refused to admit his guilt, which was heard throughout its listening area, 
 the alleged victim had failed to identify the plaintiff. Id. 
mong Greer’s other allegations were that Justice had no warrant for the arrest and never named 
the al
the ce 
wr  one and 
lis nd 
sla
for the reason 
that the complaint alleges four causes of action, which do not affect all the parties to the action. One, a 
ion against Justice as an individual for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious 
prosecution. Two, a cause of action against Justice as an individual for libel. Three, a cause of action 
ay for libel. Four, a cause of action against both defendants for conspiracy to libel and 
sla  any 
 
150
though Skyway and its employees knew
 
148 Id. at 100. A
leged victim; that Justice took the alleged victim into a private room after she failed to identify Greer as 
 perpetrator, emerging ten minutes later to falsely report that the victim had identified Greer; and that Justi
ote several warrants charging Greer for the crimes on his knowledge, serving as the only witness on
ting six witnesses who knew nothing of the crime on the other warrant; and that Justice willfully libeled a
ndered Greer. Id. at 99-100. 
 
149 Id. at 102.  
Skyway. . . contends there is a clear and fatal misjoinder of parties and causes of actions, 
cause of act
against Skyw
nder plaintiff, though the allegations of conspiracy are vague and indefinite and not supported by
alleged factual basis. Id. 
 Id. at 104 (citations omitted). 
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Therefore, the North Carolina Supreme Court did not address specifically whether televisio
defamation sh
n 
ould be classified as libel or slander but held that, on the facts of this case, the 
 
n 
he 
, Perry 
othing 
                                                
defamation was actionable per se. 
    A California Court of Appeals case in 1966, Arno v. Stewart, applied the state’s civil code
to hold that broadcast defamation constitutes slander.151 Russ Arno, a singer, performed o
Dick Stewart’s television program, during the course of which Stewart allegedly called Arno 
an “iron-clad singing member of the Mafia.”152 In the present case, Arno appealed a 
judgment entered for the defendants, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to instruct t
jury that the comment was defamatory per se.153 The court noted that the audience had 
laughed in response to the comment, and the defendants argued “that ‘The word ‘Mafia’ is 
frequently used as a gag by such television entertainers as Frank Sinatra, Dean Martin
Como and others. . . . Such references are made and received as being humorous and n
more.’” 154 The court’s decision focused on whether the statement was defamatory and the 
instructions given the jury,155 but of particular note is that the court cited California Civil 
 
151 254 Cal. App. 2d 955 (Ct. App. 1966). 
 
Russ Arno, a singer, at the paid invitation of Dick Stewart, appeared on the latter’s television program. 
ing member of the Mafia.’ Plaintiff 
admitted that the statement, however it was worded, was made in banter and without malice. Id. 
153 Id
co
 
154
 
155
out reference to the truth of the alleged membership. It is concluded that it would have 
been error to disassociate the alleged derogatory phrase from its context and to give the unqualified 
uction offered by plaintiff that the statement alone was defamatory per se. Id. 
152 Id. at 958.  
. . . Plaintiff Arno testified that after he had sung several songs on the program, Stewart referred to Arno, 
in his presence, as an ‘iron-clad singing member of the Mafia.’ Defendant Stewart denies this, and 
testified that he called Arno ‘my buddy from the Mafia,’ or ‘the sing
 
. at 958. The code states that “[s]lander is a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered, and also 
mmunications by radio or any mechanical or other means.” West's Ann.Cal.Civ.Code § 46. 
 Id. at 959. 
 Id. at 965.  
So in this case a fair-minded man could construe the whole visual and auditory publication as a 
practical joke with
instr
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Code and made clear, “Defamation by radio or television broadcast is treated as slander in 
this state.”156 
    As was the situation with the radio cases, there seems to have been a lapse in cases that 
directly addressed whether television defamation was libel or slander, this one lasting until
1980; here, too, it is unclear why there were so few cases that addressed the libel/slander 
distinction in broadcast media. In 1980, though, the Alabama Supreme Cou
 
rt decided in Gray 
v. 
In
W cast in July 1975 that Gabriella Gray and 
 
d impression that the Plaintiffs were guilty of sharp, unethical, dishonest and/or 
                                                
WALA-TV that defamation transmitted via television constituted libel, citing First 
dependent Baptist Church v. Southerland and the Restatement of Torts section 568A.157 
ALA-TV employee Carlton Cordell had broad
fellow plaintiffs had used political connections to gain a contract with the city of Mobile to
produce auditorium brochures and were paid for the contract but never produced the 
brochures.158 Gray alleged that the broadcasts were defamatory, conveying “the false 
meaning an
illegal acts in the conduct of their business, and that the Plaintiffs had failed to fulfill their 
contracts.”159 
 
156 Id. at 961. 
7 384 So. 2d 1062, 1065 (Ala. 1980). “Based upon the considerations in First Independent Baptist Church v. 
 are of the opinion that § 568A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, as it applies to both radio 
and te
 
158
ull payment to the Plaintiffs some five and one-half months before, that the 
Plaintiffs had failed to deliver any brochures, that no member of the auditorium board knew or had been 
med of the contract, that the actions of the Plaintiffs were in violation of the laws of the State of 
Al
 
159
 
15
Southerland, we
levision broadcasts, should be the rule within this jurisdiction.”  
 Id. at 1064. Cordell alleged: 
That the plaintiffs had contracted with the City of Mobile for the production of auditorium brochures, 
that the City had made f
infor
abama, that the brochures had been received even though the Plaintiffs had been contracted for over a 
year and that none had been received even though the Plaintiffs had received $15,000 for them, and that 
the Plaintiffs had handled the election campaign of the person who was Mayor at the time the contract 
was awarded. Id. 
 Id. 
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    The Alabama Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the television broadcast 
constituted libel or slander. The court noted that it was unclear whether the trial court h
distinguished between the two forms, writing: “The parties do not characterize this cause of
action as either libel or slander. There is nothing in the record to indicate whether the tr
judge considered this to be an action in libel or slander.”
ad 
 
ial 
l 
contempt, though it does not embody an accusation of crime, the law presumes damages 
there must be an imputation of an indictable offense involving infamy or moral 
 
at 
d the 
ion 
160  However, the distinction of libe
or slander in this case was an important determination, as the court noted: 
    In cases of libel, if the language used exposes the plaintiff to public ridicule or 
to the reputation, and pronounces it actionable per se. While to constitute slander per se, 
turpitude.161 
The court held “that television broadcasts of defamatory matter must be declared upon as 
libel rather than slander.”162 Three years after the Restatement of Torts had declared 
broadcast defamation constituted libel, then, the Alabama Supreme Court chose to adopt th
approach. 
    Several years later, in 1993, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, which had establishe
defamacast category thirty years earlier, heard a defamation case against a television stat
                                                 
160 Id. 
1 Id. at 1065.  
, however, does not deny the right to maintain an action for slander founded on oral 
ma
ent of 
 
162
 
ad not performed under the 
contract though having been paid to do so, and thereby dishonestly obtained public funds. Certainly in 
d time an accusation of political corruption would subject the plaintiffs to public ridicule and 
would injure their reputation, both individually and in their business. Thus, we are of the opinion that the 
 se. Id. 
 
16
This distinction
licious defamation subjecting the plaintiff to disgrace, ridicule, odium, or contempt, though it falls 
short of imputing the commission of such crime or misdemeanor. In such case the law pronounces the 
words actionable per quod only, and the plaintiff must allege and prove special damages as an elem
the cause of action. Id. 
 Id.  
We think it is fair to say that the words employed imputed to the plaintiffs that they had corruptly and
illegally obtained, through political connections, a contract with the city and h
this day an
publications if false are libelous per
 
 65
and reporter in Brewer v. Rogers.163 Brewer, a high school football coach, was the subject of
a newscast narrated by Shuler and broadcast by WAGA-TV 5. The newscast explored 
allegations of grade changes for a football-playing student at an Athens high school w
Brewer was head coach of the team. In the course of the newscast, Shuler reported on 
charges against Brewer from fifteen years earlier: “Shuler related that Brewer was charg
with commercial gambling, keeping a gambling place, and felony possession of a pound
marijuana, pointing out that Brewer’s was the only raided location which yielded drugs.”
 
here 
ed 
 of 
 
 
, 
GA 
Massachusetts U.S. district court in Brown v. Hearst Corp.167 noted that the defamation 
164
Shuler failed to note that Brewer had been treated as a first-time offender, that the charges 
were far less severe than he made them out to be, and that the records had been sealed and
Brewer exonerated; consequently he misrepresented Brewer’s criminal record.165 In Brewer
the Georgia court again applied its defamacast category: “The count of libel against WA
and its employee Shuler merges with the count alleging ‘defamacast’ and is constituted of 
defamation on television.”166 
    In a 1994 opinion that examined several facets of a television defamation claim, a 
                                                 
163 43
 
164
 
165
eived first offender treatment and would not have a record if he complied with the court 
order. . . . [U]pon petition from Brewer and with the consent of the district attorney, the court ordered the 
l the record and the “indictment” so that “the same will not be available to the public; 
however, the Clerk is required to furnish the indictment (sic) and sentence to any court when ordered to 
 probation supervisor, the 
court ordered Brewer “discharged without court adjudication of guilt . . . [which] shall completely 
rewer] of any criminal purpose . . . not affect any of [Brewer’s] civil rights or liberties, and 
[B
 
166
 
167
9 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). 
 Id. at 78. 
 Id. at 79-80.  
Brewer rec
clerk to sea
do so”. . . .Three months later, on December 9, 1975, upon the petition of the
exonerate [B
rewer] shall not be considered to have a criminal conviction.” Id. at 79-80. 
 Id. at 80. 
 862 F. Supp. 622 (D. Mass. 1994). 
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should be classified as libel. Willis Brown, a pilot, alleged that Hearst Corporation, thro
WCVB-TV Channel 5, defamed him in an epis
ugh 
ode of Chronicle titled “The Other Pilot’s 
flight 
t the 
d 
 
y 
                                                
Wife.” The newsmagazine-style broadcast discussed the disappearance of two flight 
attendants, both married to pilots, from the same small town in Connecticut. One of the 
attendants was Brown’s wife, Regina; the other, Helle Crafts, had gone missing several 
months prior to Regina’s disappearance, but her body had been found and her husband 
implicated in her murder.168 As the basis for his defamation claim, “Brown asserts tha
juxtaposition of his wife’s disappearance with the story of Mrs. Crafts’ disappearance an
murder, defames him by implying that his wife has also been murdered and that he is the 
killer.”169 Brown specifically alleged that he had been slandered by the broadcast, to which 
the court responded in a footnote, “Initially, the court notes that because the allegedly 
offensive statements were fixed, recorded, and widely distributed in a television program, if
defamation does exist in this case, it is libel and not slander.”170 For a number of reasons, 
including the newsworthiness of the story171 and the classification of some of the defamator
 
cidence that Helle Crafts, another 
wn just a few months before 
d that fragments of Mrs. Craft’s [sic] body were 
ts, had evidently put her body through a 
gina’s disappearance remains 
t 626. 
S § 568A (1977)). 
Here, however, there was a legitimate public interest and concern with respect to the remarkable 
rried to pilots disappearing from the same small 
Connecticut town within a few months of one another. These were legitimate news stories, in the public 
168 Id. at 625.  
The Broadcast’s title,  “The Other Pilot’s Wife,”  refers to the coin
flight attendant married to a pilot, disappeared from the same small to
Regina’s disappearance. The Broadcast accurately reporte
found in the Housatonic River. Her husband, Richard Craf
woodchipping machine. He was subsequently convicted of murder. Re
unsolved. Id. 
 
169 Id. a
 
170 Id. at 627 & n.6 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT
 
171 Id. at 628.  
coincidence of two flight attendants who were both ma
domain and of general public interest. Their mere juxtaposition in the same Broadcast did not, for that 
reason alone, defame the plaintiff. Id. 
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remarks as opinion and therefore not actionable,172 the district court granted the Hearst 
Corporation’s motion for summary judgment. 
   The television defamation cases reflect similar trends to the radio defamation cases in that 
ourts took a variety of approaches in applying the traditional common-law distinction 
between libel and slander to television defa rior to the Second Restatement of Torts. 
 
, 
ander 
, 
c
mation p
Early cases distinguished based on whether the content was extemporaneous, treating such a 
broadcast as slander,173 or whether it was scripted, treating that as libel.174 Television
defamation was outright treated as libel by several courts175 while one court, basing its 
decision on state law, treated broadcast defamation as slander.176 Two cases were found in 
which the courts ducked the issue by treating the defamation in question as actionable per se
but one held that the defamation resembled libel177 while the other noted that libel or sl
could apply to television defamation.178 Finally, Georgia courts adhered to the defamacast 
category, which they said was recognized by state statute.179 Post-Second Restatement cases
on the other hand, cited section 568A in determining that broadcast defamation constituted 
                                                 
expressions of opinion. . . .For this reason, they are not actionable.” Id. 
 
173 Remington v. Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). 
 
172 Id. at 619. “This court regards the allegedly offensive statements set above to be unambiguous classic 
174 Landau v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 128 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1954). 
 
175 Gearhart v. WSAZ, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Ky. 1957); Shor v. Billingsley, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 
 Arno v. Stewart, 254 Cal. App. 2d 955 (Ct. App. 1966). 
road.-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 126 S.E.2d 873 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962); Brewer v. 
ogers, 439 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966). 
1957). 
 
617
 
177 Riss v. Anderson, 304 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1962). 
 
178 Greer v. Skyway Broad., 124 S.E.2d 98 (N.C. 1962). 
 
179 American B
R
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libel.180 The cases presented here indicate that courts had taken different approaches in 
determining whether television defamation constitutes libel or slander, but that the 
Restatement of Torts seemed to have proved influential in later cases.  
 
Internet 
    In spite of the technology of the Internet which, like that of television, allows for aud
visual transmission of defamatory content, only one case was found in which a court 
addressed whether defamation posted on the Internet constituted libel or slander. In Varian 
Medical Systems, Inc., v. Delfino, a California appeals court was asked to address whether 
defamatory postings to Internet bulletin board sites con
io and 
stituted slander, rather than libel, as 
th
De rds 
bout Varian and two of its executives, George Zdasiuk, vice president of VMS, and Susan 
B. Felch, director of a Varian research center. Zdasiuk had fired Delfino, a senior engineer, 
“in 1998 for complaints that he was disruptive and harassing to Felch and other co-
work . 
Th
 and personal reputations.183 Varian and the two executives sued, inciting the two 
e defendants argued.181 In this case, two former employees of Varian, Michelangelo 
lfino and Mary Day, posted thousands of derogatory messages on Internet bulletin boa
a
ers.”182 Day resigned two months after Delfino was fired in sympathy for his dismissal
e two began posting defamatory messages that attacked Zdasiuk’s and Felch’s 
professional
                                                 
018  Brown v. Hearst Corp., 862 F. Supp. 622 (D. Mass. 1994); Gray v. WALA-TV, 384 So. 2d 1062 (Ala. 
003). The case was appealed and reversed, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 298 (Cal. 
005), on grounds that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The libel/slander question was not 
e appeal; therefore, it is deemed appropriate that this case can serve as an example of a court 
ddressing whether Internet defamation constitutes libel or slander.  
2 Id. at 334. 
3 Id. 
1980). 
 
181 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325, 333 (Ct. App. 2
2
addressed in th
a
 
18
 
18
 69
former employees to renew their efforts to post on hundreds of bulletin boards, so that “[b
the time of trial the defendants had posted over 13,000 messages and vowed to continu
posting until they died.”
]y 
e 
185  
 
 a true 
 noting that it was in the interest of 
fre
 
uish any potential the forum might have 
for the meaningful exchange of ideas.  
Furthermore, the court argued, whether the Internet audience would believe the postings did 
not affect whether the words were capable of defamatory meaning.  Delfino and Day had 
184 A trial court found the two liable for defamation.
    On appeal, the defendants argued both that the messages were hyperbole and that, to the 
extent that the messages were defamatory, they were slanderous, not libelous, and therefore
special damages needed to be proved.186 The court quickly struck down the first of the 
defenses, “that Internet message boards are so filled with outrageous anonymous postings 
that no reasonable person would take a typical anonymous and outrageous posting as
statement of fact.”187 The court rejected that argument,
e speech to allow some policing of Internet speech: 
    We would be doing a great disservice to the Internet audience if we were to conclude
that all speech on the Internet is so suspect that it could not be defamatory as a matter of 
law. In effect, such a conclusion could exting
188
 
189
                                                                                                                                                       
 
Zdasiuk with being mentally ill. He claimed both executives were incompetent and accused them of being 
 
184 Id. at 333. 
.” 
 Also of note is that the defendants set up a Web site once the trial began in which they offered a narrative of 
ke 
 Id. at 337. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
[Delfino] maligned Varian products. He accused Felch of being “a neurotic hallucinatory.” He charged
chronic liars. Many of his messages contained sexual implications. One early message implied that Felch 
had attained her position by having sex with a supervisor. Id. 
 
185 Id. “Defendants were found liable for defamation, invasion of privacy, breach of contract, and conspiracy
Id. For the purposes of this analysis, the defamation action will be the focus. 
 
618
the events that “typically distorted actual facts or statements or simply took statements out of context to ma
their meaning derogatory.” Id. at 334. 
 
718
 
18
 
18
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been found liable for libel per se by a jury,190 which had awarded presumed and punitive 
damages to the plaintiffs.191  The court next turned to the question of whether Internet 
efamation, posted on Internet bulletin boards, constituted libel or slander.  
    In arguing that the speech was slander ts ignored the traditional distinction 
s 
ial 
nt of 
Internet communications. Application of the common law to matters involving the 
slander involves a practical difference in the requirements for pleading and proof so that 
 
her 
the communication was written or spoken, holding that because the “messages were 
publication by writing. . . composed and transmitted in the form of written words just like 
newspapers, handbills, or notes tacked to a conventional bulletin board,” they constituted 
libel al 
   
d
, the defendan
between libel and slander as written and oral speech, respectively, instead focusing on the 
element of proving damages. The distinction would be “crucial because slander require
proof of special damages and libel does not and since plaintiffs did not prove any spec
damages they cannot recover for defamation.”192 The court noted the importance of 
addressing this question for Internet communications: 
    The issue presented here involves a question that has arisen only with the adve
Internet is of considerable public interest. Moreover, the distinction between libel and 
the question is one that is likely to recur.193 
The court, however, chose to retain the traditional libel/slander distinction based on whet
.194 Although it is only one decision, this case represents a court applying tradition
                                              
 Id. at 338. Among the type of statements that would constitute libel per se were those that impute a crime; 190
jure one in one’s profession; suggest impotence, adultery, or other inappropriate sexual behavior such as 
 
191
$4  
aw
 
192
 
193
 
4 Id. at 343.  
in
sexual harassment and misconduct or sleeping with a supervisor for promotion;  and suggest one is a chronic 
liar or has committed perjury. Id. at n.5. 
 Id. at 335-36. “The jury found defendants liable for defamation (libel). . . . The jury awarded plaintiffs 
25,000 in presumed or general damages and $350,000 in punitive damages. No special damages were
arded on any cause of action.” Id. 
 Id. at 340. 
 Id. at 341. 
19
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common-law defamation principles to the Internet and finding that Internet speech could
policed and should be treated as libel, with no proof of sp
 be 
ecial damages required.195 
ourts 
 
Restatement of Torts, stating the broadcast defamation constitutes libel not slander, has 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
Conclusion 
    The case analysis in this chapter provides some insight into the question of how c
historically have grappled with applying defamation law to new mass communication 
technologies. In particular, courts faced the question of whether the transmission of a 
defamatory statement using sound technologies via the telegraph, radio, and television
constituted slander or libel. In trying to seek out a general theme that characterizes the 
approaches taken by the courts, one thing is clear: In working through how to treat 
defamation via telegraph, radio, television, and Internet, courts initially failed to reach a 
uniform approach; however, the publication in 1977 of section 568A in the Second 
   
inting them) as they are 
deleted or modified. In short, the only difference between the publications defendants made in this case 
 The defense also presented the argument that the court should treat Internet defamation as slander in the 
ng 
 
green,” it deserves the greater protection traditionally accorded slander. The argument confuses the 
titutional right to free speech and the plaintiff’s interest in protecting his or her good name. However, 
that balance is struck by weighing factors such as the plaintiff’s status (as a public or private figure) and 
They are representations “to the eye.” True, when sent out over the Internet the messages may be 
deleted or modified and to that extent they are not “fixed.” But in contrast with the spoken word, they are 
certainly “fixed.” Furthermore, the messages are just as easily preserved (as by pr
and traditionally libelous publications is defendants’ choice to disseminate the writings electronically. Id. 
 
519
interest of free speech, an argument that the court said misapplied defamation principles: 
Defendants also urge us to categorize communications over the Internet as the supposed lesser wro
of slander because, since Internet communication is the modern-day equivalent of a speech on the “village
analyses. In defamation cases we are always mindful of the balance between the defendant’s 
cons
the subject of speech itself against the defendant’s constitutional interests. Whether the speech is 
classified as libel or slander is an arbitrary and, some would say, archaic distinction. 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d  at 
342-43. 
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proved very influential in subsequent rulings.196 This section of the chapter provides an 
overview of the findings from the cases presented here. 
    In spite of the sound technology the telegraph used to transmit messages via sound waves,
defamation via the telegraph was considered libel because the message began and en
intended, in written form.
 
ded, as 
sed on 
eous.199 Several courts, particularly in 
n 
                                                
197 The radio and television cases both reveal a variety of 
approaches taken by courts. Some courts differentiated between libel and slander ba
whether the defamation was scripted198 or extemporan
recent cases, held that broadcast defamation is libel, regardless of whether a script is 
present.200  Only two courts have held that broadcast defamation constitutes slander, and 
those cases both occurred prior to 1977.201 Rather than determining whether the defamatio
constituted libel or slander, some courts viewed broadcast defamation as a distinct action that 
combined elements of libel and slander;202 others merely considered whether the content was 
 
 or 
 
6 
(N.Y. 1947); Landau v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 128 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1954)). 
 
t. 
d Broad., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. 
o. 1934); First Independent Baptist Church v. Southerland, 373 So. 2d 647 (Ala. 1979); Matherson v. 
1984); Shor v. Billingsley, 158 N.Y.S.2d. 476 (Sup. Ct. 1957). 
t. App. 1966); Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 20 P.2d 847 (Wash. 
933). 
2 American Broad.-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 126 S.E.2d 873 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962); Brewer v. 
196 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568A (1977). “Broadcasting of defamatory matter by means of radio
television is libel, whether or not it is read from a manuscript.” 
 
197 Peterson v. W. Union Tel. Co., 74 N.W. 1022 (Minn. 1898). 
198 Gearhart v. WSAZ, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Ky. 1957); Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 11
A.2d 440 (Conn. 1955); Sorenson v. Wood, 243 N.W. 82 (Neb. 1932); Hartmann v. Winchell, 73 N.E.2d 30 
199 Remington v. Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Locke v. Gibbons, 299 N.Y.S. 188 (N.Y. Sup. C
1937), aff’d mem., 2 N.Y.S. 2d 1015 (App. Div. 1938). 
 
200 Gearhart v. WSAZ, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Ky. 1957); Coffey v. Midlan
M
Marchello, 100 A.D.2d 233 (N.Y. App. Div. 
 
201 Arno v. Stewart, 254 Cal. App. 2d 955 (C
1
 
20
Rogers, 439 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Kelly v. Hoffman, 74 A.2d 922 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1950); Summit 
Hotel Co. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 8 A.2d 302 (Pa. 1939).  
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actionable per se.203 Finally, in the one Internet case found that addressed whether online 
defamation constituted libel or slander, the court focused on the common-law distinction 
between written and spoken defamation rather than the element of damages.204 As the ca
reveal, although the trend has been to treat defamation transmitted via each of these 
technologies as libel, particularly in the broadcast cases, different courts initially took a 
number of different approaches both in arriving at that decision and, conversely, in 
concluding that the defamation was slander, not libel. 
ses 
rt,205 
 
ral approaches. A few focused solely on the nature of the message as written 
r spoken.208 The conduct of the publisher prior to publication factored into several courts’ 
                                              
    Two clear examples of state courts being directed by state statutes were Arno v. Stewa
in which the court applied the state’s civil code to hold that broadcast defamation constitutes 
slander, and American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson,206 in which a 
Georgia court interpreted a state statute to create a third category of defamacast in addition to
libel and slander. Of note is that as recently as 1993, Georgia courts have continued to apply 
the defamacast category in the only post-1977 case found that did not adhere to the 
Restatement’s recommendation that broadcast defamation constitutes libel.207 
        In assigning a defamatory communication into the category of libel or slander, courts 
have taken seve
o
   
203 Riss v. Anderson, 304 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1962); Niehoff v. Cong. Square Hotel Co., 103 A.2d 219 (Me. 
1954); Greer v. Skyway Broad. Co., 124 S.E.2d 98 (N.C. 1962). 
 
t. App. 1962). 
57); Peterson v. W. Union Tel. Co. 74 N.W. 1022 
inn. 1898); Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 20 P.2d 847 (Wash. 1933). 
204 Varian Med. Sys., Inc., v. Delfino, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 325, 333 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 
205 254 Cal. App. 2d 955 (Ct. App. 1966). 
 
206 126 S.E.2d 873 (Ga. C
 
207 Brewer v. Rogers, 439 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). 
 
208 Gearhart v. WSAZ, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Ky. 19
(M
 
 74
decisions, too, as the cases that determined wh her libel or slander had occurred based on 
the presence or lack of a script demonstrate.209 Several courts focused on the impact of the 
defamation, noting that the harms caused by the widespread dissemination of broadcast 
defamation exceeded those of mere slander.  An exception is Summit Hotel Company v. 
National Broadcasting Co., in which the court viewed broadcast defamation as potentially 
having less impact than print media as a less permanent form with circulation dependent on 
the strength of the signal tower transmitting the broadcast.  
    In conclusion, then, the cases in this chapter demonstrate a variety of approaches and 
holdings by the courts. Generally, defamation transmitted via telegraph, radio, television, and 
Internet has been treated as libel, in spite of the sound technologies used by the telegraph and 
broadcast technologies, in particular. This suggests that courts have had to move away from 
the traditional distinction between libel and slander based solely on the nature on the speech. 
It is clear, too, that the Second Restatement of Torts has unquestionably influenced courts’ 
tre famation as libel. The potential harms of the dissemination have led 
m  
forms—
 
et
210
211
atment of broadcast de
ost courts to conclude that such defamation should be treated as the more serious of the two
libel.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE EVOLUTION OF MASS PUBLICATIONS INTO SINGLE PUBLICATION 
 
    Under traditional common-law defamation, each defamatory publication by the defamer t
a third party constitutes a new publication; under a strict interpretation of this approach, a 
newspaper publisher, for example, would be liable for every individual copy of an edition of 
the newspaper in every jurisdiction to which it was delivered for an indefinite period of 
Recognizing the inherent dangers and drawbacks of this approach, in the first half of t
twentieth century courts began to apply what is now known as the “single publication rule,” 
articulated in the Second Restatement of Torts as:  
    (2) A single communication heard at the same time by two or more third p
o 
time. 
he 
ersons is a 
single publication. 
exhibition of a motion picture or similar aggregate communication is a single publication. 
(a) only one action for damages can be maintained; 
(c) a judgment for or against the plaintiff upon the merits of any action for damages 
between the same parties in all jurisdictions.1 
 
Therefore, the single publication rule provides that “aggregate” publications, such as copies 
dcast aired to an audience, will be treated as one publication 
e publication rule functions to limit the number of suits a plaintiff may file, 
                                              
    (3) Any one edition of a book or newspaper, or any one radio or television broadcast, 
    (4) As to any single publication, 
(b) all damages suffered in all jurisdictions can be recovered in the one action; and 
bars any other action for damages 
of a newspaper or a single broa
for the purposes of the statute of limitations.  
    The singl
thereby protecting both defendants and the courts. The Restatement explains: 
   
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A (1977). 
 
    In order to avoid multiplicity of actions and undue harassment of the defendant by 
repeated suits by new individuals, as well as excessive damages that might have
recovered in numerous separate suits, the communication to the entire group is treated 
as one publication, giving rise to only one cause of action.
 been 
 
In ccessive or concurrent 
ds 
 as many separate lawsuits as there are causes of action.”3 
dicial 
4 
 
uns 
r 
e National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws approved the Uniform Single Publication 
                                              
2 
 1961, lawyer William Painter noted that “the theory that su
republications give rise to separate causes of action places a formidable weapon in the han
of an injured party, for he can bring
Painter described the adoption of the single publication rule as developing from “a ju
redefinition of the term ‘publication’ to confine a single wrong to a single cause of action.”
A significant implication of the single publication rule, which factored into many of the cases
discussed in this chapter, is that it is used in determining the statute of limitations for a 
publication: With each new instance of publication, the statute of limitations renews; 
however, if a publication is treated as an aggregate publication, the statute of limitations r
from the initial publication of the material. Therefore, the single publication rule has 
significant implications for suits in which the statute of limitations is an issue. 
    Courts began to adopt the single publication rule—or at least the principle of it, whether o
not they used that terminology—in the early twentieth century,5 and in 1952, th
Act.6 Section 1 of the Act provides: 
   
r, Republication Problems in the Law of Defamation, 47 VA. L. REV. 1131, 1138 (1961).  
ORM SINGLE PUBLICATION ACT §§ 1, 2 (1952). 
2 Id. § 577A cmt. b. 
 
3 William H. Painte
 
4 Id. at 1139. 
 
5 Wolfson v Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 4 N.Y.S.2d 640 (App. Div. 1938), a newspaper case commonly viewed 
as applying the rule, will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
 
6 UNIF
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    No person shall ha r libel or slander 
or invasion of privacy or any other tort founded upon any single publication or 
 
any one presentation to an audience or any one broadcast over radio or television or any 
any such tort suffered by the plaintiff in all jurisdictions.  
Many courts have adopted the single publication rule,  and seven states have adopted the 
Uniform Single Publication Act.  
    In this chapter, the focus will be on radio, television, and Internet cases that have 
addressed whether and how the single publication rule should apply. Most of the case law 
applying the single publication rule addresses newspaper or magazine publication. Only one 
ra
pu
e single publication rule proved an important question which the courts were forced to 
address.  Cases are arranged chronologically within each technology. As the analysis 
reveals, courts seem to have adopted the principles set forth in the Uniform Single 
Publication Act and the Restatement of Torts so that most courts treat separate publications 
as such and aggregate publications as single publications, as will be discussed. 
ve more than one cause of action for damages fo
exhibition or utterance, such as any one edition of a newspaper or book or magazine or
one exhibition of a motion picture. Recovery in any action shall include all damages for 
7
 
8
 9
dio case was found and no telegraph cases were found that directly addressed the single 
blication rule or its principles. For television and the Internet, whether and how to apply 
th
10
                                                 
Id. (cited in Andrea G. Nadel, Annot7 ation, What Constitutes “Single Publication” Within Meaning of Single 
ule Affecting Action for Libel and Slander, Violation of Privacy, or Similar Torts, 41 A.L.R. 4th 
rticularly § 
77A on the single publication rule; the American Jurisprudence Database, particularly 50 Am. Jur. 2d §§ 238, 
Publication R
41 (1986)). 5
 
8 Id. § 2. 
 
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A (1977). “The Uniform Single Publication Act, promulgated in 
1952 . . . has been adopted in Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, New Mexico, North Dakota and 
Pennsylvania.” Id. 
 
10 Cases were found through examining cases cited in contemporary law review articles; the Uniform Single 
Publication Act on Westlaw, which included links to cases; the Restatement (Second) of Torts, pa
5
245, 246; and through Westlaw searches using the Terms and Connectors feature including telegraph, radio, 
television, Internet, defamation, “single publication,” multiple publication and “Uniform Single Publication 
Act.” 
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Background: Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers 
     The case credited with creating the single publication doctrine was a newspaper case, 
Wolfson v Syracuse Newspapers, Inc.11 Although the case did not involve a new technology,
it laid the groundwork for the single publication doctrine. The defamation claim in Wolfson 
centered on an allegedly defamatory article concerning William J. Wolfson published in the 
Syracuse newspaper on December 16, 1935. The court wrote, “If we assume that 
 
these 
rticles then constituted actionable libel, plaintiff’s right of action expired on April 8, 
1937.”12 The opinion continued: 
his amended complaint that between December 16, 1935, when the alleged libels were 
maintained in connection with its main office a library where “the libelous news matter 
 
, 
 
en 
e 
                                                
a
    In an apparent effort to escape the bar of the statute of limitations plaintiff alleges in 
published, and May 7, 1937, when this action was commenced, the defendant 
complained of” was made available to the general public.13 
The plaintiff argued that a republication had occurred, renewing the statute of limitations
when a third party asked and was allowed to review the issue in question during March 1937.
The court, in a 3-2 decision, refused to support Wolfson’s claim that the defamation had be
republished when viewed in the reading room.14 The court considered the publication to hav
 
 Id. at 641. 
13 Id. 
pu
ex he 
opi
stat the material was distributed could enable a cause of action, even if the 
laintiff had already been awarded damages in another court. “I am speaking of the facts as shown by the 
he post office here, for circulation 
roughout other states, territories, counties, and districts, there is one publication, and that is here. If that is 
ublic the 
11 4 N.Y.S.2d 640 (App. Div. 1938). 
 
12
 
A 1909 case, United States v. Smith, 173 F. 227 (D. Ct. Ind.), articulated the principles of the single 
blication rule but did not refer to it as such. In this case, a newspaper that was published and almost 
clusively distributed in Indiana circulated 50 copies of its newspaper throughout Washington, D.C. In t
nion, Justice Anderson argued that the original publication should be the sole publication; otherwise any 
e, county, or territory in which 
p
evidence here—where people print a newspaper here, and deposit it in t
th
true, then there was no publication, under the evidence, in Washington.” Smith, 173 F. at 232.  
 
14 Wolfson, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 642. “We cannot accept plaintiff’s arguments that by thus according to the p
privilege of examining bound copies of its prior issues . . .  the defendant republished the alleged libels which 
had appeared in the single edition of that date.” Id. 
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occurred at the time of the first publication of the newspaper only,15 stating, “The number of 
separate publications of the alleged libels and the causes of action arising therefrom [sic
plaintiff’s favor were not gauged by the number of copies of the single edition in which t
articles appeared and which defendant circulated by sale or otherwise.”
] in 
he 
iting a 
on 
 by a New York federal district court, is the only case 
g 
                                                
16 Through lim
cause of action to the original publication date and treating the publication as one aggregate 
publication, the court thus originated the single publication rule for newspapers. 
 
Radio 
    Only one radio case was found in which the question arose regarding the initial publicati
of a radio broadcast or the number of actions that could be filed. Jewell v. Capital 
Cities/ABC, Inc.,17 decided in 1998
located to fit the criteria of involving radio defamation and the single publication rule.18 
Security guard Richard Jewell entered the public eye in July 1996 after the bombings durin
the Centennial Olympic Games in Atlanta on July 27. In the wake of the bombings, radio 
personality Michael Lebron, who went by the professional name “Lionel,” made allegedly 
 
at at the 
If plaintiff had commenced this action before the statute of limitations expired, the fact that copies of 
lleged libels were filed and preserved for public and private 
record, as a matter of common business practice, and in public libraries for purposes of reference and 
historical data, would have been competent elements of damage by which the extent of plaintiff’s injury 
might have been measured. Id. 
 No. 97 Civ. 5617 LAP, 1998 WL 702286  (Oct. 7, S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 Searches through contemporary law review articles and Westlaw turned up no additional radio defamation 
search was 
ompleted using the “Terms and Connectors” feature and the terms: “radio & ‘single publication’ & 
ation” and “radio & ‘statute of limitations’ & defamation.” Many cases addressed privacy issues, but no 
thers addressed defamation and the single publication rule. 
15 Id. “[I]n the publication of a defamatory article in a newspaper there is but one publication, and th
place where the newspaper is published.” Id. 
 
16 Id.  
the single edition which contained the a
 
17
 
18
cases involving radio defamation and the application of the single publication rule. The Westlaw 
c
defam
o
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defamatory statements regarding Jewell in three broadcasts aired July 31 to August 
Jewell sued Lionel, Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., and WABC-AM Radio, Inc. In Jewell v. 
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., the court addressed whether Jewell could amend a defamation 
complaint after the statute of limitations had run to add both additional allegations of 
defamatory statements and five individuals as defendants who had not been mentioned 
original complaint. Jewell had initially filed his complaint July 28, 1997, “shortly before the 
statute of limitations expired.”
2, 1996.19 
in the 
ed 
loyment history which imply or suggest that he committed or 
kely committed the bombing.”21 
    Less than two months later, on Septem  Jewell sought to amend his complaint 
iduals 
 the 
five individuals was barred under the one-year New York statute of limitations on 
; Jewell argued that, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures,23 he was 
   
20  The original complaint alleged the defamatory statements 
uttered by Lionel during the broadcast included: “i) those which directly allege plaintiff’s 
guilt in the Centennial Olympic bombing; and ii) those which allege that Jewell possess
personality traits and/or an emp
li
ber 9, 1997,
by adding sixteen new defamatory statements to the two categories above: “Nine of those 
statements were attributable to Lionel, and the remainder were attributable to five indiv
who were not identified in the original complaint but who had participated in the Lionel radio 
broadcasts of July 31 through August 2, 1996.”22 The defense argued that the addition of
defamation
permitted to amend the complaint. 
                                              
 Id. at * 1.  
Id. 
19
 
20 
 
 Id. (citing Plaintiff’s Rely Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Amend Complaint). 
 Id. 
 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)). 
21
 
22
 
23
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    Jewell argued that the statements were all part of the original broadcast, a single 
publication, and that, in line with the single publication rule, “there ‘can only be one single
defamation claim arising from a single publication,’ and that Lionel’s daily broadcast
its entirety, a single publication.”
 
 is, in 
l could be 
urt treated the words of each speaker as separate 
    Ten years after the promulgation of the Uniform Single Publication Act, the First Circuit 
d complaints for 
unfa
               
24 The court said that, under New York law, “every distinct 
publication of a ... slanderous statement gives rise to a separate cause of action.”25  
Therefore, the court found that, while the additional statements attributed to Lione
added to the complaint, “[t]he statements made by individuals other than Lionel are barred by 
the statute of limitations.”26 Thus, the co
publications and consequently limited the plaintiff’s ability to amend the complaint to 
include additional defendants. 
 
Television 
Court of Appeals addressed the application of the single publication rule to television 
efamation in 1962 in Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co.27 Performer Bert Lahr filed
ir competition, invasion of privacy, and defamation after Adell Chemical Company 
                                                                                                                                        
 
24 
 
 Id. (quoting Barber v. Daly, 185 A.D.2d 567, 586 N.Y.S.2d 398, 400 (3d Dept.1992). The court also argued 
sed amendment to the complaint was too far removed from the original:  
An amendment asserting a claim will not relate back to the original complaint unless it “arose out of 
t, transaction or occurrence attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.” . . . An 
amendment will not relate back if its sets forth a new set of operational facts; it can only make more 
at has already been alleged. . . . Here, although the new defamatory statements were made at 
the at 
 
26 
 
 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962). 
Id. at *2. 
25
that the propo
the conduc
specific wh
 same time as those alleged in the original complaint, plaintiff alleges new defamatory statements th
were made by different individuals. As such, the proposed amended complaint introduces a new set of 
operational facts. Id. 
Id. at *3. 
27
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advertised a product in a television commercial using a cartoon duck character with a voice 
that Lahr alleged imitated his voice.28 Lahr, who argued that his stardom was due in large 
part to his distinctive voice,29 rested his defamation claim on his assumption that his 
professional reputation had been injured, “both because it cheapened plaintiff to indicate that 
he
alt
de urt 
for failure to state a cause of action.”  
    The single publication rule factored into the decision because Lahr claimed that his 
reputation had been damaged perhaps “throughout the land,” although the court persuaded 
him to limit his actions to Massachusetts and New York.  In spite of the court’s doubts 
about the damage to Lahr’s reputation,  it was willing to allow the single publication rule 
 was reduced to giving anonymous television commercials and because the imitation, 
hough recognizable, was inferior in quality and suggested that his abilities had 
teriorated.”30 In this case, Lahr appealed the dismissal of his complaint by the district co
31“
32
33
                                                 
television, used as a commercial a cartoon film of a duck and, without plaintiff’s consent, ‘as the voice of the 
aforesaid duck, an actor who specialized in imitating the vocal sounds of the plaintiff.’” Id. 
 
29 Id. 
28 Id. at 257. “The complaint alleges that Adell Chemical Company, in advertising its product ‘Lestoil’ on 
According to the complaint the plaintiff is a professional entertainer who has achieved stardom—with 
commensurate financial success—on the legitimate stage, in motion pictures, on radio, on television and 
other entertainment media throughout the United State, Canada and elsewhere. This he has done in 
substantial measure because his “style of vocal comic delivery which, by reason of its distinctive and 
original combination of pitch, inflection, accent and comic sounds,” has caused him to become “widely 
kn
 
30 
 
31 
 
 Id. at 258.  
h plaintiff asserts the “voice of the aforesaid duck,” alias perhaps mockingbird, was heard 
throughout the land, with possibly varying legal consequences, the law he cites is on no such scale. Upon 
pressing, he agreed that we need consider no law except that of Massachusetts and New York. We 
will interpret this concession as meaning not that plaintiff does not claim injury in other states, but that for 
 with one or both of the two 
jurisdictions specified. Id. 
 
33 Id. at 259.  
own and readily recognized . . . as a unique ant [sic] extraordinary comic character.” Id. 
Id. at 258. 
Id. at 257. 
32
Althoug
our 
present purposes we may assume the law of those states to be in accord
 83
and the statute of limitations to be reconsidered in this case: The commercial began to air in 
December 1958, but Lahr did not file an action until January 1961, well past the one year 
statute of limitations for libel claims in Massachusetts.34 The court decided the issue shoul
be addressed on remand: 
    It does not appear for how long a period the duck trespassed on plaintiff’s reputatio
barred by December 1960. This rule is normally applicable to continued sales and new 
Whether the single publication rule should be applied to the circumstances had best be
35
 
36
d 
n. 
Defendant, relying on the single publication rule, asserts that plaintiff’s rights became 
editions of a single literary work. The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. 
 
decided when we know what they were.  
The appellate court vacated the district court dismissal and remanded the case  because the 
First Circuit was unable to determine from the known facts of the case how long the 
commercial had appeared on TV and, thus, when the statute of limitations would run. This 
case presented a new and interesting issue:  Does the single publication rule apply to a 
commercial that is repeated over a period of time? Is each repetition of the commercial a new 
publication or, as the defendant asserted, does the entire run of a commercial count as a 
single publication? That question, however, was apparently never answered as no additional 
opinions in this case could be found.  
                                                                                                                                                       
question. Even entertainers who make no claim to uniqueness have distinctive vocal characteristics and 
like me, but not so good,” and contend the public believed, in spite of the variance, that it was he, and at 
 
34 Id. at 260.  
 Id. 
 No further cases were found using the Westlaw “Full History” option.  
Plaintiff’s additional assertion that an inferior imitation damaged his reputation raises a more doubtful 
may be thought to be recognized. If every time one can allege, “Your (anonymous) commercial sounded 
the same time believed, because of the variance, that his abilities had declined, the consequences would 
be too great to contemplate.  Id. 
 
35
 
36
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    Four years later, Devlin v. National Broadcasting Co.37 reflected another challenge raised 
by the single publication rule: Because the rule had not been adopted in all jurisdictions, libe
plaintiffs would naturally want to seek out those venues most likely to rule in their fav
Devlin was a blatant example of forum shopping. The plaintiff, Dr. Edward A. Devlin, wa
California resident who also was a surgeon and atto
l 
or. 
s a 
rney associated with the Oceanside 
Ho of 
th
na  
re
sulting in the girl’s death. During the episode, Dr. Robert Devlin filed a defamation suit 
against Dr. Kildare for statements he made suggesting that Devlin’s behavior was criminal; 
in a fictional court proceeding that resulted, a third doctor referred to Devlin’s refusal to care 
for the girl as “an ungodly act.”   
   Devlin and Oceanside Hospital filed libel actions in California, which had adopted the 
Uniform Single Publication Act, as well as in Washington, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, 
where the present case occurred. NBC moved to dismiss the New Jersey suit on the ground 
that California was “the more convenient forum,” but the trial court denied that motion.39 On 
appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that “plaintiffs apparently have no connection 
with New Jersey” but chose to sue in states other than California because they feared “that 
the California action might ultimately be dismissed under California’s retraction statute.”40  
                                              
spital in that state. In 1964, the National Broadcasting Company broadcast an episode 
e popular television series Dr. Kildare titled “The Ungodly Act,” in which a character 
med Dr. Robert Devlin, a physician, lawyer, and operator of a small private hospital,
fused to care for a poor, young female patient brought to his hospital by Dr. Kildare, 
re
38
   
 A.2d 523 (N.J. 1966) (per curiam). 
 Id. at 524-25. 
 Id. at 525. 
37 219
 
38 Id. at 524. 
 
39
 
40
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    The plaintiffs argued that they should be allowed to maintain claims in both Californ
New Jersey because the program was broadcast from both New York to the East Coast and 
from Burbank, California, to the West Coast and, therefore, constituted two separate 
publications. Noting that New Jersey had not yet adopted the single publication rule, the 
plaintiffs urged the court not to do so in this case. 
    They poi
ia and 
nt out that the New Jersey Legislature has not adopted the Uniform Single 
Publication Act, and that, although many states have adopted the Uniform Single 
by judicial decision, the New Jersey courts have not thus far expressly departed from the 
place of communication. They urge that if the single publication rule which they label 
rather than judicial decision.  
The New Jersey high court refused to rule on the single publication rule and instead stayed 
the New Jersey action pending the outcome of the California case. Once the California courts 
ruled, the New Jersey Supreme Court said, “many of the issues raised by the plaintiffs may 
have been effectively disposed of or may have become moot.”  As the plaintiff’s request 
suggests, however, adoption of the single publication rule had become common as state 
legislatures adopted the Uniform Single Publication Act or state courts adopted the single 
 rule through common law rulings. 
    A New York court addre
pr
Co ut the Municipal 
             
Publication Act, and that, although many states have adopted a single publication rule 
common law doctrine that each publication may give rise to a separate action at the 
“inadequate and unfair” is to be adopted for New Jersey, it should be by legislative act 
41
 
42
publication
ssed the application of the single publication rule to television 
ograms in defamation case Municipal Training Center, Inc. v. National Broadcasting 
rp.43 The facts of the case as provided in the opinion are sparse, b
                                                                                                                                          
 
41 
 
 No further proceedings were found using Westlaw history or Keycite searches, for either the California or 
ersey proceedings. 
t. 1976). 
Id. 
42
New J
 
43 387 N.Y.S.2d 40 (N.Y. Sup. C
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Training Center alleged that National Broadcasting Corporation libeled it in television 
programs broadcast on August 2, 1974, and September 11, 1974.44 In the present case, the 
Ce ; 
ho ime 
e Center sought to amend the original complaint, which included only the 1974 
broadcasts.  
    The Center argued that the January 1975 libel was part of an aggregate publication of the 
previous libels.  The court, however, disagreed and held that each broadcast was a separate 
publication. In doing so, the court noted that “the law is clear with respect to libel actions . . . 
each publication gives rise to a separate cause of action which does not relate back to the 
earlier publication.”  In making its decision, the court noted Hartmann v. Time,  in which 
the Third Circuit held that the publication in a magazine of a new libel almost identical to a 
previous libel, one month after a complaint had been filed for the original, constituted a new 
                                                
nter sought to amend the complaint to include a third libel published January 21, 1975
wever, more than the one year of the statute of limitations for libel had passed by the t
th
45
46
47 48
 
 
45 Id.  
This is a motion by plaintiffs for leave to serve a supplemental complaint. . . .Plaintiff’s original 
complaint alleges that they were libeled by defendants on two television programs broadcast on August 2, 
mental complaint sets forth an additional cause of 
act
 
46 
eged libel published on January 21, 1975 was in part a republication of the 
earlier libels, of which defendants had notice by virtue of the commencement of this lawsuit, and that the 
plemental complaint relates back to the original causes of action, and is therefor [sic] not time-barred. 
Id. 
 Id. 
44 Id. at 41. 
1974 and September 11, 1974. The proposed supple
ion for libel as a result of a further broadcast by defendants on January 21, 1975. Leave to serve this 
pleading was sought more than one year after the January, 1975 broadcast. Id. 
Id.  
Plaintiffs argue that the all
sup
 
47
 
48 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1947). 
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publication and separate cause of action.49 In line with that rationale, the New York cour
held: 
    Leave to serve the supplemental complaint having been sought more than one year 
the January 21, 1975 publication is barred by the statute of limitations and plaintiff’s 
50
 
t 
after the broadcast of the alleged libel set forth therein, the cause of action arising from 
motion for leave to serve the supplemental complaint is therefore denied.  
The court, therefore, held that, because the January 1975 broadcast constituted a separate 
publication, and because more than one year had passed before the plaintiffs sought to 
include that publication in their complaint, the action was time-barred. 
    A 1987 case, Herron v. King, case centered around a racketeering scandal that had 
received wide press coverage and involved allegations against the prosecuting attorney of 
Pierce County, Don Herron.  Reporter Don McGaffin wrote and broadcast a story over 
KING TV Channel 5 on the 5:30 p.m. news on December 1, 1978, alleging that Herron was 
being questioned by FBI agents about bail bond procedures as a result of his connection to 
several people arrested by the Justice Department on racketeering charges. The story was 
rewritten and read again by another broadcaster on the 11 o’clock news that evening.  
Finally, a variation of the story, attributed to McGaffin and distributed through the United 
Press International wire service, was printed the next day in the Bremerton Sun newspaper.  
51
52
                                                 
49 387 N.Y.S.2d at 41. The court wrote of Hartmann:  
In that case, the original complaint set forth an alleged libel published in defendant’s issue of January 
17, 1944. Thereafter, an amended complaint was served alleging a new libel contained in the issue of 
ruary 7, 1944. The alleged new libel was almost identical to the original one. Nevertheless, the Court 
held that the latest publication was “separate, distinct and apart” from the earlier one, precluding relation 
 Id. 
 746 P.2d 295 (Wash. 1987) (en banc). 
 “Although the content was similar, (the later) report included a statement that bail bond interests had 
uted ‘approximately $50,000’ to the campaign.” Id. at 300. 
Feb
back to the earlier issue. Id.  
 
50
 
51
 
52
contrib
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    Herron sued McGaffin, KING Broadcasting, and the Bremerton Sun for five specific 
statements of alleged defamation that had each appeared in the newspaper story.53 After the 
statute of limitations had expired, Herron attempted unsuccessfully to add UPI to the claim. 
 
tter 
ide 
                                                
He also attempted to amend the complaint to add the statements made in the 11 o’clock 
broadcast; this request was denied by the trial court as time-barred, as the court decided that 
“each newscast constituted a separate cause of action for defamation.”54 One of the issues 
before the Washington Supreme Court, therefore, was considering whether and how to apply 
the single publication rule. 
    Whereas common law had traditionally treated each publication, such as the sale of a
book, as a separate cause of action,55 the court found “the single publication rule the be
reasoned rule in the light of the modern realities of mass publication and broadcasts to w
audiences.”56 The court held that “[t]he 11 p.m. newscast was the result of a conscious 
independent act, using a new script and broadcaster, and so clearly constitutes a separate 
publication, even under the single publication rule.”57 While the court refused to amend 
Herron’s previous complaint, it said that the second broadcast “is, however, evidence of 
King’s actual malice.”58 The state supreme court, therefore, reversed the trial court’s 
dismissal of the case. In Herron, then, the court examined whether the republication of a 
 
53 Id. “Herron sued KING Broadcasting, McGaffin, and the Bremerton Sun for defamation. His complaint set 
forth five specific statements alleged to have been defamatory, all of which appeared in the printed article 
published by the Bremerton Sun.”  Id. 
 
54 Id. 
 
 of a defamatory utterance (e.g., each sale of a book) constituted a 
parate cause of action.” Id. 
 Id.  
55 Id. “At common law, each publication
se
 
56
 
57 Id. 
 
58 Id. 
 
 89
story in a second edition of the evening news involved an intentional, separate act from the 
original publication and found the single publication rule could not apply when that intent to 
produce a separate publication was evident. 
   ld 
am le 15(c) 
of  or 
efense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence 
set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to 
the date of the original pleading.”  In this case, plaintiff James Burt alleged that CBS 
defamed him with a report about his medical practice on its program West 57th Street, 
initially broadcast October 29, 1988.  The show was broadcast two additional times—
November 19, 1988, and July 8, 1989.  Burt filed his complaint March 5, 1990—more than 
a year after the initial broadcast, thus after the one-year statute of limitations had expired. He 
claimed, however, that because CBS had rebroadcast the program in the year prior to his 
March 1990 complaint—the July 1989 publication—the complaint was not time-barred. 
    The court noted that Burt might be able to make a case based on the third broadcast having 
been aired less than a year before his complaint was filed because it viewed each broadcast as 
 A 1991 Ohio U.S. district court case, Burt v. CBS, Inc., addressed whether a plaintiff cou
end a complaint to include an additional allegedly defamatory broadcast under Ru
 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.59 Part of Rule 15(c) states,  “Whenever the claim
d
60
61
62
                                                 
59 769 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D. Ohio 1991). 
 
60 Id. at 1015 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)). 
 
61 In addition to CBS, Burt filed defamation actions against Vickie Samuels, the show’s producer, and Karen
Burnes, a reporter.  
 
t 1014. 
 
62 Id. a
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“a distinct and separate publication and separate cause of action.”63 The defense, however, 
argued that Burt had not included the July 1989 broadcast in his initial defamation co
but waited until October 1990 to do so:  
    Defendants contend that Plaintiff did not assert a defamation claim arising out of the 
[1990], which was more than one year after said broadcast. Therefore, Defendant 
relation back provisions in Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which, 
64
 
mplaint 
July 8, 1989, broadcast until he filed his second amended complaint on October 17, 
contends that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations, unless it is saved by the 
not surprisingly, Defendants argue does not apply in this case.  
The court agreed with the defendants’ approach, stating that “Courts and commentators alike 
have said that relation back should not apply in instances where the plaintiff is asserting a 
new claim for defamation based upon the separate publication of a defamatory statement.”65 
Because the publications were separate and distinct causes of action, and because the court 
held that Rule 15(c) did not apply in this case,  Burt’s complaint was viewed as time-barred, 
having been filed after the statute of limitations had expired. Ultimately, the court treated 
each of the three broadcasts as separate publications. Had Burt filed within the one-year 
statute of limitations, he would have been able to claim three separate causes of action. As it 
was, after not filing a complaint specifically mentioning the final broadcast until more than a 
ear had passed after that broadcast, and the statute of limitations had expired. 
 
y
    In 2004, a New York federal district court cited the Restatement of Torts in holding that 
the rebroadcast of a defamatory television program on The Learning Channel, part of 
                                                 
63 Id. at 1015. “It is apparent that any defamation claims that the Plaintiff might assert as a result of the first two 
 the filing of this lawsuit on March 5, 1990.” Id. 
t 1015. The original text reads that the second amended complaint was filed October 17, 1989. Not only 
oes that not make sense given the question of the statute of limitations, but later in the opinion, the court notes: 
broadcasts are barred by the statute of limitations. . . .It is equally apparent that the broadcast of July 81, 1989, 
occurred less than one year prior to
 
64 Id. a
d
“Plaintiff sought leave to file the second amended complaint on October 12, 1990. The seconded amended 
complaint was filed on October 17, 1990.” Id. n.5. 
 
65 Id. 
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Discovery Communications, Inc., constituted a separate publication each time the program 
aired. In Lehman v. Discovery Communications, Inc.,66 Discovery filed a motion for 
summary judgment. The libel action was brought by Dr. Martin A. Lehman, an orthopedic 
surgeon, who was arrested in 1997 on charges of insurance fraud;67 his arrest was one of 2
resulting from an undercover stin
0 
g operation called “Operation Backbone,” which received 
ex  
Le
   ery aired a program called “World’s Most 
 
ting 
al to 
of 
tensive press coverage in the wake of the arrests.68 On March 3, 1999, a jury acquitted
hman of all charges.69  
 A few weeks later, on March 21, 1999, Discov
Outstanding Undercover Stings” on The Learning Channel, which included a segment on 
Operation Backbone.70 Assistant District Attorney Barbara Kornblau, who had been involved
in Operation Backbone, appeared on the program and spoke about the logistics of the s
operation, including her opinion that undercover video footage of the doctors led sever
enter guilty pleas.71 Lehman alleged that, during the course of the program, three clips 
video footage were shown of him while Kornblau or the narrator spoke. During one clip, 
showing Lehman taking x-rays of a patient and performing other tests, the narrator said, 
                                                 
66 332  F. Supp. 2d 534 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 
67 Id. at 535. “The investigation was conducted to address growing incidences of insurance fraud by medical 
providers and legal representatives in the area of automobile no-fault, disability and the workers’ compensation 
.” Id. 
e operation was conducted jointly by the Special Investigations Bureau of the Office of the District 
ttorney, the Nassau County Police Department, and the United States Postal Inspection Services. The 
ion led to the arrests of 20 individuals, including the plaintiff.” Id. 
he District Attorney’s Office prosecuted the plaintiff, and on March 3, 1999, following a jury trial, he 
was a
 
70 
 
 Id. at 536. “Kornblau also said that personnel involved in Operation Backbone videotaped doctors performing 
of patients, and the prosecutors used the videotapes extensively during their grand jury 
resentations. In the televised interview, Kornblau opined that the videotapes led many defendants to enter 
claims
 
68 Id. “Th
A
operat
 
69 Id. (T
cquitted of all charges.”) Id. 
Id. 
71
examinations 
p
guilty pleas.” Id. 
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“Twelve undercover agents found corruption on every level from doctors willing to spen
only seconds examining a phoney [sic] patient.”
d 
 
d in 
llars in false claims are brought to justice.”73 In the final 
ople 
displayed had been convicted of insurance fraud, while the third person was the plaintiff 
following comments were made: “Operation Backbone is a success but the fight to 
 
 21, 1999, and May 24, 2001. On June 21, 2001, 
Le .75 
    
publication of the episode on March 21, 1999, and urged the court to apply the single 
 
on which the work was placed on sale or became generally available to the public.’”77 
       
72 During another video clip of Lehman, “the
narrator states, ‘With enough evidence in their possession, twenty professionals involve
billing more than two million do
instance of alleged defamation: 
    The third clip consists of pictures of three health care providers. Two of the pe
who had been acquitted of such charges. While these three pictures were shown, the 
eliminate false insurance claims continues.”74 
The program aired 17 times between March
hman filed an action claiming that he had been defamed in the May 24, 2001, broadcast
Discovery argued that the one-year statute of limitations began to run with the first 
publication rule to the broadcast to consider all airings of the program as an aggregate 
publication.76 In New York, the court noted, “the statute of limitations for libel is one year 
and begins to accrue at the time of the first publication which is defined as ‘the earliest date
                                          
Id. 
Id. 
72 
 
73 
 
 Id. 
75 Id.  
ages in 
24, 2001 airing of the program. Id. 
he court cited Van Buskirk v. New York Times Co., 325 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2003), an Internet case that will 
e discussed in the next section, in applying this standard. 
74
 
On June 21, 2001, Dr. Lehman commenced this action, alleging that, on May 24, 2001, the defendant 
aired the program on The Learning Channel. The plaintiff alleges that several quotations from the 
program constitute libel and slander per se and seeks both compensatory and punitive dam
connection with only the May 
 
76 Id. at 537. 
 
77 Id. T
b
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Discovery asked the court to apply the single publication rule—which had already be
applied to books, newspapers, 
en 
and Internet publishing—“to [the] rebroadcast of defamatory 
 
at 
editions [sic] of a newspaper, a rebroadcast of a television show is intended to reach a 
ed 
impact with each viewing and creates a new opportunity for injury, thereby justifying a 
 
2001, broadcast, was 
well within the statute of limitation in this case  In Lehman, therefore, a rebroadcast of a 
                                                                                                                                                      
material on television” because courts had previously applied the single publication to 
television in privacy claims.78  
     Instead, the court cited the Restatement of Torts, stating that “Section 577A(3)(comment
d) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts explicitly recognizes that a rebroadcast of 
defamatory material via television constitutes a separate publication.”79 The court cited the 
intent of the television network to reach a new audience with each broadcast in holding th
each broadcast was a separate publication: 
    Like a publication of the same defamatory statement in both a morning and evening 
new audience and is therefore an additional communication. A rebroadcast has renew
new cause of action.80 
Finding that each airing constituted a republication, the court held that Lehman, who had 
commenced the defamation action within one month after the May 24, 
.81
 
 
78 Id.  
Courts have adopted the rule to books and newspa rs and have extended it to Internet publishing. . . . 
According to the defendant, the single publication rul  should be applied to rebroadcast of defamatory 
material on television. In support of its argument, DCI points out that, in relation to privacy television 
programming in the context of privacy claims, New York courts have applied the rule and have not 
treated each individual broadcast as a republication. Id. 
79 
Rebroadcast of the defamation over radio or television or a second run of a motion picture on the same 
] that reaches a new group and the repetition justifies a new cause of 
action. The justification for this conclusion usually offered is that in these cases the second publication is 
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
577A(3)(comment d) (1977). 
 Id. at 539. 
pe
e
 
Id. at 538.  
evening. . . [is a separate publication
intended to and does reach a new group. Id. (citing RE
 
80
 
81 Id. 
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defamatory television program was held to e a republication, not part of an 
 
 
n 
e-Restatement case, a New York court treated three 
rate 
                                              
 constitut
aggregate, single publication. 
    The television defamation cases in which courts addressed whether and how to apply the 
single publication rule are, for the most part, recent cases. No cases were found that 
addressed this issue prior to the 1952 Uniform Single Publication Act, but three cases were 
decided before the Restatement of Torts endorsed the single publication rule in 1977.82 Two
of those cases did not settle the issue: One court remanded the case to determine the facts of
the publication dates for a television commercial for the purposes of applying the single 
publication rule.83 In the other case, the New Jersey state court awaited the decision of a 
California state court and avoided having to decide whether to apply the single publicatio
rule in New Jersey.84 In the third pr
broadcasts of a television program as a multiple publications, in line with what the 
Restatement would decree one year later.85 The post-Restatement cases have treated sepa
broadcasts as distinct publications, consistent with the Restatement.86  
 
 
 
 
   
6); 
256 (1st Cir. 1962). 
o., 219 A.2d 523 (N.J. 1966). 
 
85 M
 
86 Supp. 
10 . King, 746 P.2d 295 (Wash. 1987). 
82 Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962); Devlin v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 219 A.2d 523 (N.J. 196
Mun. Training Ctr., Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Corp., 387 N.Y.S.2d 40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). 
 
83 Lahr, 300 F.2d 
 
84 Devlin v. Nat’l Broad. C
un. Training Ctr., Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Corp., 387 N.Y.S.2d 40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). 
Lehman v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 2d 534 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Burt v. CBS, Inc., 769 F. 
12 (S.D. Ohio 1991); Herron v
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Internet 
    One of the defining cases in the single publication rule’s application to the Internet is Firth
v. New York.
 
 
the 
ber 16, 1996, 
y88 
he 
d 
ion 
 the 
                                                
87 Plaintiff George Firth was a former employee of the New York Department of 
Environmental Conservation (DEC) and had served as its director of the Division of Law
Enforcement (DLE) for the thirteen years by 1997. During May 1992, an investigator for 
Office of the Inspector General began an investigation of a DEC theft that led to an inquiry 
into pistol purchases by the DEC. The inspector published a report on Decem
that became the root of the action in this case. Firth alleged that the report was defamator
and that, because the report was available on the Internet, publication included not only t
initial posting on the Internet of the report but additional republication for every day the 
report was available on the Web.89 
    The court held that Firth failed to meet the statute of limitations for his claims. Firth ha
ninety days to notify the Attorney General that he intended to file a claim, which he did 
March 3, 1997, and then had one year from that date to actually file; he filed his defamat
claim March 18, 1998, more than a year later. Firth, however, argued that the presence of
report on the Internet resulted in the republishing every day of the defamation. The court 
likened copies of a newspaper or magazine to “hits” on the Web and held that the single 
 
87706 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Ct. Cl. 2000), aff’d, 731 N.Y.S.2d 244 (App. Div. 2001), aff’d 775 N.E.2d 463 (N.Y. Ct. 
App. 2002), aff’d  761 N.Y.S.2d. 361 (App. Div. 2003).  
 
88 Statements in the report included allegations questioning Firth’s fitness for duty and that Firth “knowingly 
tolerated repeated breaches of law and policy. The citizens of this state demand of our law enforcement officers 
gree of integrity, honesty and trustworthiness. . . George Firth fall[s] short in every category.” 706 
.Y.S.2d at 838. 
 706 N.Y.S.2d. at 838.  
seeks to recover a sum of $2,500,000 upon a defamation theory due to the 
alleged injury to the claimant’s reputation in the Capital District. The second cause of action seeks 
0 alleging that defendant’s publication of defamatory statements upon the Internet has 
impugned his reputation worldwide and prevented him from securing new employment within the law 
orcement community. Id. 
the highest de
N
  
89
The first cause of action 
$2,500,00
enf
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publication rule should apply to the Internet in the interest of avoiding a multiplicity of sui
“While the act of making the document available constitutes a publication, in the absence o
some alteration or
ts: 
f 
 change in form its continued availability on the Internet does not constitute 
sin t 
co
   
 
 
dcast aired June 7, 1998, and the next day, Plaster posted a letter critical of the news 
                                              
a republication acting to begin the Statute of Limitations anew each day.”90 Because the 
report had been published on the Internet but not altered, therefore, the court applied the 
gle publication rule and held that the mere presence of a defamatory publication did no
nstitute a separate republication for each day the material was accessible. 
    In 2003, one year before Lehman v. Discovery Communications, Inc.,91 in a case on 
appeal from a New York federal district court, Van Buskirk v. New York Times Co., the 
Second Circuit also held that the single publication rule applied to Internet publications.92 
Robert Van Buskirk alleged that he had been libeled by John L. Plaster and The New York
Times Company after Plaster wrote an article of and concerning Van Buskirk, which he 
published on the Internet and which The New York Times then ran on its editorial page.93 The 
letter concerned a CNN broadcast in which the news network, Plaster claimed, “relying 
primarily on Van Buskirk, [inaccurately] suggested that American forces used nerve gas 
during Operation Tailwind,” a U.S. military initiative that took place in Laos in 1970.94 The
broa
   
 
 F. Supp. 2d 534 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 
92 3
 
93 
90 Id. at 843.
 
91 332 
25 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 2003). 
Id. at 88. 
 
94 Id. 
 
 97
segment on a Web site; The New York Times published the editorial June 18, 1998.95 Van 
Buskirk subsequently filed defamation complaints against the New York Times and, later, 
.  
New York imposes for libel actions, the suit against Plaster was not filed within one 
single publication rule, the statute of limitations begins to accrue on the first date of 
 
t 
 1998, 
kirk’s claim as time-barred. Van Buskirk, in line with 
                                                
against Plaster.96 
    The issue before the court was determining whether Van Buskirk’s complaint against 
Plaster’s Web publication was timely under the one-year New York statute of limitations
    While the suit against the Times was filed within the one-year statute of limitations 
year of the date Plaster first published his letter on the Internet. Under New York’s 
publication. Van Buskirk argued that the rule should not apply to Internet publications.97 
The Second Circuit held that, in line with Firth, the single publication rule applied to the 
Internet.98 Under the single publication rule in New York, “a defamation claim accrues a
publication, defined as ‘the earliest date on which the work was placed on sale or became 
generally available to the public.’”99 Plaster posted his letter to the Internet on June 8,
and Van Buskirk did not file an amended complaint including the letter until January 14, 
2000—well past the one-year statute of limitations.100 Therefore, the court held, the district 
court had properly dismissed Van Bus
 
95 Id. 88-89. “Plaster, a former Green Beret and author of SOG: The Secret wars of America’s Commandos in 
Vietnam, wrote a letter critical of the CNN report and published that letter on a website on June 8, 1998.” Id. at 
88. 
ents in the Article, including (1) the CNN report alleging U.S. 
force
wa
 
97 
New York adheres to a single publication rule in determining when the statute of limitations begins to 
amation claim. Under this rule, the publication of a single defamatory item, such as a book or 
article, even if sold in multiple copies, and in numerous place, at various times, gives rise to “only one 
of action which arises when the finished product is released by the publisher for sale.” Id. 
t 90. 
 
96 Id. at 89. “Plaster made a number of statem
s used nerve gas to attack a Laotian village during Operation Tailwind was untrue; and (2) Van Buskirk 
s a source for this untrue statement.” Id. 
Id. at 88. 
 
98 Id. at 89. 
 
99 Id.  
run on a def
cause 
 
100 Id. a
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Firth, reinforced the application of the single publication rule to the Internet and emphasized 
that publication occurred when the content was first made available on the Internet.101  
   The single publication rule was again applied to the Internet by a federal district court in 
Kentucky in a 2003 case, Mitan v. Davis.102 In 1998, Keneth Mitan had acquired a business, 
S 
Da ts and 
de iums, and not paying suppliers and selling off 
n 
te, 
se 
 are 
                                                
& B Glass Company, from Emory and Carol Davis. After the sale of the business, the 
vises alleged, “Mitan ‘raided the business by diverting accounts receivables, paymen
posits, not paying employee insurance prem
assets.’”103 The Davises created a Web site, “www.mitanalert.com, to ‘inform others of their 
experiences with Mitan and to offer access to other information . . . concerning Mitan.’”104 I
1999, Mitan discovered the site and filed an action to terminate the use of the Web si
which was denied, but he did not pursue any other actions concerning the site until he cho
to file a defamation action on December 29, 2000.105 Mitan alleged that “ten specific 
statements on the mitanalert.com website. . . cast him in a false and defamatory light and
libelous, caused him embarrassment and mental anguish, and improperly interfered with his 
prospective contractual relations.”106 
 
101 The court also addressed whether Plaster’s statements were capable of defamatory meaning and, affirming 
the district court, found that they were not. 
The article maintains that CNN’s accusations are untrue. It also explains that the CNN report attributes 
those accusations to Van Buskirk. However, the article avoids speculating as to why CNN reported false 
sations. It suggests neither that CNN mistakenly attributed the accusations to Van Buskirk, nor that 
CNN was misled, let alone that CNN was misled by Van Buskirk. 325 F.2d  at 92. 
accu
 
102 243 F. Supp. 2d 719 (W.D. Ky. 2003). 
 
103 Id. 720. 
 
104 Id. at 721. 
 
105 Id. 
 
106 Id. 
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    The Mitan court addressed whether the single publication rule applied to Internet 
publications and, if so, whether the one-year statute of limitations had expired by the time 
ere time-
on October 12, 1999. Five of the statements were added to the website when it was 
libelous is a WXYZ Channel 7 (Detroit, Michigan) investigative report which was 
 
he 
 
o 
ent 
he 
d 
 
                                                
Mitan filed his action. The Davises argued that nine of the ten defamation actions w
barred: 
    Of the ten statements Mitan contends are libelous, four were present on the website 
modified by the Davises on December 7, 1999. The final statement Mitan claims is 
posted on the site on February 25, 2000.107 
The district court questioned whether Kentucky, whose law it was applying, would apply t
single publication rule to the Internet and, noting that Kentucky had a history of consulting
the Restatement of Torts, found that it would.108 The court reasoned that “the single 
publication rule is much better equipped to handle aggregate communication.”109 It als
compared Internet publications to traditional print publications, arguing that “[a] statem
electronically located on a server which is called up when a web page is accessed, is no 
different from a statement on a paper page in a book lying on a shelf which is accessed by t
reader when the book is opened.”110 In applying the single publication rule to the Web, an
in treating the initial posting of the comments as the initial publication, the court found that
 
rmation is disseminated in our modern world, along with the adoption of 
e single publication rule by a majority of jurisdictions, we must ask whether a Kentucky court faced with this 
uld follow the precedent established in 1899, or would instead revisit the issue and adopt the 
ngle publication rule.” Id. 
9 Id. “After carefully examining the issue, we can find no basis for treating defamatory communication 
n 
. 
107 Id. 
 
108 Id. at 722. “In light of the way info
th
issue today wo
si
 
10
differently than any other form of aggregate communication. Therefore, we will apply the single publicatio
rule to the statements in this case which were published on the Internet.” Id. at 724. 
 
110 Id. at 724
 
 100
any statements posted before December 29, 1999—one year prior to Mitan’s action—were
time-barred. Therefore, nine of the ten statements were not actionable.111 
 
    
ne
En  Scott McCandliss appealed the dismissal by a trial court of his defamation 
e’ 
 
ta was noted on the cover [of Plumpers and Big Women]: 5,000 
                                                
In 2004, a state appeals court in Georgia applied the single publication rule to a 
wspaper’s archival of the print edition on the Internet. In McCandliss v. Cox 
terprises,112
action against Cox Enterprises based on the statute of limitations having run. McCandliss 
founded a club named Hipsters “to provide social gatherings that included ‘size-positiv
spectacles for persons of size and those who support them.”113 McCandliss anonymously 
wrote and published an article about Hipsters in the magazine Plumpers and Big Women, 
including pictures of a lingerie show featuring plus-sized models without their permission. 
The models sued McCandliss and the magazine, and the Atlanta-Journal Constitution 
covered the story: “In an article published on September 7, 2000, the AJC wrote: ‘The
Hipster party in metro Atlan
Pounds of Sex-Starved Fatties.’”114 The article was also made available online. Two years 
later, McCandliss filed suit against the Atlanta-Journal Constitution, alleging that he had 
been libeled when the newspaper “improperly attributed the caption from the cover of the 
magazine to Hipsters.”115 
 
111 Id. “The only libel claim which remains viable is the posting of the WXYZ Channel 7 news report.” Id. 
 
112 593 S.E.2d 856 (Ga. App. 2004). 
3 Id. at 857. 
4 Id. Similar statements were made in a November 2000 article. 
5 Id. The court opinion never explicitly states what the caption is, but in the context of the opinion—the 
ed from the article—it appears to have been the “5,000 Pounds of 
ex-Starved Fatties” that McCandliss argued was improperly attributed to his magazine by the Atlanta 
 
11
 
11
 
11
statement above is the only statement quot
S
newspaper. 
 
 101
    ot 
ap
se 
d be considered a new 
publication that retriggers the statute of limitations.” This argument, however, lacks 
 
s 
e 
004 
 
Traditional Cat Association, an organization involved with cat breeding, in which defendants 
man, Randi Briggs, and John Herold worked as directors and 
rs.120 However, tension arose within the organization:  
                                              
As was the case in Firth, McCandliss argued that the single publication rule should n
ply to the Internet, specifically to the archival of newspaper articles online. 
    McCandliss argues that “because a [w]eb116 site may be altered at any time by its 
publisher or owner and because publications on the Internet are available only to tho
who seek them, each ‘hit’ or viewing of the [news article] shoul
merit.117 
The nature of the Internet as a widely accessible medium worldwide, the court contended, 
“implicated an even greater potential for endless retriggering of statute of limitations, 
multiplicity of suits, and harassment of defendants. Inevitably, there would be a seriously 
inhibitory effect on the open, pervasive dissemination of information and ideas over the 
Internet, which is, of course, its greatest beneficial promise.”118 Like Firth, the McCandlis
case revealed the courts’ attempts to protect both defamation defendants and courts from th
potentially limitless actions available if every viewing of information on the Internet 
constituted a republication. 
    A California appeals court applied the single publication rule to the Internet in the 2
case Traditional Cat Assn., Inc. v. Gilbreath.119 Plaintiff Diana Fineran had been president of
Laura Gilbreath, Lee Zimmer
office
   
of Web site as “[w]eb site” quoted directly from text. 
 
117
 
118
116 Formatting 
 Id. at 858. 
 Id. 
 
119 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 353 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 
120 Id. at 355. 
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    In 1998 a dispute developed between Fineran and the individual defendants with 
established another organization, plaintiff and respondent The Traditional Cat 
of lawsuits
respect to criticism of Fineran’s leadership of TCA. As the result of the dispute, Fineran 
Association, Inc., a Washington corporation (TTCA). TTCA then commenced a series 
 against TCA and the individual defendants, alleging that they had 
misappropriated TCA funds and were guilty of conversion, copyright infringement, 
 
In
Response Website,” which was dedicated to reporting on the status of the litigation; however, 
TTCA 
 
nd 
 a 
und 
 
                                              
unfair competition, trademark and trade secret infringement.121 
 response to Fineran’s actions, Herold created a Web site called “The Diana Fineran 
“[t]he descriptions of the litigation on the Web site were highly critical of Fineran and 
and very favorable to TCA, Herold, and the other defendants.”122 On May 22, 2002, Fineran
and her organization, The Traditional Cat Association, filed action against the defendants a
Traditional Cat Association for statements made on the Web site, alleging defamation.123 
    In the case, the defendants appealed the denial of a motion to strike,124 arguing that the 
statute of limitations had expired on Fineran’s defamation claim because, Herold swore in
declaration, the Web site had not been edited since before May 21, 2001.125 The court fo
that “the statements on the Web site were an exercise of free speech which shifted to 
plaintiffs the burden of establishing the merits of their defamation cause of action, including
   
 
123
de
 
4 Id. at 356.  
 ruling on the motion to strike, the trial court found the statements on the Web site were made in 
fu n to 
 
125  
all support of the motion to strike, Herold submitted a declaration in which he stated 
at he had not altered the Web site after May 21, 2001.” Id. 
121 Id. 
 
122 Id. 
 Id. “Fineran and TTCA alleged that the statements on the Web site gave rise to a cause of action for 
famation. She also alleged unfair competition and conversion causes of action.” Id. 
12
In
rtherance of the defendant’s petition and free speech rights. . . . However, the court denied the motio
strike because it found, among other matters, the statute of limitations defenses asserted by the 
defendants, even if conclusive, will not support relief under the anti-SLAPP statute. Id. 
 Id  “The motion to strike was directed primarily at the defamation cause of action. The demurrer challenged
 three causes of action. In 
th
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its timeliness.”126 Furthermore, the court noted that the single publication rule applied in 
California, one of the states to adopt the Uniform Single Publication Act discussed earlier in 
commence running, upon the first general publication or broadcast of a tortious 
many people hear or see the broadcast. . . .We find the single-publication rule applies to 
 
ion May 
t 
, 
 
on rule to Internet 
this chapter: 
    Under the rule, one cause of action will arise, and the statute of limitations will 
statement, notwithstanding how many copies of the publication are distributed or how 
statements published on Internet Web sites.127 
In reaching its decision, the court cited Firth, noting that this exact issue had not been 
addressed in California.128 Applying the single publication rule, then, because the Web site 
had not been altered since before May 21, 2001, and because Fineran filed her act
22, 2002, the one-year statute of limitations had expired.129 Notably, the court argued tha
Internet publication merited even more protection than traditional print publication, writing
“[T]he need to protect Web publishers from almost perpetual liability for statements they 
make available to the hundreds of millions of people who have access to the Internet is 
greater even than the need to protect the publishers of hard copy newspapers, magazines and
books.”130 Therefore, in this case, California applied the single publicati
                                                 
 
127 Id. at 354-55. 
 
128 Id. at 362.  
and how the single-publication rule applies when, as here, an alleged defamatory statement has been made 
126 Id. at 358. 
The parties have not cited any California authority, and we have found none, which considers whether 
on an Internet Web site. However, the issue was recently discussed by the New York State Court of 
Appeals. Id. (citing Firth). 
 
129 Id.  
[A]ccording to Herold the web site was not altered after May 21, 2001. In opposing the motion to 
strike, plaintiffs did not offer any evidence which contradicted Herold’s declaration or provide admissible 
n republished in other formats in the year preceding the 
filing of their complaint. . . .Thus for purposes of determining the motion to strike, plaintiff’s cause of 
efamation arose no later than May 21, 2001, and had expired on May 22, 2002, when plaintiffs 
filed their complaint. Id. 
0 Id. 
evidence that statements on the Web site had bee
action for d
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publications, following the logic that republication had not occurred by the mere presence of 
content on the Web without editing or alteration. 
    A recent case addressed whether altering a Web site constituted a republication of 
allegedly defamatory matter. In Churchill v. New Jersey,131 Scott Churchill and Michael 
Russo appealed the dismissal by a trial court of their defamation action based on the statute 
of limitations having run. The two were volunteers with a county animal cruelty preventi
society that was investigated by the State Commission of Investigation as part of a statewid
investigation. The Commission published a report in 2001 that Churchill and
on 
e 
 Russo alleged 
ort 
g 
the limitations period and rendering their defamation claim timely.”133  
    Despite the arguments presented by Churchill and Russo, the court maintained that the 
single publication rule applied because the actual report had not been altered, only where the 
e cated. “The updates were merely technical changes to the Web site. They altered 
e means by which visitors could access the report, but they in no way altered the substance 
                                                                                                                                                    
defamed them by “improperly accus[ing] them of dishonesty, secrecy, and fiscal 
irresponsibility.”132 The plaintiffs filed a complaint in 2003, two years after the report’s 
publication, past the one-year statute of limitations. Churchill and Russo, however, argued 
that because the Commission updated its Web site several times, including where the rep
could be accessed, the single publication rule did not apply: “Plaintiffs contend that each 
alteration to the Web site constituted a separate publication of the report, thereby extendin
r port was lo
th
   
.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
 
131 876 A.2d 311 (N
 
132 Id. at 314. 
 
133 Id. at 315. 
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or form of the report.”134 The court rejected several arguments by the plaintiffs, includi
one that the Internet was a more permanent form of publication th
ng 
an print media because 
Internet publications are available in the same manner, with the same level of prominence, 
throughout time, and have the potential f ter circulation than traditional print 
s.136 
lication for the purposes of the statute of 
val of 
“
or much grea
media.”135 To this, the court replied that libraries are evidence to the contrary that print 
media publications are less permanent or accessible than electronic media publication
The court, therefore, concluded that an unedited or unaltered report posted on the Internet 
does not constitute a republication, even if the Web site itself is edited or altered. 
    Courts have consistently applied the single publication rule to Internet publications. The 
mere presence of a publication online does not constitute republication.137 The initial posting 
of content online is considered the pub
limitations,138  but it also appears that editing content or posting new material to a Web site 
constitutes republication for the purposes of the statute of limitations.139 The archi
newspaper articles on the Internet has been held to not constitute a republication.140 Finally, a 
                                                 
134 Id. at 319. 
 
 
136
135 Id. at 315. 
 Id. at 320. 
 
137 Firth v. New York, 706 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Ct. Cl. 2000), aff’d, 731 N.Y.S.2d 244 (App. Div. 2001), aff’d 775 
N.E.2d 463 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2002), aff’d  761 N.Y.S.2d. 361 (App. Div. 2003). 
 
138 Van Buskirk v. New York Times Co., 325 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 2003); Mitan v. Davis, 243 F. Supp. 2d 719 
(W.D. Ky. 2003). 
 
139 Traditional Cat Assn., Inc. v. Gilbreath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 353  (Ct. App. 2004). 
 
140 McCandliss v. Cox Enters., 593 S.E.2d 856 (Ga. App. 2004). 
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court recently held that altering a Web site, including where content may be accessed, is
republication of the content unless the content itself is edited.
 not 
dio case 
nclude 
ingle 
e 
d 22 
h, was a separate cause of action, barring the plaintiff from 
it 
                                              
141 
 
Conclusion 
    As the case analysis in this chapter reveals, within the parameters of this study, there have 
been relatively few defamation cases in which the courts have directly addressed the 
application of the single publication rule: No telegraph cases were found, and only ra
was found that addressed the application of the single publication rule in the context of a 
defamation claim. In that 1998 case, the court refused to treat three separate broadcasts aired 
on different days as a single publication to allow the plaintiff to amend a complaint to i
additional actions and defendants.142 
    The television cases to a certain extent reflect some hesitancy by courts to apply the s
publication rule prior to the revision of the Restatement in 1977. Of the three pre-
Restatement cases, only one considered whether three separate broadcasts over a span of tim
would constitute single publication; using the same rationale the Jewell court applie
years later, that court held that the rebroadcast of a program constituted a republication of the 
initial broadcast and, as suc
amending the complaint to include another action.143 In the other two cases, the First Circu
remanded a case to determine the facts of publication for the purposes of establishing how 
   
App. Div. 2005). 
, 1998 WL 702286 (S.D.N.Y.  Oct. 7, 1998). 
. 1976). 
141 Churchill v. New Jersey, 876 A.2d 311 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
 
142 Jewell v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 5617 LAP
 
143 Mun. Training Ctr., Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Corp., 387 N.Y.S.2d 40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct
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the statute of limitations would apply,144 and the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to 
decide whether to apply the single publication rule, instead staying the action pending the 
outcome of the same case filed and underway in California.145 
    Post-Restatement, cases, on the other hand, have treated broadcasts aired at different times 
as separate or multiple publications, not single publications. A newscast that was edited and
rebroadcast on a later edition of the evening news was treated as a separate publication
resulting from “a conscious independent act” to publish a separate broadcast.
 
 
on 
 then, both served to allow and prevent plaintiffs 
to file defamation actions. 
    The Internet cases have treated Web site publications as aggregate publications. As the 
Georgia Court of Appeals noted, the nature of Web publication is such that, without applying 
                                                
146 The 
broadcast of a television program multiple times was twice treated as constituting multiple 
publication rather than single publication by two different U.S. district courts. The first case 
reflected a situation similar to both Jewell and Municipal Training Center, in which a 
plaintiff was unable to amend a complaint to include an additional broadcast because the 
rebroadcast was considered a separate cause of action and the statute of limitations had 
expired.147 In the second case, on the other hand, the court allowed a plaintiff to file an acti
on a later broadcast of a show that he would not have been able to do had the court treated 
each broadcast as part of an aggregate publication.148 The application of the single 
publication rule to television defamation has,
 
144 Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962). 
 
145 Devlin v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 219 A.2d 523 (N.J. 1966). 
 
146 Herron v. King, 746 P.2d 295 (Wash. 1987) (en banc). 
 
147 Burt v. CBS, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D. Ohio 1991). 
 
148 Lehman v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 332 F. Supp.2d 534 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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the single publication rule, there would be the danger of excessive lawsuits spurred by a 
ever-ending statute of limitations and limitless opportunities for plaintiffs to file multiple 
causes of action: “Inevitably, there would be a seriously inhibitory effect on the open, 
pervasive dissemination of information and ideas over the Internet, which is, of course, its 
greatest beneficial promise.”  Therefore, the general rule of Internet publication has been 
at, unless the defamatory content itself is reposted or edited in some way, the initial 
publication is treated as the single publication for the purposes of the statute of limitations.   
    In conclusion, courts seem to have been influenced by the Restatement of Torts in 
applying the single publication rule in defamation cases to broadcast technologies. However, 
the courts have taken the lead in applying the single publication rule to the Internet. The 
result is that the a defamation plaintiff must file an action within whatever length of time the 
statute of limitations in that state mandates, dating from the initial posting of the content. The 
mere presence of unedited, unchanged defamatory content on the Web does not constitute 
republication; on the other hand, when a broadcaster rebroadcasts a defamatory segment, it is 
likely that such an action will be seen as an attempt to reach a new audience, a republication 
that will retrigger the statute of limitations.  
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CHAPTER IV 
DETERMINING LIABILITY: CATEGORIZING PUBLISHERS 
 
    Liability, as demonstrated in the first chapter, has been a hot topic for the Internet due to 
section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which provides immunity for providers 
and users of Internet services for third-party content and, as a federal statute, supersedes state 
common law.  Traditionally, however, common law dictates that the publisher of a 
defamation is liable for any damage caused to the defamed.   A person who repeats a 
defamatory statement is considered to have become a republisher of the defamation and is as 
liable as the original publisher.  Common law also recognizes distributors of defamatory 
content: Distributors, such as bookstores and newsstands, have no editorial control over the 
content of the material they distribute and are liable only if they know or have reason to 
know they are distributing defamatory content.  As this chapter reveals, post-CDA cases 
have held that one who republishes or distributes third-party defamation via the Internet is 
immune from liability for that publication. But how have courts historically chosen to impose 
liability for third-party defamation with other new technologies? 
                                                
3
4
 
1 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2004). The Act is described in greater detail later in this chapter. 
 
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977). 
 
3 Id 
 
4 Id. § 581. 
 
    This chapter examines cases involving the third-party transmission of defamatory 
any 
d 
ases.   
m  
pr
re
 
 
 
messages via the telegraph, radio, television, and Internet to see how and whether courts 
applied these categories of publisher and distributor liability, in particular, to each 
technology. For the telegraph, cases typically focused on the liability of a telegraph comp
for transmitting a defamatory message. With radio and television broadcast technologies, 
questions arose over the extent to which a station’s owners or agents could be held liable for 
comments broadcast by non-employees of the station, in particular when the station ha
leased its facilities to a third party. Finally, as suggested in the first chapter of this thesis, the 
courts’ treatment of liability for third-party defamation on the Internet can be broken down 
into pre- and post-Communications Decency Act section 230 c
    It is important to note that the Supreme Court abolished the standard of strict liability, 
initially applied to broadcast defamation, in New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny, 
establishing fault requirements first for public official libel plaintiffs and subsequently for 
public figure and private figure plaintiffs.5 In this chapter, it is apparent that courts in those 
cases prior to 1964 tended to impose either strict liability or a standard of negligence that 
ore closely resembles the modern standard of actual malice. In post-1964 cases, it is
esumed that actual malice is the applicable level of fault. As the cases in this chapter 
veal, courts have taken different approaches both with and within each technology.  
                                                
6 U.S. 254 (1964). The actual malice standard provides that publishers cannot be held liable for statements 
 the statement was made “with knowledge 
at it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id. at 279-80. Subsequent cases 
ded the application of the actual malice standard to public figures, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 
8 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker 389 U.S. 130 (1967); and a standard of at least negligence to private 
s, Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
5 37
made about public officials’ conduct related to their position unless
th
exten
2
figure
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Telegraph 
 In a series of Peterson v. Western Union Telegraph Co. cases, the telegraph co   mpany 
sulted 
 him that read:  “Slippery Sam, your name is 
n 
 
r, 
 to say 
meaning, on its face, and is forwarded in good faith by the operator, the defendant 
proves to be such in fact. In such a case the operator cannot wait to consult a lawyer, or 
principal office for instructions. He must decide promptly, 
and forward the message without delay, if it is a proper one, and for any honest error of 
judgment in the premises the telegraph company cannot be held responsible. But where 
the message, on its face, is clearly susceptible of a libelous meaning, is not signed by 
 responsible person, and there is no reason to believe that it is a cipher message, and 
                                        
fought hard to avoid liability for transmission of a defamatory message. The lawsuit re
in four trials and three separate appeals to the Minnesota Supreme Court.6 State Senator 
Samuel Peterson sued over a message sent to
pants. [Signed] Many Republicans.”7 The first time the state supreme court heard the case, i
1896, it held the message was susceptible of a defamatory meaning because the word 
slippery “means, when so used, that the person to whom it is applied cannot be depended on
or trusted; that he is dishonest, and apt to play one false. . . . To falsely publish of a man that 
he is slippery tends to render him odious and contemptible.”8 
    The court also held that publication had occurred when the telegraph operator in New 
Ulm, Minn., transmitted the message to the operator in St. Paul for delivery to Sen. Peterson. 
The court acknowledged, without discussion, that Western Union “was a common carrie
and was bound to transmit all proper messages delivered to it.” But the court went on
that a telegraph company “was not bound to send indecent or libelous communications.”9 
    Where a proffered message is not manifestly a libel, or susceptible of a libelous 
cannot be held to have maliciously published a libel, although the message subsequently 
forward the message to the 
any
         
77 N.W. 985, 985 (Minn. 1899). 
n v. W. Union Tel. Co., 67 N.W. 646, 647 (Minn. 1896). 
Id. 
Id. 
6 
 
7 Peterso
 
8 
 
9 
 
 112
it is forwarded under such circumstances as to warrant the jury in finding that the 
premises, the company may be held to have maliciously published the libel.10 
The court, however, sent the case back for a new trial because the $5,200 in damages 
awarded by the jury were excessive in light of the fact that the only publication that occurre
was to a Western Union agent in St. Paul.11 
    The second time the case reached th
operator, in sending the message, was negligent or wanting in good faith in the 
 
d 
e state supreme court was discussed in Chapter 2. In 
, 
 this 
nce 
                                              
that opinion the court held that the message constituted libel, not slander, in spite of the 
sound technologies used to transmit the message.12 Once again, though, the supreme court 
remanded the case for a new trial, this time because the jury had awarded punitive damages 
based on faulty instructions.13 The third time the case reached the Minnesota Supreme Court
Western Union tried to escape liability by claiming it was not legally responsible for the act 
of its New Ulm agent, G.R. McHale. Applying standard agency law, the court dismissed
claim, saying, “[W]hen the master substitutes an agent or servant in his own place, and 
clothes him with power to act for the master's benefit in serving the public, he is not 
permitted to shelter himself behind the plea of nonliability for the act of the agent.”14 O
again, though, the court found the damage award excessive—this time $2,000—in light of 
the limited publication of the libel and ordered another new trial unless Peterson agreed to 
accept an award of $1,000.15 
   
 77 N.W. at 987. 
 Id. 
10 Id. 
 
11 Id. 
 
12 74 N.W. 1022, 1022 (Minn. 1898). 
 
13 Id. at 1023. 
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   t even 
th per 
m ssage that was defamatory on 
ributor, 
rict court in Minnesota 
t there 
with 
consideration in the year 1896, and as being corrupt and dishonest.”19 Because the telegraph 
rcumstances surrounding the telegram, Western 
n was held not liable. The court described the role of the telegraph agent: 
                                                                                                                                                    
 Through a long and convoluted history, then, the Minnesota Supreme Court held tha
ough a telegraph company was a common carrier, it was only required to carry “pro
essages” and could be held legally liable for transmitting a me
its face. Such conduct constituted negligence, and as most early courts did, the Minnesota 
court equated negligence with the malice necessary to find a common carrier, or dist
liable for third-party-created content. 
   In 1900, in Nye v. Western Union Telegraph Co., a federal dist
followed the same pattern, describing the telegraph as a common carrier required to transmit 
messages as a public service and, therefore, liable only for transmitting messages that were 
“obscene, profane, or clearly libelous.”16 In this case, though, the court concluded tha
was “nothing in the language of this message likely to cause the receiving clerk to infer that 
the purpose was to defame the plaintiff, to whom the message was sent.”17 In Nye, two 
telegrams were sent from W.H. Vanderburgh to M.H. Boutelle, an attorney who worked 
Frank Nye, suggesting that Nye had been “bought.”18 Nye alleged that the telegrams 
suggested that he had “been bribed to sell his vote and political influence for a money 
operator had not known Nye or any of the ci
Unio
   
16 104
 
17 
 
18 
Va e 
18 ould 
ha
 
19 
 
 F. 628, 630 (D.C. Minn. 1900). 
Id. at 631. 
Id. at 629. One telegram, which was similar in substance to the second, read: “Frank Nye: Judge 
nderburgh, who was elected district judge, Minneapolis, 1859, 1866, 1873, 1880, elected supreme judg
81, 1886, stated distinctly in my presence that Charlie Pillsbury bought you up in 1896, otherwise you w
ve been for Bryan.” Id. 
Id. 
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    Having no duty of censorship . . . if he acts in good faith, and the language of the 
circumstances, would not necessarily conclude that defamation was the object and 
duty the telegraph company would incur no responsibility.
message is such that a person of ordinary intelligence, knowing nothing of the parties or 
purpose of the message, it would be his duty to send it, and for his performance of that 
 
 annoying 
urg 
an22 presented a 
co tor, 
wa ss 
Le an.23 
Su he news story with the message: “Vicksburg Evening Post: Your 
                                                
20 
The court said that imposing a stricter standard of liability on telegraph companies, requiring 
them to screen carefully for messages not libelous on their faces, would only cause 
difficulties, leading to “embarrassment and delays, and make necessary such
inquiries, as to greatly diminish the efficiency of the service.”21 
    Western Union again came under fire in 1906, when Cashman, the editor of the Vicksb
Evening Post, alleged that a telegram sent to him in response to an article he had run in his 
newspaper was defamatory. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Cashm
nvoluted series of facts. Cashman ran a story reporting that W.V. Sullivan, an ex-sena
s prosecuting a civil case during which a witness pointed a gun at the defendant, a Mi
eton, threatening to kill her; Miss Leeton alleged that the gun belonged to Sulliv
llivan responded to t
article in issue of Thursday is a dirty lie as you know. Who is responsible? You nasty dog. 
 
21 Id. 
 
 F. 367 (5th Cir. 1906). 
he article read:  
A civil proceeding against Miss Leeton was being tried, and somewhat in contrast to his former 
eton was represented by Hon. C. L. Silvey. The main point at issue was 
wh
 the courtroom for several minutes, effectually breaking up the 
proceedings. Miss Leeton declared that the gun pointed at her by the witness belonged to Ex-Senator 
of this she was positive, having kept the weapon for him for three years. Id. 
20 Id. at 631. 
 
22 149
 
23 Id. at 368. T
attitude toward the woman, Ex-Senator was in the role of an attorney prosecuting the claim of a local 
drygoods firm for debt. Miss Le
ether she was a nonresident, and therefore liable for the attachment. During the proceedings, one of the 
witnesses questioned the chastity of Miss Leeton, provoking some sulphurous [sic] language from her 
lips, and the witness drew a gun and threatened to kill her. Miss Leeton attempted to borrow the gun, 
evidently with the purpose of shooting her traducer, who had in the meantime been taken in charge by 
friends, and there was great excitement in
Sullivan, and 
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Answer.”24 Cashman proceeded to publish that telegram in his paper but then filed an action 
against Western Union for transmitting Sullivan’s “nasty dog” telegram, arguing that the 
company “did wickedly and maliciously write and publish and cause to be written and 
published of and concerning the plaintiff a false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory 
libel.”25 Judge Pardee, writing for the court, remarked that in filing an action against Weste
Union, Cashman sought to blame “the only innocent party in the matter.”
rn 
er 
s 
 a 
envelope, was the only libelous message for which the telegraph company, if liable at 
 
le 
26 
    The Fifth Circuit addressed several liability issues in Cashman, first of which was wheth
the copying and transmission of the telegram by various telegraph operators constituted 
republication. The court reasoned that the messages transmitted by the telegraph operator
were copies of the original message and not separate publications: 
    The message as transmitted and received and written out in Memphis was not the 
original libelous message, but a copy of the same more or less exact. The same may be 
said of the message transmitted from Memphis to the agent at Vicksburg. That was
copy of a copy of Sullivan’s original message, therefore the message written out in 
Vicksburg, copied by the messenger boy and delivered to Cashman in a sealed 
all, is responsible.27 
Having established that there was only one message for which Western Union might be liab
as a republisher, the court then proceeded to address the extent to which the telegraph 
company was, in fact, liable. 
                                                 
 
25
24 Id. 
 Id. at 369. 
 
26 Id. at 369-70. Commenting on both Sullivan’s telegram and Cashman’s subsequent publishing of it and 
comments upon it, Pardee wrote:  
ms to have ended the matter between the long distance belligerents, but not as to the telegraph 
company, whose agents Sullivan had made a tool of: for, on more deliberation, the defendant in error 
nd that his feelings had  been more wounded, because the telegraph company’s agents carried the 
message that Sullivan sent and which he himself had published in his newspaper. Hence this suit against 
nocent party in the matter. Id. 
t 370-71. 
This see
fou
the only in
 
27 Id. a
 
 116
    The Fifth Circuit addressed whether the telegraph company should be treated as a common
carrier. In line with Peterson and Nye, the court considered Western Union “a corporation 
engaged in the business of receiving and transmitting written messages for hire; and, like 
other common carriers, [it] is liable for the acts of its agents in conducting its business.”
 
f 
did not act 
of duty and business, who are shown to be bound to secrecy by the statutes of the state, 
knowledge of the contents of the message or any interest or improper motive, and from 
any.31 
 
of malice, Western Union was not liable for the transmission of the defamatory 
m  
lia in 
di  
evelopment in liability for the transmission of defamatory messages 
                                              
28 
The company could be liable, the court held, if its agents had acted with malice, failing to 
take “reasonable care, at least, not to injure others”29 by transmitting material that was 
anonymous or libelous on its face. To prove malice, the court further explained, a plaintif
must demonstrate “that the defendant was governed by a bad motive, and that he 
in good faith but took advantage of the occasion to injure the plaintiff in his character or 
standing.”30 The court found that the telegraph company had not acted with malice.  
    [The message] was handled as a matter of routine by agents acting in the regular line 
and who are not shown to have had any knowledge of the parties or any particular 
these circumstances it seems impossible to impute malice to the telegraph comp
Absent proof 
essage. Cashman seemed to cement the role of telegraph companies as common carriers
ble only if a plaintiff could prove an employee of the company had acted with malice 
stributing a defamatory message.
   The next significant d
via the telegraph was the creation of the “wire service defense” in the 1933 case Layne v. 
   
2. 
28 Id. at 371. 
 
29 Id. 
 
30 Id. at 37
 
31 Id. 
 
 117
Tribune.32 John H. Layne brought an action against the Tribune Company, publisher of The 
Tampa Morning Tribune, seeking damages for the publication of two press dispatches sent 
from Washington, D.C., that suggested Layne had violated national liquor laws during the 
Pr  
re  from the 
 
 
news, nor assume in advance the burden of specially verifying every item of news 
y established news gathering agencies, and continue to discharge with 
efficiency and promptness the demands of modern necessity for prompt publication, if 
ohibition era.33 The court considered the publication of a wire service article to be a “mere
petition” of the original publication.34 While noting the harms that could arise
wide distribution of an article, the court ruled that “the mere reproduction in a newspaper of
outside press dispatches . . . suggests the application of no such strict rule of liability.”35 
    The Supreme Court of Florida chose to eliminate liability for newspapers that 
unknowingly printed defamatory content from reputable wire service providers. In a nod to 
the effects of technological developments on the news industry, the court said that, while 
courts are bound by stare decisis, “it does not follow . . . that the courts are wholly powerless
to remold and reapply the ancient rules so as to fit them to modern conditions.”36 The 
modern conditions described by the court included the demand for rapid dissemination of 
information. 
     No newspaper could afford to warrant the absolute authenticity of every item of its 
reported to it b
publication is to be had at all.37 
                                                 
32 146 So. 234 (Fla. 1933). 
 
5-36. The first dispatch was sent by the Associated Press on June 30, 1930, and included the charge 
at Illinois Representative Dennison and his secretary were indicted after prohibition agents found alcohol in 
spatch was sent by Universal Service on July 7, 1930, and identified Layne as 
ennison’s secretary. Id. 
. 
33 Id. at 23
th
Dennison’s office. The second di
D
 
34 Id. at 237. 
 
35 Id
 
36 Id. 
 
37 Id. at 239. 
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The wire service defense did not create an absolute immunity for newspapers, but it did limit 
liability by requiring proof of at least negligence on behalf of the publisher. The court held: 
s 
r, 
Th
de onditions created by advances in mass communications technologies. 
ing 
rcuit 
the message.42  
mmunity for 
mpanies for the transmission of defamatory messages “must be broad enough to 
                             
    [A] declaration for libel predicated upon the alleged publication of a false new
dispatch as to which neither the publisher, nor his agents, may be regarded as the autho
must show either wantonness, recklessness, or carelessness in its publication, or be 
counted upon as a libel per quod, in order to set up a good cause of action.38 
 
e creation of the wire service defense serves as an example of a court’s attempt to adapt 
famation law to the c
    Telegraph companies were once again treated as common carriers in O’Brien v. Western 
Union Telegraph Company.39 A telegram was sent to Father Charles Coughlin disparag
the character of Thomas C. O’Brien, whom Coughlin had advised to run for the offices of 
U.S. senator from Massachusetts and vice president of the United States.40 The First Ci
noted that the message was defamatory on its face and addressed the question of whether the 
telegraph company was privileged to send the message.41 The court held that the telegraph 
company acted as a common carrier and that, because the company’s agents had not known 
they were transmitting libelous content, the company was not liable for the transmission of 
    In concluding that the company was not liable, the court noted that the i
telegraph co
                    
38 Id. 
 
39 
 
 Id. at 540. The telegram was purportedly sent by Robert Robinson. The court noted, “The purported interest 
ed 
et.”  
. 
113 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1940). 
40
of the sender of the message was that [as] a prominent and lifelong member of the Democratic Party he fear
the adverse effect which the candidacy of Mr. O’Brien might have upon the success of the Democratic tick
Id. 
 
41 Id. 
 
42 Id. at 541
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enable the company to render its public service efficiently and with dispatch.”43 Furtherm
the court said, such immunity benefited the public: 
    If the telegraph companies are to handle such a volume of business expeditiously, it is 
messages with a view to determining whether th
ore, 
obvious that their agents cannot spend much time pondering the contents of the 
ey bear a defamatory meaning, and if 
so, whether the sender might nevertheless be privileged. The effect of putting such a 
burden upon the telegraph companies could only result in delayed transmission of, and 
in some cases refusal to transmit, messages which the courts after protracted litigation 
might ultimate determine to have been pr ffered for transmission and which the 
sender was entitled to have dispatched promptly even though defamatory matter was 
 
any’s 
  
 
 
 distributors. Finally, the creation of the 
                                                
operly o
contained therein.44 
Therefore, as other courts had held before, the First Circuit held that unless the comp
agent knew the message was defamatory or acted in bad faith, telegraph companies, as 
common carriers, could not be held liable for the transmission of defamatory messages.45
    In summary, then, cases involving liability for defamatory messages transmitted via 
telegraph have reflected consistent treatment of telegraph companies as common carriers. As
carriers required to transmit messages and unable to censor or edit them, telegraph companies
could be held liable only if an agent acted with malice in transmitting the message.46 As 
such, telegraph companies were essentially liable as
 
45 Id. at 543.  
a defamatory message, it could only be in the necessarily rare cases where the transmitting agent of the 
th Cir. 1906); Nye v. W. Union Tel. Co., 104 F. 628 (D.C. 
nn. 1900); Peterson v. W. Union Tel. Co., 74 N.W. 1022 (Minn. 1898). See also W. Union Tel. Co. v. 
.S.C. 1948) (holding that a public utility whose duty it is to transmit messages for 
e public is privileged to send messages unless the agents who transmit the message should know or have 
w he content is defamatory); Mason v. W. Union Tel. Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 53 (Cal. Ct. App. 
975) (holding that Western Union was not liable to a defamed person for the transmission of a defamatory 
m).  
43 Id. For telegraph companies, the court said, “Speed is the essence of the service.” Id.  
 
44 Id. at 542. 
 
Our conclusion is that if the telegraph company is ever to be held liable for the routine transmission of 
telegraph company happened to know that the message was spurious or that the sender was acting, not in 
the protection of any legitimate interest, but in bad faith and for the purpose of traducing another. Id. 
 
46 W. Union Tel. Co. v. Cashman, 149 F. 367 (5
Mi
Lesesne, 83 F. Supp. 918 (E.D
th
reason to kno
1
telegra
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“wire service defense” reflected the impact of telegraph technology on newspapers through
the growing reliance on wire service stories.
 
 
 
slander question served as a 
t 
ry 
w only 
 on Stebbins’ behalf.49 
   
lik
under the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.), duly licensed and subject to the 
ission, which provided that “in broadcasting material for candidates 
47 These developments reflected efforts on the 
part of the courts to allow telegraph companies to function optimally without the fear of 
liability interfering with the public service they provided. 
 
Radio 
    Sorenson v. Wood was a case in which deciding the libel/
precursor to the question of liability for Richard Wood, who uttered the defamatory 
comments, and KFAB Broadcasting Company, which owned and operated the station tha
broadcast them.48 Sorenson, as previously discussed, was up for reelection as Nebraska 
attorney general; Wood, a candidate for railway commissioner, broadcast his defamato
statements on the eve of the primary election, disparaging Sorenson’s character. During his 
broadcast, Wood also promoted the candidacy of W.M. Stebbins for the U.S. Senate. KFAB 
claimed that, prior to the broadcast, it had not seen a script of the broadcast but kne
that Wood intended to speak
 In the 1932 case before the Nebraska Supreme Court, KFAB argued in its defense that, 
e a telegraph company, it was “a common carrier of intelligence by wire and wireless 
regulation of the federal radio commission.”50 As such, it was also subject to Order No. 31 of 
the Federal Radio Comm
                                                 
47 Layne v. Tribune, 146 So. 234 (Fla. 1933). 
 
84  243 N.W. 82 (Neb. 1932). 
 Id. at 84. 
 Id.  
 
49
 
50
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for public office, ‘such licensee shall have no power for censorship over the material,’ and 
that equal opportunities must be afforded legally qualified candidates for any public office in 
the use of such broadcasting station.”  KFAB argued that it was required to allow Wood, as 
a candidate himself endorsing a candidate, to broadcast his speech and was unable to censor 
the content. The court held, however, that radio stations were not common carriers  and that, 
furthermore, while broadcast stations could not censor political ideas, they still were 
obligated to block the publication of libelous statements.  
    The court also addressed the standard of liability that should be applied to KFAB, holding 
that the instructions given to the jury during the trial erroneously asked them to consider 
whether the radio station had acted negligently. “[T]hey were told in effect that, if the station 
owner honestly and in good faith exercised due care, he is absolved from liability for 
transmitting unprivileged defamatory words uttered by a speaker.”  Instead, the court held, 
“[t]he underlying basis for liability is libel, and not negligent conduct,”  applying a standard 
of strict liability to KFAB’s actions. KFAB had failed, the court found, to stop the 
defamation as it occurred:  
    It was shown that, while defendant company did not require and did not have a copy 
n did 
not use or attempt to use means to stop or shut off the speech, though that could have 
51
52
53
54
55
of the speech in advance of the utterance, yet its employees in charge of its statio
been done instantly by mechanism which was a part of the equipment.56 
                                                 
ection 18 of the Radio Act of 1927 (47 U.S.C.A. § 98) as providing that broadcast 
stations could not censor political candidates. Id. at 85. 
utterances.” Id. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled otherwise in 1959 in a decision that will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
 
 Id. at 86. 
 Id. at 85. 
 Id. The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
51 Id. The court also cited s
 
52 Id. at 86. 
 
53 Id. at 85. “The federal radio act confers no privilege to broadcasting stations to publish defamatory 
54
 
55
 
56
 122
 
The Nebraska Supreme Court, therefore, held that a broadcasting station was strictly liable as 
the publisher of a defamatory message, even if the original publisher was not an agent or 
employee of the station. Sorenson raised several issues that would be tested again in the 
courts, including the issue of the liability of broadcast stations for defamatory statements 
ut
ce  fault 
quirement—applied to KFAB would also be tested in later cases. 
    A year later, the Supreme Court of Washington considered whether a broadcasting station 
could be held liable for defamatory comments in a paid advertisement in Miles v. Louis 
Wasmer, Inc.  Louis Wasmer, Inc. owned and operated radio station KHQ, where Charles 
Lantry was employed as an announcer. William Castner ran a Spokane newspaper called 
Public Opinion, which was dedicated to anti-Prohibition causes. Castner purchased airtime 
on KHQ to advertise Public Opinion and submitted a manuscript to Lantry, whom Castner 
employed for the broadcast. Lantry was to edit and correct as necessary before broadcasting 
n was: “The Spokane sheriff’s office 
re
n to be both 
fa
     
tten by an advertiser who purchased the air time to broadcast the content, which 
              
tered by political candidates that the stations were required to broadcast but unable to 
nsor. The standard of strict liability—treating broadcast stations as publishers with no
re
57
the manuscript. The allegedly defamatory accusatio
cently auctioned off its stock of confiscated stills, home brewing equipment and 
oonshiners accessories to the highest bidders.”58 The court found the allegatiom
lse and defamatory. 
The court considered whether Louis Wasmer, Inc., could be held liable for defamatory
content wri
                                                                                                                                         
 
57 20 P.2d 847 (Wash. 1933). 
 
58 Id. at 848. 
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was edited and read by one of the station’s own employees.59 The court held that Castner w
liable as a publisher for preparing the article, paying for the time to broadcast it, and 
employing Lantry to read it. Lantry was liable as a publisher for both speaking the words 
over the air an
as 
d for editing the article before it was read.60 
 
 and received compensation for the time that it was being used.  
is 
o, 
uri company 
    As to the appellant Louis Wasmer, Inc., it seems to us that there is a close analogy 
between the words spoken over a broadcasting station and libelous words contained in a
paid advertisement in a newspaper. The owner of the station furnished the means by 
which the defamatory words could be spoken to thousands of people. It operated the 
station for profit 61
 
Likening the role of the broadcast station to that of a newspaper, the court held that Lou
Wasmer, Inc., was liable for a publication of the defamation.62 The court, therefore, followed 
Sorenson’s lead by holding a radio station liable for defamatory comments broadcast by the 
station. 
    In 1934, a U.S. district court in Missouri addressed another case of defamation via radi
Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co.63 Midland Broadcasting Company, a Misso
that owned and operated station KMBC in Kansas City, Mo., had carried an allegedly 
                                                 
59 The broadcast clearly stated that it was an advertisement:  
This talk, facts on prohibition, is broadcast every Saturday evening at 7:30 over Station K.H.Q. 
Spokane, Washington by Public Opinion, a monthly publication devoted entirely to the great American 
ibition—Public Opinion gives you the facts. Public Opinion will be very glad to mail you a 
sa
 
60 T
ity of Castner who prepared the article, paid for the 
time over the broadcasting station, and employed Lantry to read it. Lantry likewise would be liable 
ause he not only spoke the words over the station, but assisted in editing the article which was thus 
read. Id. 
 Id. at 849. 
62 Id. 
g 
 
63 pp. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1934). 
issue—Proh
mple copy without obligation on your part, if you are interested in knowing the truth. Id.  
he court did not itself use the term “publisher” for Castner or Lantry. The exact language used was:  
There can be no question about the individual liabil
bec
 
61
 
at 850.  
The fundamental principles of the law involved in publication by a newspaper and by a radio station 
seem to be alike. There is no legal reason why one should be favored over another nor why a broadcastin
station should be granted special favors as against one who may be a victim of a libelous publication. Id. 
8 F. Su
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defamatory broadcast from Remington Rand, Inc., transmitted by Columbia Broadcasting 
Company from a station in New York City.64 A statement in the broadcast accused Robert 
Coffey of being an ex-convict who had served time for his crimes. Judge Otis described the
transmission: 
    [T]he program came to KMBC and through its instruments directly went out upon the 
of the Midland Company, but they had no knowledge that any defamatory words woul
to be spoken.
 
air. The instruments of KMBC were in charge of and being operated by the employees 
d 
be included in the program and no means whatever of interrupting them after they began 
 
nce on the part of the owner of the station” did not absolve the 
 
n he 
Comparing a radio station to a newspaper, Otis wrote, “The latter prints the libel on paper 
                                        
65 
Nonetheless, the court applied a strict liability standard, saying that, even “a complete 
absence of the slightest neglige
owner of liability as the publisher of the defamation.66 Furthermore, Otis said, regardless of
whether the defamation was broadcast from the station itself or transmitted from another 
station, “The mere matter of distance . . . from the broadcasting instrumentality whe
speaks into it certainly cannot affect the liability of the owner of the station.”67 
    In the opinion, the court compared radio broadcasting and other forms of publication. 
         
 Id. at 889.  
probably requiring less than three seconds for utterance, were spoken into a 
receiving instrument in New York City by an employee of Remington Rand, Inc., a Delaware 
 as part of a radio program put out by that company through the facilities of the Columbia 
Br
 
65 
 
66 
 
67 
at 
64
The defamatory words, 
Corporation,
oadcasting Company, a New York corporation. Id. 
Id. 
Id. at 890. 
Id. at 889-90.  
I see no essential distinction between a situation in which the owner of a broadcasting station in 
Kansas City sells the privilege of speaking over the station for thirty minutes to X who, speaking in the 
local studio of the station, suddenly and unexpectedly offers a defamatory sentence concerning A and a 
situation in which the same station sells the same privilege to X, who, speaking in New York, projects his 
defamation by telephonic means into the identical broadcasting apparatus in the Kansas City station. Id. 
889. 
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and broadcasts it to the reading world. The owner of the radio station ‘prints’ the libel on a 
different medium just as widely or even more widely ‘read.’”68 Absence of negligence did 
not relieve a newspaper, or radio station, of liability. Comparisons to telegraph companie
were rejected. Although telegraph companies had been found not liable in the absence
negligence, Otis said that while a telegram is carried in a sealed envelope to an individual, a
radio broadcast message is spread to the world.
s 
 of 
 
 broadcasting company to a standard of strict liability for a defamatory message it 
ent 
rt 
 
in, 
69 Coffey, therefore, continued a trend of 
holding a
transmitted, regardless of where the message originated or the station’s ability to prev
dissemination of the message. 
    Four years later, in Irwin v. Ashurst the Supreme Court of Oregon applied the fair repo
privilege to a radio station’s coverage of a criminal proceeding.70 Josephine Irwin, a witness
for the state in a murder trial, was portrayed by the defendant’s attorney, David R. 
Vandenberg, as a drug addict who gave false testimony prepared by her husband, John Irw
the prosecuting attorney.71 Under the authority of the trial judge, Edward B. Ashurst, the 
                                                 
 Id. 
 
68
69 Id. 
During the argument of the defendant Vandenberg to the jury it is alleged that he made the following 
statement of and concerning the plaintiff, which was broadcast to the general public: “Did you watch her? 
Did you see how she acted? The mind of a dope fiend, she was full to it when she testified; she showed 
ddict; why, she’s a lunatic, she’s a crazy lunatic; she’s a dope fiend; how nervous she was all 
through her testimony; she’s a hop head; her whole testimony is imagination and delusion from taking 
e; all through her testimony she showed it; that she testified she had taken dope for ten years, and you 
may well know that she is still taking it . . . that she is lower than a rattlesnake; that a rattlesnake gives 
 warning before it strikes, but this woman gives no warning . . . that all the testimony made regarding 
Marion Meyerle is only in her mind; that account of her being an addict, that I wouldn’t believe a word 
band 
uns the bullets, and that she fired them; that Lawyer John fixed up the testimony and 
drilled her, and Mrs. Irwin swore to it.” Id. 
 
70 74 P.2d 1127 (Or. 1938). 
 
71 Id. at 1129.  
she was an a
dop
you
she said; that for this reason her testimony is out of the case. That her husband, Lawyer John (the hus
of the plaintiff, John Irwin), knew what was necessary to convict one of the murder in the first degree, and 
that Lawyer John r
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proceedings were broadcast by KFJI Broadcasters. Writing for the Oregon Supreme Court,
Justice Belt explained: “[I]f no cause of action exists against Vandenberg, it follows that the
defendant broadcasting company and its manager are not liable. Otherwise stated, if the 
argument made by Vandenberg in a court proceeding was qualifiedly privileged, the 
publication thereof by the defendant broadcasting station would likewise be privileged.”
 
 
adcaster, therefore, depended on whether it transmitted privileged 
co
    no 
omment by the radio company concerning the proceedings. All it did was to transmit to the 
public a true and accurate report of what was going on in the trial of the murder case.”  
Irwin then had the burden of proving that the content was not privileged or, in other words, 
“that the alleged defamatory matter spoken of and concerning her was irrelevant and 
impertinent to the issues in the murder case, and that it was uttered with express or actual 
malice.”  The court upheld the decision of the trial court jury that Vandenberg’s statements 
were privileged, which meant that KFJI could not be held liable because it simply transmitted 
privileged information from a criminal judicial proceeding.  
    The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided an important case involving the liability of a 
radio station for defamation in Summit Hotel Company v. National Broadcasting Company.76 
                             
72 
The liability of the bro
ntent. 
Applying the fair report privilege, the court said: “In the instant case there was 
c
73
74
75
                    
 Id. at 1130. 
 Id. 
 Id. 
75 Id. 
Va by 
ex
 
 8 A.2d 302 (Pa. 1939). 
72
 
73
 
74
 
at 1132. “The jury by its verdict in favor of the defendants must necessarily have found that what 
ndenberg said was pertinent to the issues, or, assuming that it was not pertinent, that he was not actuated 
press malice.” Id. 
76
 127
In this case, NBC rented its facilities to a commercial advertising corporation. During the 
program, comedian Al Jolson, who had been hired by the advertiser, deviated from a s
submitted to
cript 
 the radio station prior to the broadcast and called the Summit Hotel “a rotten 
ho f 
Ju  
Am
es 
its facilities is liable for an impromptu defamatory statement, interjected “ad lib” into a 
ot in the employ of the 
broadcasting company, the words being carried to the radio listeners by the facilities.79 
The Summit Hotel filed an action for defamation to recover alleged damages to the hotel’s 
reputation and business, and the lower court had held that the radio station was liable even 
though it was without fault.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court focused much of its analysis 
on determining the proper standard of liability that should apply and found that absolute 
liability without fault was an unnecessarily harsh standard for a broadcasting company that 
had leased its facilities. 
    The court undertook an extensive discussion of the imposition of liability without fault in 
Pennsylvania common law. Writing that the principle behind liability without fault was that 
                                                                                                                                                      
tel.”77 Noting that “the law of defamation by radio is very much in its infancy,”78 Chie
stice Kephart wrote for the court that the case involved an issue never before addressed in
erica or England: 
    The important question raised is whether a radio broadcasting company which leas
radio broadcast by a person, hired by the lessees, and n
 
80
 
 
77 Id. at 303. 
 Id. 
The court below held that defendant’s liability was absolute though it was without any fault. The fact 
 its facilities to another to publish and disseminate a nondefamatory program, and that the 
defamatory interjection was spoken by lessee’s employee under circumstances which precluded 
 
78
 
79 Id. 
 
80 Id.  
that it rented
anticipation or prevention by the broadcaster, was treated as immaterial. Id. 
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“every wrong must have a remedy,”81 the court noted the incongruity of applying liability 
without fault to tort law, which is based on intentional wrongful conduct.82 The court 
explained: 
    [I]t may be stated that the doctrine of liability without fault has little or no place in 
has rarely been looked upon favorably in this State. In all of the exceptional cases there 
of harm to others by intentional conduct.
torts involving injuries to the person, and its extension from the law of trespass to land 
is a common ground of either antecedent negligence, or the assumption of a known risk 
 
t 
’s 
ederal rules were violated. Therefore, there already was a check in 
concluded.85  
         
83 
Because strict liability without fault was originally intended to redress injuries to land, 
therefore, it was not properly applied to personal injury. 
    The court held that, while a radio station could be held liable if one of its own employees 
or agents made a defamatory remark that was published with malice or was unprivileged, i
could not be held liable for defamatory remarks broadcast by a lessee or one of the lessee
agents, provided the station “exercised due care in the selection of the lessee, and, having 
inspected and edited the script, had no reason to believe an extemporaneous defamatory 
remark would be made.”84 In its decision, the court noted that radio differed from 
newspapers in that broadcasting companies required licenses from the federal government 
that could be revoked if f
place to prevent stations from intentionally broadcasting defamatory statements, the court 
                                        
 Id. at 304. 
82 Id. t, or 
lac
 
 Id. at 306. 
have been infrequent, and governmental regulation affords a check.” Id. 
81
 
“A tort today implies fault or wrong. Tort liability must be founded upon some blameworthy conduc
k of due care resulting in the violation of a duty owing to others.” Id. 
83
 
84 Id. at 312. 
 
85 Id. at 311. “Radio defamations 
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air
Ho he 
rentonian Publishing Company, wrote an editorial that accused Lloyd Kelly, deputy to the 
mayor, of political corruption. Hoffman alleged that Kelly was using underhanded tactics and 
threats to arrange for the police department to begin using Ford models instead of Chevrolet 
models for vehicles. Hoffman called Kelly’s tactics an attempt at a “capricious switchover to 
makes of cars with which [the police] are not fully familiar.”  The editorial was then 
broadcast over radio facilities owned and controlled by the Trent Broadcasting Corporation, 
which periodically leased the station to the newspaper for news broadcasts. Kelly filed an 
action for defamation against Hoffman, the Trentonian Publishing Company, and Trent 
Broadcasting Corporation.  During the first trial of the case, the trial judge had struck the 
complaint against Trent Broadcasting because the plaintiff failed to assert in his complaint 
that the broadcaster had acted without due care. That decision was reversed by the N.J. Court 
of Errors and Appeals, which said the wording of the complaint was sufficient to encompass 
the due care standard.   
  The appellate court agreed that the radio station was liable as a distributor or disseminator: 
                                              
 The New Jersey Supreme Court in 1948 considered whether a broadcasting station that 
ed a defamatory newspaper article published or simply distributed the content in Kelly v. 
ffman.86 In this case, Arthur Hoffman, the managing editor of a newspaper owned by t
T
87
88
89
   
 
87 7
y Hall with 
 
88 F
dis
 
 (N.J. 1948). 
86 61 A.2d 143 (N.J. 1948).  
4 A.2d 922, 924 (N.J. Super. L. 1950).  
Police here have used Chevrolets for years. . . Yet ever since Kelly obtained a Ford Station Wagon 
from a local Ford dealer, and City officials had their pictures taken by the press in front of Cit
it, Kelly has been pressuring authorities to change over to Fords. Id. 
or the purposes of this analysis, only those aspects of the case relating to the broadcast station will be 
cussed. 
89 61 A.2d 143, 147
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    We elect to decide this case upon the broad duty of this defendant as a disseminator. 
not liable for a defamatory statement during a radio broadcast by the person hired by the 
carried to the radio listeners by its facilities, if it could not have prevented publication 
90
The defendant-respondent as a radio broadcasting company which leased its facilities is 
lessees and not in the employ of the radio broadcasting company, the words being 
by the exercise of reasonable care.  
In reaching its decision, the court noted that “[t]he rule or terminology of absolute liability 
may hamper the radio in the performance of a public service,” further explaining that it 
viewed determining the circumstances under which radio stations should be held strictly 
liable for defamatory content as an issue to be resolved by the legislature.   
    Having decided that Trent Broadcasting could be liable as a distributor, the appeals court 
sent the case back to the trial court. During the second trial, the judge asked the jury to 
consider whether the company, “by reason of the proved activity of its representative in 
control of its facilities, in editing, revising and approving the proposed broadcast script, did 
not so aid and abet the publication as to become itself a publisher and responsible as such.”92 
The jury found that Trent Broadcasting Corporation was not liable as a publisher and that, as 
a disseminator, it had exercised reasonable care. The jury also ruled in favor of the other 
defendants, Hoffman and the Trentonian Publishing Co., and the plaintiff appealed to the 
Law Division of the N.J. Superior Court. That court upheld the verdict regarding the 
   
 
91
                                              
Id. at 146. The court drew this conclusion in the context of comparing radio broadcasts to newspapers: 
But there is obvious distinction between a newspaper libel and defamation by radio, especially wher
the defamation made is an interjected extemporaneous remark. The rules of law 
 
91 
e 
applicable to libel are 
based in the main on the permanence of the defamation. There are considerations which may warrant the 
y to be resolved in the legislative forum. 
The rule or terminology of absolute liability may hamper the radio in the performance of a public service; 
y be abused. The balancing of the benefits and advantage and 
the evils arising from the abuse of the power are questions for the Legislature. Id. 
.  
extension of absolute liability to radio defamation, such as the size of the radio audience, the 
ineffectiveness of retraction. These are questions of social polic
on the other hand the power of the radio ma
 
92 74 A.2d at 925
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broadcast station, denying Kelly a new trial on that issue.93 In Kelly, then, the courts held that 
 
adio 
le 
 of 
, or 
rt 
s abandoned the strict liability standard and held that as mere 
 
a broadcasting corporation could be deemed a disseminator if it leased its facilities to another
news outlet and, as a disseminator, was not liable unless it failed to exercise reasonable care. 
    The radio cases reveal that the courts grappled with how to handle the liability of a r
station that had leased its facilities. Initially, radio stations were held to be absolutely liab
as publishers for defamatory content spoken by someone other than an employee or agent
the station, regardless of whether they were required to transmit it, had prior knowledge
were able to stop the transmission of the message as it occurred.94 Later cases began to 
reflect an easing up on the broadcast stations. In one case, the court applied the fair repo
privilege to a radio station that broadcast court proceedings, holding that the radio station 
was not liable for the defamatory content in the proceeding.95 In the last two cases, Summit 
Hotel and Kelly, the court
disseminators or distributors of the statements of others, stations would not be liable if they
exercised reasonable care.96 This, in essence, was the same distributor liability standard 
courts were applying to telegraph companies at the turn of the century. 
 
                                                 
93 Id. at 927. The court held that the jury had erred in denying Kelly compensatory damages:  
I determine that the verdict of the jury, as it concerned the denial of compensatory damages to the 
fendants, Trentonian and Hoffman, was so contrary to the weight of the evidence as 
to indicate its basis as mistake, passion or prejudice and, therefore, that a new trial as to such issue should 
 As to so much of the verdict as relieved the Trent Broadcasting Corporation of liability, and as 
acquitted all defendants of responsibility for punitive or exemplary damages, I find that the same was 
e evidence and a new trial as to such issues is denied. Id. 
 Soren
Coffey v. Mi
 
95 Irwin v. A
 
ummit Hotel Co. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 8 A.2d 302 (Pa. 1939); Kelly v. Hoffman, 74 A.2d 922 (N.J. Super. 
Ct
plaintiff against the de
be granted.
amply supported by th
 
94 son v. Wood, 243 N.W. 82 (Neb. 1932); Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 20 P.2d 847 (Wash. 1933); 
dland Broad. Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1934). 
shurst, 74 P.2d 1127 (Or. 1938). 
96 S
. 1950). 
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Television 
    The only United States Supreme Court case to directly address the liability of a broad
station for transmission of defamatory content was decided in 1959. In Farmers Educat
& Cooperative Union of America, North Dakota Division, v. WDAY, Inc.,
cast 
ional 
 in 
e, 
 censoring 
llowed 
he strictures of section 315: “Townley’s speech, in substance, accused 
ts, together with petitioner, Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of 
                                              
97 the Court 
addressed whether a broadcast station could be held liable for a defamation contained
content it was required to transmit. The issue at stake was “whether § 315 of the Federal 
Communications Act of 1934 barred a broadcasting station from removing defamatory 
statements contained in speeches broadcast by legally qualified candidates for public offic
and if so, whether that section granted the station a federal immunity from liability for 
libelous statements so broadcast.”98 Section 315 requires stations to provide equal speech 
opportunities for political candidates for public office and prohibits stations from
the material broadcast. 99 
    WDAY operated radio and television station facilities in North Dakota and had a
candidates for the U.S. Senate to speak on its programs. During the course of a broadcast, 
candidate A. C. Townley uttered allegedly defamatory remarks, which WDAY did not feel it 
could censor under t
his opponen
   
 
98 
 
99 
f any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to 
use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that 
ffice in the use of such broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of 
n is 
    
97 360 U.S. 525 (1959). 
Id. at 526. 
Section 315 provides: 
 
(a) I
o
censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obligatio
imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate.  
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2002). 
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America, of conspiring to ‘establish a Communist Farmers Union Soviet right here in North 
Dakota.’”100 A North Dakota state district court heard the libel suit against WDAY and 
by the North Dakota Supreme Court.102 Justice 
Bl
    e 
br  
sta  Justice Black argued that stations should not be responsible for censoring 
nsor 
as 
ns to 
Townley and held that section 315 provided immunity for the broadcast station for the 
alleged defamation,101 a decision affirmed 
ack delivered the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in the 5-4 decision. 
The majority and dissenting opinions indicate that the justices debated whether to provid
oadcasters immunity for speech under section 315 or whether the issue should remain in
te courts.103
political candidates’ speech: “[I]t is obvious that permitting a broadcasting station to ce
allegedly libelous remarks would undermine the basic purpose for which section 315 w
passed—full and unrestricted discussion of political issues by legally qualified 
candidates.”104 If stations were obligated to censor candidates’ speech, Justice Black cited 
the difficulties a broadcasting station would face in determining what statements were 
defamatory.105 Such uncertainty could lead broadcast stations to needlessly censor speech or 
even prevent them from carrying any political speech; furthermore, it might allow statio
                                                 
100 306 U.S. at 526-27. 
101 Id. at 527. 
 
 
103  Justice Frankfurter wrote the dissent, in which he argued,  
the binding principle of federalism, leaving to the States authority not withdrawn by the Constitution or 
 
104 Id. at 529. 
 
t 530.  
The decision a broadcasting station would have to make in censoring libelous discussion by a 
 far from easy. Whether a statement is defamatory is rarely clear. Whether such a statement is 
actionably libelous is an even more complex question, involving as it does, consideration of various legal 
ch as ‘truth’ and the privilege of fair comment. Id. 
102 89 N.W.2d 102 (N.D. 1958). 
 
[D]ue regard for the principle of separation of powers limiting this Court’s functions and respect for 
absorbed by the Congress, are more compelling considerations than avoidance of a hardship legally 
imposed. 306 U.S. at 536. 
105 Id. a
candidate is
defenses su
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inhibit a candidate’s platform by intentionally blocking out portions of it under the guise of 
censoring for defamatory content.106 
    The Court held that broadcast stations must have immunity for libelous statements m
by political candidates under section 315: 
    Petitioner alternatively argue
ade 
s that section 315 does not grant a station immunity from 
liability for defamatory statements made during a political broadcast even though the 
ot 
ate to 
 
In
emselves from liability through insurance, the Court feared that, without immunity, 
broadcast stations might deny access to all candidates: “While denying all candidates use of 
stations would protect broadcasters from liability, it would also effectively withdraw political 
discussion from the air. Instead the thrust of section 315 is to facilitate political debate over 
radio and television.”  Therefore, Farmers established the precedent that broadcast stations 
are immune from defamation actions that arise from political candidate speech that the 
stations were required to transmit but unable to censor under the Communications Act of 
1934. Like the CDA, this federal immunity supersedes state common law. 
    In response to a different question, as discussed previously, a Georgia appellate court 
established the category “defamacast” to describe transmission of defamation via television, 
ents of both libel and slander, in American Broadcasting-
section prohibits the station from censoring allegedly libelous matter. Again, we cann
agree. For under this interpretation, unless a licensee refuses to permit any candid
talk at all, the section would sanction the unconscionable result of permitting civil and 
perhaps criminal liability to be imposed for the very conduct the statute demands of the 
licensee.107 
 spite of the petitioner’s arguments that broadcast stations could sufficiently protect 
th
108
which the court said possessed elem
                                                 
106 Id. 
. 
710  Id. at 531. 
 
108 Id. at 534. 
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Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson.109 While the court did not reach a decision whether the 
broadcast station should be held liable as a publisher, republisher, or distributor, it did not 
have to—the case reflects an instance in which a state law had already established the 
standard of liability to be applied to broadcast stations disseminating third-party content. The
Georgia statute in question read: 
    The owner, licensee or operator of a visual or sound radio broadcasting station or 
operator, shall not be l
 
network of stations, and the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee or 
iable for any damages for any defamatory statement published or 
uttered in or as part of a visual or sound radio broadcast, by one other than such owner, 
licensee, or operator, or agent or employee thereof, unless it shall be alleged and proved 
by the complaining party, that such owner, licensee, operator or such agent or employee, 
has failed to exercise due care to preven ication or utterance or such statement 
in such broadcast.110 
The court found that the language of the statute extended to television and that the station had 
failed to exercise due care to prevent the transmission of defamation contained in a fictional 
television program.  Although the court used the term “secondary publisher” to refer to the 
broadcaster transmitting non-employee speech, the Georgia statute codified the distributor 
liability standard used by the Summit Hotel and Kelly courts in earlier radio cases.112 
   ission 
Co
                                                
t the publ
 
111
 While few cases were found that addressed television station liability for the transm
of defamatory content, some observations may be made. First, the United States Supreme 
urt established a definitive precedent for the courts to follow in Farmers Educational & 
 
109 126 S.E.2d 873 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962). 
0 Id. at 877 (citing Code § 105-712, Ga.L.1949, p.1137). 
gh there are no decided cases in Georgia applying this provision, we think that the language 
isual or sound radio broadcasting station’ is sufficiently broad to encompass television stations and their 
Id. 
parently makes at least the broadcaster’s liability comparable with that of a ‘secondary 
ublisher’ in printed libel.’” 
 
11
 
111 Id. “Althou
‘v
broadcasts. We find failure to exercise due care is sufficiently alleged.” 
 
112 Id. “The legislation ap
p
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Cooperative Union of America, North Dakota Division, v. WDAY, Inc.113 The Court held that 
stations could not be held liable for defamatory content in political candidate speech that they 
were required to carry but unable to censor under section 315 of the Communications Act of 
1934. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson also suggests that some 
states had begun to address broadcast defamation by statute.  As the Internet cases reveal, 
statutory law dictates the approach courts must take in applying defamation law to a new 
technological medium.  
 
Internet 
    Before undertaking a review of the Internet cases, it is important to review the language of 
the Communications Decency Act.  While most of the Act was struck down in Reno v. 
ACLU,  the portion that remained, section 230, has played an integral role in courts’ 
approach to liability for third-party defamation on the Internet. The language of the statute 
reads: 
    (1) Treatment of publisher or speaker. No provider or user of an interactive computer 
another information content provider. 
ld 
liable on account of-- 
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material 
is constitutionally protected.117 
                                              
 114
115
116
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
       (2) Civil liability. No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be he
          (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of 
   
). 
. Examples of state statutes are addressed in the concluding section of 
is chapter. 
5 Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2004).  
 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). 
113 360 U.S. 525 (1959
 
114 126 S.E.2d 873 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962)
th
 
11
 
116 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
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 118
119
The term “interactive computer service” was defined as “any information service, system, or 
access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a 
computer server.”  An “information content provider” was defined as “any person or entity 
that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information 
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”  Therefore, no 
provider or user can be treated as a publisher of information provided by another or third-
party information content provider. For the Internet, this has meant that providers or users 
who re-post content from third-party content providers are immune from liability, even if the 
content is false and defamatory. The CDA was passed in reaction to two early Internet cases. 
    An Internet Service Provider was treated as a distributor in the earlier Internet case, Cubby, 
Inc., v. CompuServe, Inc., decided in 1991  As a service to its subscribers, CompuServe 
of ic 
lib m, the 
urnalism Forum, was operated and maintained by Cameron Communications, Inc. 
(CCI).  Don Fitzpatrick and his company, Don Fitzpatrick Associates of San Francisco, 
contracted with CCI to provide the content for Rumorville USA, which appeared in the 
Journalism Forum. The libel action arose when, in response to attempts by plaintiffs Cubby, 
                                                                                                                                                      
120
fered CompuServe Information Service (CIS), an online information source or “electron
rary” that also provided access to special interest forums.121 One such foru
Jo
122
 
 Id. § 230(f)(2). 
 
119 Id. § 230(f)(3). 
0 766 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
1 Id. at 137. 
2 Id. “Cameron Communications, Inc. (‘CCI’), which is independent of CompuServe, has contracted to 
, create, delete, edit and otherwise control the contents’ of the Journalism Forum ‘in accordance 
ith editorial and technical standards and conventions of style as established by CompuServe.’” Id. 
 
118
 
12
 
12
 
12
‘manage, review
w
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Inc., and Robert Blanchard to start a competitive newsletter, Skuttlebut, Fitzpatrick published 
allegedly libelous statements: “The allegedly defamatory remarks included a suggestion tha
individuals at Skuttlebut gained access to information first published by Rumorville ‘throug
some back door’; a statement that Blanchard was ‘bounced’ from his previous employer, 
WABC; and a description of Skuttlebut as a ‘new start-up scam.’”
t 
h 
as 
ern District of New York held that CompuServe had 
sted 
cted to screen every publication: 
ompany unrelated to 
CompuServe.  
In the interest of the First Amendment, CompuServe could be liable only if it knew or had 
reason to know of the allegedly defamatory content.   
    r of 
statements made on its Money Talk computer bulletin board in Stratton Oakmont, Inc., v. 
rnet bulletin boards that were 
                                              
123 In spite of the fact that 
CompuServe had no editorial control over the content, the plaintiffs charged that the ISP w
liable for carrying the messages. 
    The U.S. District Court for the South
acted as a distributor and, furthermore, that it had no knowledge of or control over the po
content. Referring to the ISP as “an electric, for-profit library,”124 the court noted that 
CompuServe could not be expe
    While CompuServe may decline to carry a given publication altogether, in reality, 
once it does decide to carry a publication, it will have little or no editorial control over 
that publication’s contents. This is especially so when CompuServe carries the 
publication as part of a forum that is managed by a c
125
 
126
Four years later, in 1995, Prodigy Services Company was held liable as a publishe
Prodigy Services Co.127 Prodigy operated a series of Inte
   
 
124
 
125
 
6 Id. 140-41. 
7  No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). 
123 Id. at 138. 
 Id. at 140. 
 Id. 
12
 
12
 139
m who 
ere meant to enforce the guidelines and had the ability to delete postings, and a software 
screening program that detected offensive language.  The court described Money Talk as 
“allegedly the leading and most widely read financial computer bulletin board in the United 
States, where members can post statements regarding stocks, investments, and other financial 
matters.”  In October 1994, defamatory statements were posted by a user on the Money 
Talk bulletin board that alleged fraud and criminal activity on the part of plaintiffs Stratton 
Oakmont, Inc., and Daniel Porush.   
    The plaintiffs claimed that Prodigy was liable as a publisher, rather than a distributor, 
because the company advertised itself as exercising editorial control over its content and had 
mechanisms in place to do so. 
    Plaintiffs base their claim that Prodigy is a publisher in large measure on Prodigy’s 
 
held itself out as an online service that exercised editorial control over the content of the 
 
y 
same way that a newspaper would be. The court agreed. 
itself out to the public and its members as controlling the content of its computer 
anaged through content guidelines that encouraged appropriate postings, board leaders 
w
128
129
130
stated policy, starting in 1990, that it was a family oriented computer network . . . and
messages posted on its computer bulletin boards.131 
The plaintiffs alleged this policy differentiated Prodigy from CompuServe and made Prodig
liable in the 
    The key distinction between CompuServe and Prodigy is two fold. First, Prodigy held 
bulletin boards. Second, Prodigy implemented this control through its automatic 
                                                                                                                                                       
128 1995 N.Y. Misc. at *5-6. 
 
129 Id. at *3. 
0 Id. at *1-2.  
er lie for a living or get fired.” Id. 
 
 
13
These statements included the following: (a) Stratton Oakmont, Inc., a securities investment banking 
firm, and Daniel Porush, Stratton’s president, committed criminal and fraudulent acts in connection with 
the initial public offering of stock of Solomon-Page Ltd.; (b) the Solomon-Page offering was a “major 
criminal fraud” and “100% criminal fraud”; (c) Porush was “soon to be proven criminal”; and, (d) 
Stratton was a “cult of brokers who eith
 
131 Id. at *3. 
 
 140
software screening program, and the Guidelines which Board Leaders are required to 
132
 
enforce.  
The court held that Prodigy’s choice to market itself as screening its bulletin board content 
m —
an
    The conflicting results from these two cases provided an area of law that needed 
n 
y 
A clearly immunizes publishers, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
                                                
ade it more accountable for the content that was posted and found that the ISP had acted
d was liable—as a publisher. 
clarifying: When could Internet Service Providers and users be considered publishers or 
distributors? The irony was that an ISP that did not edit or filter content would not have to 
worry about liability for content on its network, whereas a network like Prodigy that made a
effort to screen obscene or offensive material opened itself to liability for content that it did 
not catch. As discussed previously, the CDA addressed the question by absolving ISPs and 
users of liability for third-party content in an attempt to encourage ISPs and users to filter 
content without fear of liability. Courts in post-CDA cases are bound to follow federal 
statutory law as a matter of federal supremacy, so lower federal courts and state courts 
routinely conclude that neither ISPs nor users are liable for posting third-party defamator
content.133  
    While the CD
the immunity provided by section 230 extended to distributors in Zeran v. America Online, 
Inc.134 Kenneth Zeran was the target of an anonymous prankster who posted on AOL 
 
132 Id. at *10. 
3 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that even publishers or those with editorial control 
ir. 
 after being notified of its presence). 
7 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 
13
over content are immune from liability under Section 230); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.C. C
1998) (holding that an ISP could not be liable for making a gossip column available to its subscribers); Zeran v. 
AOL, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that AOL was not liable for failing to remove defamatory content 
even
 
134 129 F.3d 32
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advertisements for offensive T-Shirts about the Oklahoma City bombing starting one week 
after the bombing occurred. 
    On April 25, 1995, an unidentified person posted a message on an AOL bulletin 
shirts featuring offensive and tasteless slogans related to the April 19, 1995, bomb
purchasing the shirts were instructed t
135
board advertising “Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts.” The posting described the sale of the 
ing of 
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Those interested in 
o call “Ken” at Zeran’s home phone number in 
Seattle, Washington.  
 
Ze ed; 
lat id the 
ontent would be removed. However, the next day, another message advertising additional 
shirts was posted, again with Zeran’s phone number, leading to more harassing phone calls. 
The unknown person continued to post messages with different advertisements of the same 
nature over the next four days. Because Zeran used his home phone as his business phone 
number, he could not change it. Thus, he continued to receive threatening phone calls.  
“Kenneth Zeran brought this action against America Online, Inc. (‘AOL’), arguing that AOL 
unreasonably delayed in removing defamatory messages posted by an unidentified third 
party, refused to post retractions of those messages, and refused to screen for similar postings 
thereafter.”  
    The Fourth Circuit held that, under section 230, even if a computer service provider had 
acted as a distributor and failed to take down defamatory content after being given notice, it 
                                              
ran began to receive threatening and harassing phone calls after the message was post
er that day, he contacted AOL, during which conversation an AOL representative sa
c
136
137
   
ere posted would soon be closed. Zeran also reported the case to 
eattle FBI agents. By April 30, Zeran was receiving an abusive phone call approximately every two minutes.” 
135 Id. at 329. 
 
136 Id. “During this period, Zeran called AOL repeatedly and was told by company representatives that the 
individual account from which the messages w
S
Id. 
 
137 Id. at 328. 
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was immune from liability for third-party defamatory postings on the Internet.138 The court 
pointed out that distributor is just a subcategory of a publisher and, therefore, distributors 
were immune under the “publisher” language used in section 230.139 The court refus
swayed by Zeran’s argument that AOL should be liable for failing to take down the 
defamatory content in a timely manner. 
    Zeran simply attaches too much importance to the presence of the distinct notice 
from an original publisher to a distributor in the eyes of the law. To the contrary, once a 
thrust into the role of a traditional publisher.
ed to be 
element in distributor liability. The simple fact of notice surely cannot transform one 
computer service provider receives notice of a potentially defamatory posting, it is 
 
—
e 
 
erefore, played a key role in establishing 
                                                
140 
In other words, rather than making a computer services provider liable, notifying such a 
company of the defamatory content forced that company into the role of publisher by 
requiring the service provider to determine whether to publish, edit, or remove the content
roles traditionally played by publishers. The court’s rationale rested in the First Amendment, 
as the court articulated the fear that denying computer service providers immunity could hav
a chilling effect if those companies chose to severely limit postings rather than potentially be
held liable for their third-party content.141 Zeran, th
that section 230 provided immunity to distributors as a category of publishers. 
 
139 Id. “[Zeran] argues that distributors are left unprotected by section 230 and, therefore, his suit should be 
disagree. Assuming arguendo that Zeran has satisfied the requirements 
r imposition of distributor liability, this theory of liability is merely a subset, or a species, of publisher, and is 
 foreclosed by section 230.” Id. 
 
138 Id. at 332. 
 
permitted to proceed against AOL. We 
fo
therefore also
 
140 Id. 
 
141 Id. at 331.
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    Under section 230, AOL was once again granted immunity from liability for defam
content that it carried but did not create in Blumenthal v. Drudge.
atory 
d 
h AOL 
thal, 
rdan 
n 
The Drudge Report has learned that top GOP 
 
 After 
 
n to 
    At issue in this case was whether AOL could be held liable, and like the Zeran court, the 
S. district court held in 1998 that section 230 conferred immunity on AOL as a computer 
se ce 
on learly that such a 
a ‘publisher or speaker’ and therefore may not be held liable 
                                       
142 Matt Drudge wrote an
published the Drudge Report, an electronic, Web-based gossip column focusing on 
happenings in Hollywood and Washington, D.C.143 In 1997, Drudge contracted wit
for one year to allow AOL to make his column available to its subscribers. In August 1997, 
Drudge published a report with allegedly defamatory statements about Sidney Blumen
newly recruited to serve as an assistant to President Clinton, and his wife, Jacqueline Jo
Blumenthal, who worked in the White House as director of the President’s Commission O
White House Fellowships. The content read: “
operatives who feel there is a double-standard of only reporting [R]epublican shame believe
they are holding an ace card: New White House recruit Sidney Blumenthal has a spousal 
abuse past that has been effectively covered up. The accusations are explosive.”144
being notified by the couple’s attorney, Drudge retracted the story through a special edition
of the Drudge Report and e-mailed his subscribers, in addition to e-mailing the retractio
AOL, which posted the retraction on its service.145 
U.
rvice provider: “AOL was nothing more than a provider of an interactive computer servi
 which the Drudge Report was carried, and Congress has said quite c
provider shall not be treated as 
          
2 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). 
3 Id. at 47. 
4 Id. 
145 Id
 
14
 
14
 
14
 
. at 48. 
 144
in tort.”146 The court noted the challenges posed by the new Internet medium147 but 
emphasized the role that Congress had played in immunizing computer service providers: 
“Whether wisely or not, it made the legislative judgment to effectively immunize prov
of interactive computer services from civil liability in tort with respect to material 
disseminated by them but created by others.”
iders 
f particular note in this case is that, in spite of the statutory input from 
g 
to Smith, during the course of a conversation, Batzel revealed that she was “the 
gr
rtwork in her house was inherited, Smith began to suspect that the paintings might be 
sto d 
   
148 The Drudge case, therefore, reinforced the 
Zeran ruling. O
Congress through the CDA, the court noted that the issue was far from settled. Justice 
Friedman wrote for the court, “Needless to say, the legal rules that will govern this new 
medium are just beginning to take shape.”149 
    The Ninth Circuit addressed the application of section 230 in Batzel v. Smith, decided in 
2003.150 Ellen Batzel, an attorney, had hired Robert Smith to work on her house. Accordin
anddaughter of one of Adolf Hitler's right-hand men.”151 After hearing that some of the 
a
len.152 Smith resorted to the Web to search for sites about stolen artwork, where he foun
                                              
 Id. at 50. 
 Id. at 49.  
This information revolution has also presented unprecedented challenges relating to rights of privacy
and reputational rights of individuals, to the control of obscene or pornographic materials, and to 
competition among jo
146
 
147
 
urnalists and news organizations for instant news, rumors, and other information 
that is communicated so quickly that it is too often unchecked and unverified. Id. 
148 Id
 
149
 
0 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003). 
151 Id
 
152
im that she was “the 
granddaughter of one of Adolf Hitler's right-hand men.” Smith also maintained that as he was painting the 
 
. 
 Id. 
15
 
. at 1020-21. 
 Id. at 1021.  
Smith recounted that while he was repairing Batzel's truck, Batzel told h
 145
the Museum Security Network. He sent an e-mail to the Network—read by Ton Cremer
museum director and sole operator of the Network—sharing his belief that the artwork had 
been looted and stolen during World War II.
s, a 
ail to the 
Ne d 
be  
in
as an 
ider: 
153 Cremers posted Smith’s e-m
twork Web site and sent it to the group’s listserv, later adding a message that the FBI ha
en notified about the e-mail. Batzel discovered the message and filed a defamation action
 response.154 
    Writing for the court, Justice Berzon wrote that the Network, managed by Cremers, w
interactive computer service and thus immune.155 The question, however, entailed who, in 
this case, could be considered a content provider under section 230. Cremers edited the e-
mail before he distributed it, but the court said that was insufficient to make him a prov
“Because Cremers did no more than select and make minor alterations to Smith’s e-mail, 
                                                                                                                                                       
i politician 
intings 
hanging in her house were inherited. To Smith, these paintings looked old and European. Id. 
 
153 Id. The content of the e-mail read:  
Subject: Stolen Art. Hi there, I am a building contractor in Asheville, North Carolina, USA. A month 
ago, I did a remodeling job for a woman, Ellen L. Batzel who bragged to me about being the grand 
daughter [sic] of “one of Adolph Hitler's right-hand men.” At the time, I was concentrating on performing 
tasks, but upon reflection, I believe she said she was the descendant of Heinrich Himmler. Ellen 
Batzel has hundreds of older European paintings on her walls, all with heavy carved wooden frames. She 
herited them. I believe these paintings were looted during WWII and are the rightful legacy 
of  not 
t 
 
4 Id. at 1022. 
atzel disputes Smith's account of their conversations. She says she is not, and never said she is, a 
descendant of a Nazi official, and that she did not inherit any art. Smith, she charges, defamed her not 
lieved her artwork stolen but out of pique, because Batzel refused to show Hollywood 
co
 
155
, 
 
ork website and the listserv are potentially immune under § 230. Id. 
walls of Batzel's sitting room he overheard Batzel tell her roommate that she was related to Naz
Heinrich Himmler. According to Smith, Batzel told him on another occasion that some of the pa
my 
told me she in
 the Jewish people. Her address is [omitted]. I also believe that the descendants of criminals should
be persecuted for the crimes of the [sic] fathers, nor should they benefit. I do not know who to contac
about this, so I start with your organization. Please contact me via email [...] if you would like to discuss 
this matter. Bob. Id. 
15
B
because he be
ntacts a screenplay he had written. Id. 
 Id. at 1031.  
There is no dispute that the Network uses interactive computer services to distribute its on-line mailing 
and to post the listserv on its website. Indeed, to make its website available and to mail out the listserv
the Network must access the Internet through some form of ‘interactive computer service.’ Thus, both the
Netw
 
 146
Cremers cannot be considered the content provider of Smith’s e-mail for purposes o
230.”
f § 
person or entity that created or developed the information in question furnished it to the 
service provider or user would conclude that the information was provided for  
 
ested, 
 immune under section 230.159 The Batzel case, therefore, raised a 
qu he 
or e 
on
156  Whether Smith qualified as a content provider was also in dispute because he had 
not intended the message to be published on the Internet.157 The court held: 
    [A] service provider or user is immune from liability under § 230(c)(1) when a third 
provider or user under circumstances in which a reasonable person in the position of the 
publication on the Internet or other “interactive computer service.”158 
The court remanded the case to the federal district court to determine whether Cremers 
should “reasonably” have believed the information was for public posting. If Cremers should 
have recognized the message was not for posting on the listserv, the appeals court sugg
then he could not be
estion of who could be considered a content provider, or the third party who published t
iginal defamation; the court concluded that the service provider or user could be immun
ly if it could reasonably conclude the message was intended to be republished. 
                                                 
 
157
It is not entirely clear from the record whether Smith ‘provided’ the e-mail for publication on the 
Internet under this standa . There are facts that could have led Cremers reasonably to conclude that
Smith sent him the information because he operated an Intern
a subscriber to the listserv and apparently sent the information
156 Id. 
 Id. at 1035.  
rd  
et service. On the other hand, Smith was not 
 to a different e-mail account from the one 
at which Cremers usually received information for publication. Id. 
 
158 Id. 
9 Id. at 1035.  
and to the district court for further proceedings to develop the facts under this newly 
announced standard and to evaluate what Cremers should have reasonably concluded at the time he 
 email. If Cremers should have reasonably concluded, for example, that because Smith’s 
e-mail arrived via a different e-mail address it was not provided to him for possible posting on the listserv, 
annot take advantage of the § 230(c) immunities. Under that circumstance, the posted 
information was not “provided” by another ‘information content provider’ within the meaning of § 230. 
 
15
[We] rem
received Smith's
then Cremers c
Id. 
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    In November 2006, the Supreme Court of California issued a ruling in Barrett v. 
Rosenthal160 that section 230 confers immunity on distributors and immunizes “indi
‘users’ of interactive computer services, and that no practical or principled distinction can b
drawn between active and passive use.”
vidual 
e 
atory 
, among other things, “sleazy, unethical, a quack, a thug, a 
bu  
ac
ac
ticle 
Rosenthal received via e-mail from her codefendant Tim Bolen. This article, subtitled 
 
Rosenthal posted a copy of this article on the Web sites of two newsgroups devoted to 
discussion group.  
The California Court of Appeal interpreted section 230 to hold “that common law 
‘distributor’ liability survived the congressional grant of immunity, so that Internet service 
pr
”164 The California Supreme Court disagreed, holding that both 
di
   
161 In the case, Ilena Rosenthal posted defam
statements on the Web questioning and disparaging Dr. Stephen J. Barrett and Dr. Timothy 
Polevoy, who operated a Web site dedicated to exposing health frauds. Rosenthal posted 
content that referred to Barrett as
lly, a Nazi”162 and making similar charges against Polevoy. She also posted an article that
cused Polevoy of stalking a Canadian radio producer, which was held to be the only 
tionable content: 
    The [trial] court determined that the only actionable statement appeared in an ar
“Opinion by Tim Bolen,” accused Dr. Polevoy of stalking a Canadian radio producer.
alternative health issues and the politics of medicine, not on the site of her own 
 163
 
oviders and users are exposed to liability if they republish a statement with notice of its 
defamatory character.
stributors and users are immune under section 230. 
                                              
160 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006). 
161 Id
 
162
 
3 Id. at 514. Id. 
t 513. 
 
. at 513. 
 Id. at 514, n.2. 
16
 
164 Id. a
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   er” was 
in m “user” included 
here as an 
ted 
the prohibition in section 230(c)(1) against treating any “user” as “the publisher or 
who merely receives information on a computer without making it available to anyone 
meaning in mind. Nor is it clear how a user who removes a posting may be deemed 
 
e the concerns of those who have expressed reservations about the Zeran 
court’s broad interpretation of section 230 immunity. The prospect of blanket immunity 
 In reaching its decision, the state supreme court undertook a discussion of how “us
tended to be defined under section 230 and decided that the ter
individuals such as Rosenthal.165 Polevoy also attempted to argue that there is a difference 
between an active and passive Internet user in terms of who could be held liable. In 
Polevoy’s view, a passive user is one who simply screens and removes content, w
active user is one who “actively post[s] or republish[es] information.”166 The court rejec
the relevance of the distinction. 
    Polevoy’s view fails to account for the statutory provision at the center of our inquiry: 
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” A user 
else would be neither a “publisher” nor a “speaker.” Congress obviously had a broader 
“passive” while one who merely allows a posting to remain online is “active.”167 
The court recognized that its interpretation of section 230 extended immunity beyond a 
distributor, such as a computer service provider like AOL, to an individual user who reposts 
defamatory content. The court also noted the potential drawbacks to a broad immunity for 
third-party defamatory content: 
    We shar
                                                 
165 Id. at 526. 
technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by individuals, families, and 
 
Polevoy reasons that the term “user” must be construed to refer only to those who receive offensive 
 who actively post or republish information on the Internet are “information content providers” 
unprotected by the statutory immunity. Id. 
Section 230(a)(2) notes that such services “offer users a great degree of control over the information 
that they receive,” and section 230(b)(3) expresses Congress’s intent “to encourage the development of 
schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services.” Thus, Congress consistently 
referred to “users” of interactive computer services, specifically including “individuals.” Id. 
166 Id. at 527.  
information, and those who screen and remove such information from an Internet site. He argues that 
those
 
 
167 Id. 
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for those who intentionally redistribute defamatory statements on the Internet has 
intermediaries from defamation liability for republication.
disturbing implications. Nevertheless, by its terms section 230 exempts Internet 
 
of 
 
ers or users 
ded by Congress to apply. The 
immune.169 The Ninth Circuit seemed to qualify this immunity somewhat when it held in 
 
ternet. 
                     
168 
Post-CDA court decisions, therefore, have continued to apply an expansive interpretation 
the immunities conferred by section 230. At this point, it seems as though only those who
originally publish defamation on the Internet may be held liable for that content. 
    The Internet cases reflect the CDA’s impact on immunity for third-party defamatory 
content on the Internet. Although the statute clearly provides immunity for provid
of an interactive computer service for third-party defamatory content, it has been left to the 
courts to interpret the precise language and definitions inten
Fourth Circuit and U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia extended immunity to 
distributors, concluding that distributor is simply a category of publisher and, therefore, 
2003 that a service provider or user could be immune only if it could reasonably conclude the 
message was intended to be republished.170 Most recently, the Supreme Court of California 
held that both distributors and individual users are immune for third-party defamatory 
postings.171 
 
Conclusion 
   The cases analyzed in this chapter reveal a variety of approaches taken by the courts in 
imposing liability for defamation transmitted via the telegraph, radio, television, and In
                            
8 Id. at 529. 
3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 
1998
 
170
 
171 al. 2006). 
16
 
169 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.
). 
 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (C
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Overall, telegraphs were, from the start, treated as common carriers, public utilities requir
to transmit messages but unable to edit or censor, and therefore liable only if the company 
knows or has reason to know the content is defamatory.
ed 
 
hether the 
 
gress had codified the duties and liabilities of common carriers although the 
172 Courts initially imposed strict
liability on radio stations for broadcasting defamatory content, regardless of w
station knew of or could have prevented the transmission of the defamation.173 Few 
television cases were found, which will be discussed later in this section. Finally, while the 
two pre-CDA cases differed as to whether Internet Service Providers should be treated as 
distributors174 or as publishers,175 post-CDA cases have provided blanket immunity for those
who post third-party defamatory content on the Internet.176 
    Courts have consistently treated telegraph companies as common carriers.177 As far back 
as 1887,178 Con
                                                 
172 See generally Nye v. W. Union Tel. Co., 104 F. 628 (D.C. Minn. 1900); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Cashman, 149 
F. 367 (5th Cir. 1906); Peterson v. W. Union Tel. Co., 74 N.W. 1022 (Minn. 1898). See also W. Union Tel. Co. 
for the public is privileged to send messages unless the agents who transmit the message should know or hav
1975) (holding that Western Union was not liable to a defamed person for the transmission of a defamatory 
telegram).  
 
173 See generally Coffey v. Midland Broad. Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. 1934); Sorenson v. Wood, 243 N.W. 
v. Lesesne, 83 F. Supp. 918 (E.D.S.C. 1948) (holding that a public utility whose duty it is to transmit messages 
e 
reason to know he content is defamatory); Mason v. W. Union Tel. Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 53 (Cal. Ct. App. 
82 
(Neb. 1932); Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 20 P.2d 847 (Wash. 1933). 
 
174 Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
175 St  
 
176 thal v. 
Dr
 
7 Supra note 166. 
pt at Deregulation by Redefinition, 
987 DUKE L.J. 501, 509 (1987).  
ct dealt exclusively with railways, it is integral to 
the history of communication common carrier law. . . . Through the Interstate Commerce Act, Congress 
h companies. Id. at 509-10. 
 
ratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *1, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003); Zeran v. AOL, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Blumen
udge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006). 
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178  Phil Nichols, Note, Redefining “Common Carrier”: The FCC’s Attem
1
[Congress] enact[ed] the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, which codified the duties and liabilities of 
common carriers.  Although the Interstate Commerce A
created the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), and in 1888 it gave the ICC the power to regulate 
telegrap
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telegraph was not specifically categorized as a common carrier until 1910.179 Therefore
courts seem to have taken somewhat of a leadership role in treating telegraph companies as
common carriers, at least for the purposes of defamation liability, even before Congress 
enacted a statute establishing the common carrier status of the telegraph.
, 
 
lisher 
ever, within a few years, courts began to question 
y if 
om 
 
y content. In fact, the television 
cases or 
th 34 
led
                                                
180  
    Early radio cases reveal that some courts attempted early on to impose strict liability for 
defamation transmitted by a new technology, treating the company in question as a pub
of third-party defamatory content.181 How
whether stations should be held strictly liable. In later cases, courts began to treat broadcast 
stations as distributors when they carried content from non-employees—again, liable onl
they transmitted defamatory content without exercising reasonable care to prevent that fr
happening.182  
    As noted above, few television cases were found addressing whether television stations
should be treated as republishers or distributors of defamator
 reflect the significant impact that statutes have had on broadcast station liability f
ird-party defamation. For example, Section 315 of the federal Communications Act of 19
 to Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America, North Dakota Division, v. 
 
179 Id. at 510.  
ct of 1910 resolved whether telegraphs and telephones were classified as common 
carriers. While working out a compromise bill completely reshaping regulation of the railroads and 
ew only agency decisions, the House gave the ICC regulatory 
control of telegraph and telephone services. The bill as enacted not only gave the ICC control over 
 carriers. Id. 
7 (5th 
932); 
The Mann-Elkins A
creating the first court that would revi
communications, it also decreed telegraph and telephone providers to be common
 
180 Nye v. W. Union Tel. Co., 104 F. 628 (D.C. Minn. 1900); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Cashman, 149 F. 36
Cir. 1906); Peterson v. W. Union Tel. Co ., 74 N.W. 1022 (Minn. 1898). 
 
181 Coffey v. Midland Broad. Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. 1934); Sorenson v. Wood, 243 N.W. 82 (Neb. 1
Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 20 P.2d 847 (Wash. 1933). 
 
182 Summit Hotel Co. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 8 A.2d 302 (Pa.1939); Kelly v. Hoffman, 74 A.2d 922 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. 1950). 
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WDAY, Inc.183 In this case, the United States Supreme Court held that since the statute 
required stations to carry content from political candidates but did not allow the station to 
censor or edit that content, stations could not be held liable for defamatory content and were 
therefore granted immunity. In American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. 
Simpson,  a Georgia statute was used to treat television stations as distributors, not liable 
for defamatory content that was not produced by a station’s own agents or employees, 
providing the station exercised due care. 
    Georgia was not the only state to enact a statute addressing broadcaster liability. A 1973 
American Law Reports publication stated: “As of 1963, the legislatures of 22 states had 
adopted statutes establishing lack of due care as a necessary element of radio-television 
defamation. Of those states, seventeen placed the burden on the plaintiff, while six shifted the 
burden to the defendant to show exercise of due care.”185  One such statute declares that, 
barring evidence that the station failed to exercise due care, 
The owner, licensee or operator of a visual or sound radio broadcasting station or 
operator, shall not be liable for any damage for any defamatory statement published or 
 one other than such 
owner, licensee or operator, or agent or employee thereof, unless such owner, licensee 
184
network of stations, and the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee or 
uttered in or as a part of a visual or sound radio broadcast, by
or operator shall be guilty of negligence in permitting any such defamatory statement.186 
                                                 
183 360 U.S. 525 (1959). 
 
dio or T levi ). 
8  Negligence in permitting defamatory statements by others essential to liability of operator, etc., of 
e also Liability of Radio or Television Station Owner or 
Agen ); 
De
St  
Li
Li
41  
elevision—Limitation of Liability, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1447.1 (1957); Radio or Television Station 
184 126 S.E.2d 873 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962). 
 
85 Jeffrey F. Ghent, Defamation by Ra e sion, 50 A.L.R.3d 1311 (19731
 
61
broadcasting station, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99-5 (1949). Se
t for Defamation Published or Uttered over Station or Network, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §12-652 (2006
famation by Radio, CAL. CIV. CODE § 48.5 (2007); Broadcasting Stations—Liability for Defamation 
atements, GA. CODE. ANN. § 51-5-10 (1949); Libel and Slander, IDAHO CODE ANN. tit. 6 §§ 7 (2007); Civil
ability of Station owner, Licensee, or Operator for Defamation, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 45:1351 (2006); 
ability for Defamatory Statements Published or Uttered Over Broadcasting Stations, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
.340 (2006); Radio or Television Broadcasts, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-7-6 (1978); Defamation by Radio and
T
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188
Thus, within a matter of decades, many states had decided that the issue called for a 
statutory, rather than common law, solution. Also of note is that many states used a “due 
care” standard—less than the strict liability initially imposed but greater than the absolute 
immunity conferred by section 230 of the CDA—perhaps indicating an attempt to find a 
middle ground that would allow the technologies to flourish but still hold them accountable 
under some circumstances for the transmission of defamatory content. 
   The most dramatic example of a statute affecting liability is the Communications Decency 
Act, which, as federal law, has provided one uniform approach for the courts. Whereas the 
federal Communications Act of 1934 affected a specific type of speech—political candidate 
speech—the CDA affects all types of Internet speech. Similarly, the liability of broadcast 
technologies has been addressed through state statutes  and through the Restatement of 
Torts,  but there is no uniform approach across the states. For the Internet, the uniform 
standard is that, regardless of whether the courts classify Internet service providers or users 
as publishers or distributors, as long as the content is provided by a third party, there is 
blanket immunity for those who re-post defamatory messages. 
    In summary, an evolution in the treatment of various media for the transmission of third-
party defamation can be seen. While telegraph companies were treated as common carriers 
                                                                                                                                                       
Personnel—Liability for Defamation; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.200 (2005); Radio and Television Stations Not 
Liable if Due Care Exercised, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-11-6 (2006); Libel, UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-2-7 (2007). 
 
187 Id. 
 
188 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (1977).  
Although radio and television broadcasting companies are engaged in the transmission of the human 
voice and likeness and must to a great extent rely upon matter prepared for them by others, they are 
publishers more nearly analogous to a newspaper or the publisher of a book than to a telegraph company. 
They are not engaged solely in rendering the service of transmission to those who seek it. For their own 
business purposes they initiate, select and put upon the air their own programs; or by contract they permit 
others to make use of their facilities to do so, and they cooperate actively in the publication. Id. at cmt. g. 
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from early on, with courts imposing a distributor-like liability, with the radio, in particular, 
there was some attempt to impose publisher liability status for the transmission of third-party 
defamation. Common-law approaches then allowed for a gradual shift to distributor liability. 
While many states addressed broadcast a few decades of the advent of those 
technologies, the CDA le opportunity to 
evelop—less than a decade—before statutory intervention mandated a uniform approach 
 that 
gory 
e, 
 has 
liability within 
 was an anomaly in that common law had very litt
d
that publishers were immune from liability for third-party defamatory content. The role
the courts have played has been to grant that immunity by treating distributors as a cate
of publishers rather than as a separate category for the purposes of liability. Furthermor
whereas with other media courts have focused on the liability of corporations or 
companies—media owners—the nature of Internet technology with its ease of access
allowed even individual users with access to a computer to be held immune for the 
transmission of third-party defamatory content. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
    This thesis sought to examine how courts have applied aspects of defamation 
several new mass communications tech
 
law to 
nologies—the telegraph, radio, television, and 
ternet. In particular, for each technology the thesis examined the development of the 
libel/slander distinction, whether and how courts have applied the single publication rule, and 
he 
 extent to 
; and 
 
chapters focused on the libel/slander distinction, the single publication rule, and liability, 
ronologically for each technology. 
In
how courts have determined who can be held liable as publishers, republishers, and 
distributors of defamatory content. Through determining what trends have emerged in t
approaches courts have taken to adapting these areas of defamation common law to new 
mass communications technologies, the purpose of this project was to examine the
which the current application of libel law to the Internet fits a historical pattern. 
    Federal and state court cases were found through contemporary law review articles 
addressing these issue and technologies; through secondary legal sources such as the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts and the American Jurisprudence database on Westlaw
through Westlaw searches using keywords including the technology and the area of law to 
capture cases in which the technology in question factored into the courts’ decisions. Three
tracing the case law ch
    This concluding chapter reviews the findings of each of the three substantive chapters but, 
unlike the preceding chapters, organizes the findings by each technology rather than each 
legal topic. In the next section, the discussion turns to two key questions. First, what tr
can be identified in the development of defamation law resulting from courts decisions in 
areas of the libel/slander distinction, the single publication rule, and liability? Second, to 
what extent does the application of libel law to the Internet fit a historical pattern? Finally,
the chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of this research and 
recommendations for further research. 
 
Telegraph 
ends 
the 
 
    olved 
th  
lib Western Union Telegraph 
 
 with telegraph technology, the message is transmitted to an 
operator rather than to a mass audience, thus negating the need to address aggregate 
publications.2 The area of defamation law that courts addressed most was liability—that is, 
shers, republishers, or distributors. 
                                      
The majority of the cases in which courts applied defamation law to the telegraph inv
e liability of telegraph companies for the transmission of defamatory messages. The
el/slander distinction was addressed in one case, Peterson v. 
Co., in which the Supreme Court of Minnesota decided that, in spite of the sound 
technologies used to transmit messages, transmission of defamation via telegraph constituted
libel, not slander. 1 No cases were found in which the single publication rule was applied to 
the telegraph, likely because
whether telegraph companies should be treated as publi
           
tent that wire service stories in newspapers 
e newspaper. 
1 74 N.W. 1022 (Minn. 1898). 
 
2 The telegraph plays a role in single publication discussion to the ex
will be treated as aggregate publications for that single edition of th
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    From early on, courts treated telegraph companies as common carriers, meaning that the
could only be held liable for transmitting messages that were defamatory on their face, a 
standard of liability closely resembling distributor liability. In an earlier appeal in the 
Peterson case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota described Western Union as “a common 
carrier. . . bound to transmit all proper messages delivered to it.”3 The court ruled, however, 
that a telegraph company “was not bound to send indecent or libelous communications.
Subsequent cases affirmed that telegraph companie
y 
”4 
s could be held liable essentially as 
di  
Ny
reventing the dissemination of defamatory messages: 
    Having no duty of censorship . . . if he acts in good faith, and the language of the 
circumstances, would not necessarily conclude that defamation was the object and 
at 
duty the telegraph company would incur no responsibility.  
Furthermore, a telegraph company could not be held liable absent proof of malice, which 
required the plaintiff to demonstrate “that the defendant was governed by a bad motive, and 
that he did not act in good faith but took advantage of the occasion to injure the plaintiff in 
his character or standing.”  
                                                
stributors for transmitting messages that were clearly libelous.5 A federal district court in
e v. Western Union Telegraph Co. explained the role of the telegraph operator in 
p
message is such that a person of ordinary intelligence, knowing nothing of the parties or 
purpose of the message, it would be his duty to send it, and for his performance of th
 6
 
7
 
3 Peterson v. W. Union Tel. Co., 67 N.W. 646, 647 (Minn. 1896). 
1900
 
6 1
 
7 W
 
Id.. 4 
 
5 W. Union Tel. Co. v. Cashman, 149 F. 367 (5th Cir. 1906); Nye v. W. Union Tel. Co., 104 F. 628 (D.C. Minn. 
). 
04 F. 628, 631 (D.C. Minn. 1900). 
. Union Tel. Co. v. Cashman, 149 F. 367, 372 (5th Cir. 1906). 
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    Therefore, although telegraph companies were treated as common carriers, functioning 
more like public utilities than publishers, t lity that could be imposed on a telegraph 
es to 
 
n 
affairs that its lines of wires cover all civilized lands, cross the great oceans, and reach 
have for its services, imposes upon it the duties of common carrier.  
Recognizing the important role that the telegraph played in communication, the courts 
applied defamation law, and the liability element in particular, to the technology in such a 
way that it could be of the greatest benefit to the public, encouraging the rapid flow of 
information. Finally, it is of note that telegraph companies were not recognized by statute 
as common carriers until 1910, but courts had already treated them as such for more than a 
decade.  Courts, therefore, took a leadership role in categorizing telegraph companies as 
common carriers in the interest of promoting the technology’s use. 
 
 
   
he liabi
company for knowingly transmitting a defamatory telegram closely resembled distributor 
liability. Courts noted that the public interest was served by allowing telegraph compani
function without fear of liability should they unknowingly transmit defamatory messages. In
Nye v. Western Union Telegraph Co., for example, the court noted that telegraphs had 
become an essential communications technology: 
    The electric telegraph is so useful and constantly employed in the conduct of huma
every city, and nearly every hamlet. The law, recognizing the need that every one may 
8
 
9
                                              
04 F. 628, 630 (D.C. Minn. 1900). 
hil Nichols, Note, Redefining “Common Carrier”: The FCC’s Attempt at Deregulation by Redefinition, 1
KE L.J. 501, 510 (1987).  
The Man
carriers. 
8 1
 
9 P 987 
DU
n-Elkins Act of 1910 resolved whether telegraphs and telephones were classified as common 
While working out a compromise bill completely reshaping regulation of the railroads and 
creating the first court that would review only agency decisions, the House gave the ICC regulatory 
 as acted not only gave the ICC control over 
communications, it also decreed telegraph and telephone providers to be common carriers. Id. 
control of telegraph and telephone services. The bill en
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 Radio 
    Defamation via radio broadcasting is an area that eventually came to be largely directed 
by statute and influenced by the Second Restatement of Torts. Two key areas in which 
courts addressed how to apply traditional common law principles to radio defamation were 
whether the defamation constituted libel or slander and the liability of broadcast stations, 
particularly for non-employee speech. Only one case dealing with the single publication 
rule and radio defamation was found, and in that case the court decided in line with the 
principle articulated in the Second Restatement of Torts that each separate broadcast of a 
defamatory statement to a new audience is considered a separate cause of action.  While 
the single publication rule did not prove an area of defamation law widely addressed by 
courts applying common law to radio, both the libel/slander distinction and liability 
produced a number of cases. 
    ation. 
W  
as  of publication, radio broadcasts could reach large audiences far 
beyond the capacity of the human voice alone. Judge Fuld noted in his dissent in Hartmann 
v. Winchell that the potential harms of radio defamation were as great as those originating 
from printed defamation. 
ly, the basis of the common-law action for 
dio as when published by writing, 
both logic and policy point the conclusion that defamation by radio should be actionable 
               
10
The radio challenged the centuries-old distinction between written and spoken defam
hereas slander had traditionally been viewed as the lesser of the two forms of defamation
 the less permanent form
   Since the element of damage is, historical
defamation, and since it is as reasonable to presume damage from the nature of the 
medium employed when a slander is broadcast by ra
per se.11 
                                  
 § 577A (1977).  
 73 N.E.2d 30, 34 (N.Y. 1947) (citations omitted). 
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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Courts were thus confronted with the challenge of determining how to apply this traditional 
doctrine to the new technology:  Should the traditional distinction based on the format of the 
publication stand, or should courts focus on the harms and effects of the message in 
determining whether the defamation constituted libel or slander? 
    Courts initially took different approaches to this issue, but many seem to have arrived at 
the same conclusion, supported by the Second Restatement of Torts, that broadcast 
defamation constitutes libel.  One approach that some courts took early on involved 
differentiating based on whether written text, such as a manuscript, was involved in the 
publication. If the defamation was scripted, then it constituted libel,  but if it resulted from 
extemporaneous speech, the station could be liable for slander.  In Irwin v. Ashurst, the 
Oregon Supreme Court questioned the logic of distinguishing between libel and slander 
based on the presence of a script. 
    Assume that a person writes a speech of a defamatory nature and, after committing 
such broadcast be held slander and not libel? The person who hears the defamatory 
a manuscript. Furthermore, what difference does it make to such person, so far as the 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
12
13
14
the same to memory, speaks over the air without referring to his manuscript. Would 
matter over the air ordinarily does not know whether or not the speaker is reading from 
effect is concerned?15 
 
 
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568A (1977). 
eb. 1932); Hartmann v. Winchell, 73 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1947). 
ee 
.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1947). 
 
13 Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co, 116 A.2d 440 (Conn. 1955); Sorenson v. Wood, 243 N.W. 82 
(N
 
14 Locke v. Gibbons, 299 N.Y.S. 188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937), aff’d mem., 2 N.Y.S. 2d 1015 (App. Div. 1938). S
also Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co, 116 A.2d 440 (Conn. 1955); Hartmann v. Winchell, 73 
N
 
15 74 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Or. 1938). 
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In later cases, some courts came to view the distinction as arbitrary, categorizing radio 
defamation as possessing characteristics of both libel and slander.16 Cases decided after the 
publication of the Second Restatement of Torts in 1977 have tended to agree with the 
principle that broadcast defamation constitutes libel, regardless of whether it is scripted, 
reflecting the Restatement’s influence.17 
    Another area in which the Second Restatement and in which state statutes, in particular, 
have provided guidance for the courts is the liability of broadcasting stations for transmitting 
non-employee defamatory content. The key issue courts faced in determining the liability o
a radio station for transmitting defamatory content was whether and to what extent a sta
should be liable when the station had leased it facilities or the defamation was uttered by a
non-employee, someone not associated with or employed by the station. Initially, courts he
that stations were strictly liable for defamation, whether scripted or extemporaneous, 
regardless of whether the station had the means to stop the transmission.
f 
tion 
 
ld 
and 
with 
e 
 many 
uestion whether it was appropriate to hold 
18 As happened 
the libel/slander distinction, courts began to question the application of defamation law to th
radio: Just as courts began to question the value of the libel/slander distinction, with
eventually settling on libel, they also began to q
                                                 
16 Niehoff v. Cong. Square Hotel Co., 103 A.2d 219 (Me. 1954); Kelly v. Hoffmann, 74 A.2d 922 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. 1950); Summit Hotel Co. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 8 A.2d 302 (Pa. 1939). 
 
17 First Independent Baptist Church v. Southerland, 373 So. 2d 647 (Ala. 1979); McLaughlin v. Rosanio, Bailets 
 Div. 1984). 
land Broad. Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (D. Mo. 1934). 
& Talamo, Inc., 751 A.2d 1066 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000); Matherson v. Marchello, 100 A.D.2d 233 
(N.Y. App.
 
18 Sorenson v. Wood, 243 N.W. 82 (Neb. 1932); Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 20 P.2d 847 (Wash. 1933); 
Coffey v. Mid
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stations strictly liable without fault. Courts began to treat stations as distributors, liable only 
if they failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent the broadcast of defamatory con
    Therefore, the radio cases reveal that courts truly wrestled with applying defamation 
principles to the new technology at first, and particularly with whether the oral nature of 
publication constituted slander or whether, due to the widespread dissemination, it shou
treated as lib
tent.19     
the 
ld be 
el. Courts also held stations strictly liable at first for third-party defamation but 
seemed to reconsider. Although this point was not expanded upon in the liability chapter, the 
Communications Act of 1934 may have factored into that trend. In 1939, for example, the 
ready was a check in place to prevent stations from intentionally 
because the two can both be treated as “broadcast” technologies. Therefore, some discussion 
of the two technologies overlaps. For example, courts were not the only bodies directing the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Summit Hotel contended that broadcasting companies 
already had incentive to prevent the transmission of defamation because stations required 
licenses from the federal government that could be revoked if federal rules were violated. 
Therefore, while there is nothing in the Act regarding libel, there may have been the 
perception that there al
broadcasting defamatory statements.20 The Communications Act of 1934 factored into the 
only United States Supreme Court to directly address broadcast station liability for 
defamation, as is discussed in the next section. 
    This research has revealed that it is difficult and, at times, somewhat arbitrary to 
completely separate the application of common-law defamation to radio and television 
                                                 
19 Summit Hotel Co. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 8 A.2d 302 (Pa. 1939); Kelly v. Hoffman, 74 A.2d 922 (N.J. Super. 
 Summit Hotel, 8 A.2d at 311. “Radio defamations have been infrequent, and governmental regulation affords 
a check.” Id. 
 
Ct. 1950). 
 
20
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debate over radio and television stations’ liability; state legislatures also began to weigh in, 
as will be discussed in the next section. What can be said specifically for the radio 
 
 in radio cases. Conversely, 
 cases. 
 1977, 
radio cases, some courts attempted to base their decision on whether the defamation was 
22 n as 
                                              
defamation cases is that they seem to have paved the way for discussions of defamation 
transmitted via both broadcast technologies, and to a certain extent, served as the forum
where courts truly grappled with applying the libel/slander distinction and liability, in 
particular.  
 
Television 
    Compared to the radio and Internet, there were relatively few television cases, likely 
because courts addressed issues applicable to both technologies
the single publication rule gained far more attention in television cases than in radio
As with radio, aspects of television defamation came to be guided by state statute and the 
Second Restatement.  
    In television defamation cases prior to the publication of the Second Restatement in
courts questioned whether libel or slander should apply. As courts had initially done in the 
scripted, holding that scripted defamation constituted libel, 21 but ad lib defamation 
constituted slander.  By the end of the 1950s, courts began to treat television defamatio
   
21 Landau v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 128 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1954). 
 
22 Remington v. Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). 
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libel, regardless of whether it was scripted.23 Some courts avoided the issue by treating the 
defamation as actionable per se.24 
    The television cases reveal two trends: By the 1960s, states had begun to address broadca
defamation through statutes, and the Second Restatement was very influential in court 
decisions. For ex
st 
ample, defamation transmitted via television in Arno v. Stewart was deemed 
t,” 
ited 
 
tement, however, courts already had some guidance through the Uniform Single 
 
                                                
slander based on a California statute.25 Georgia developed a third category of “defamacas
actionable per se, based on a state statute that referred only to defamation and did not 
distinguish between libel and slander.26 Cases decided after 1977, when the Second 
Restatement stated in section 568A that broadcast defamation constitutes libel, 27 have c
the Restatement in holding television defamation to be libel.28 
    The Second Restatement again proved influential in the application of the single 
publication rule to the television broadcasts. Twenty-five years prior to the publication of the
Second Resta
Publication Act, published in 1952 by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform Laws.29 Three courts had considered whether the single publication rule applied to 
 
23 Gearhart v. WSAZ, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Ky. 1957); Shor v. Billingsley, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 
1957). 
 
24 R 24 S.E.2d 98 (N.C. 1962). 
. 2d 1062 (Ala. 1980). 
    No person shall have more than one cause of action for damages for libel or slander or invasion of 
gle publication or exhibition or utterance, such as any one 
edition of a newspaper or book or magazine or any one presentation to an audience or any one broadcast 
iss v. Anderson, 304 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1962); Greer v. Skyway Broad., 1
 
25 254 Cal. App. 2d 955 (Ct. App. 1966). 
 
26 American Broad.-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 126 S.E.2d 873, 879 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962). 
  
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568A (1977). 
 
28 Brown v. Hearst Corp., 862 F. Supp. 622 (D. Mass. 1994); Gray v. WALA-TV, 384 So
 
29 UNIFORM SINGLE PUBLICATION ACT §§ 1, 2 (1952). Section 1 of the Act provides: 
 
privacy or any other tort founded upon any sin
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television broadcasts in the 25 years between the two recommendations,30 but only one co
decided the issue, holding that three broadcasts of a program
urt 
 constituted three separate 
pu ond 
Re
Re
   
hich courts determined the liability of broadcast stations for transmitting third-party 
defamatory content. In Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America, North 
Dakota Division, v. WDAY, Inc.,  the United States Supreme Court held that, because 
section 315 of the federal Communications Act of 1934 required broadcast stations to 
provide political candidates equal opportunities for speech but forbade stations to censor that 
political speech, stations could not be held liable for defamatory content uttered by political 
candidates.  
    In addition to establishing the “defamacast” category of defamation, the Georgia 
legislature established by statute that broadcast stations—radio and television—could be held 
                                                                                                                                                    
blications, in line with what the Restatement would decree one year later.31 Post-Sec
statement cases have treated separate broadcasts as distinct publications, in line with the 
statement.32  
 As was a finding in the libel/slander cases, statutes also proved key factors in cases in 
w
33
   
over radio or television or any one exhibition of a motion picture. Recovery in any action shall include 
all damages for any such tort suffered by the plaintiff in all jurisdictions 
d 534 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Burt v. CBS, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 
012 (S.D. Ohio 1991); Herron v. King, 746 P.2d 295 (Wash. 1987). 
rmers.) 
 
30 Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962) (remanding the case to determine the dates of 
publication for the purposes of the statute of limitations); Devlin v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 219 A.2d 523 (N.J. 1966) 
(holding that the court would stay a decision pending the outcome of the same case in a California court); Mun. 
Training Ctr., Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Corp., 387 N.Y.S.2d 40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (holding that three broadcasts 
of a program constituted three separate causes of action). 
 
31 Mun. Training Ctr., Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Corp., 387 N.Y.S.2d 40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). 
 
32 Lehman v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 2
1
 
33 360 U.S. 525 (1959). (hereinafter, Fa
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liable as distributors for non-employee def peech. The Georgia statute, included 
network of stations, and the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee or 
uttered in or as part of a visual or sound radio broadcast, by one other than such owner, 
by the complaining party, that such owner, licensee, operator or such agent or employee, 
in such broadcast.  
States have, therefore, taken the initiative to relieve broadcast stations of absolute liability for 
third-party defamation. Instead, the use of a “due care” standard seemed to be a compromise 
between absolute liability and immunity for third-party defamation. 
    The story of the application of defamation law to the television is a story of courts being 
guided by principles articulated in the Second Restatement of Torts and by statutes, whether 
federal, like the Communications Act of 1934, or state, like the Georgia “defamacast” statute. 
Whereas early radio cases reveal an effort by courts to navigate how best to apply common-
law defamation principles to the new technology, television cases reveal that, in addition to 
consulting the radio case precedents, courts were able to refer to the Restatement and to 
statutes in their decisions. 
 
amatory s
here, used language similar to several other state statutes:34  
    The owner, licensee or operator of a visual or sound radio broadcasting station or 
operator, shall not be liable for any damages for any defamatory statement published or 
licensee, or operator, or agent or employee thereof, unless it shall be alleged and proved 
has failed to exercise due care to prevent the publication or utterance or such statement 
35
 
                                                 
Station r Network, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §12-652 (2006); Defamation by Radio, CAL. CIV. CODE § 
and Slander, IDAHO CODE ANN. tit. 6 §§ 7 (2007); Civil Li
Defamation, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 45:1351 (2006); Lia
34 See Liability of Radio or Television Station Owner or Agent for Defamation Published or Uttered over 
48.5 
(2007); Broadcasting Stations—Liability for Defamation Statements, GA. CODE. ANN. § 51-5-10 (1949); Libel 
ability of Station owner, Licensee, or Operator for 
bility for Defamatory Statements Published or Uttered 
ver Broadcasting Stations, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.340 (2006); Radio or Television Broadcasts, N.M. 
TAT. ANN. § 41-7-6 (1978); Defamation by Radio and Television—Limitation of Liability, OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 12, § 1447.1 (1957); Radio or Television Station Personnel—Liability for Defamation; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 31.200 (2005); Radio and Television Stations Not Liable if Due Care Exercised, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-
11-6 (2006); Libel, UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-2-7 (2007). 
 
, 877 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962) (citing 
ode § 105-712, Ga.L.1949, p.1137). 
O
S
35 American Broad.-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 126 S.E.2d 873
C
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Internet 
    The World Wide Web is only two decades old, so it is possible that a decade from now, 
another author will write about this same topic but reach a completely different conclusion
based on future court applications of defamation law to the Internet. For now, however, som
generalizations can safely be made. Of the three areas of defamation law discussed in this 
thesis, the two that courts have addressed the most with Internet defamation are the single
publication rule and liability. Only one case was found in which the question arose w
Internet defamation constituted libel or slander. 
 
e 
 
hether 
Here, too, the cases reflect the integral role 
at 
 
 or 
 
 area 
of dissemination, the deliberate and premeditated character of its publication and the 
ersistence of the defamation are factors to be considered in determining whether a 
37
that the Second Restatement of Torts and statutes have played in courts’ application of 
defamation law to the Internet. 
 In the only Internet case found to address whether Internet defamation constituted libel or 
slander, the claim was based on the potential harms of the defamation, and the court held th
the defamation constituted libel, not slander.36 The fact that the libel/slander question arose
with a written publication—which traditionally would have been assumed to be libel—
reflects the erosion of the libel/slander distinction based on whether the content is written
oral. This erosion can be seen both in the broadcast cases, which reveal that most courts view
broadcast defamation as libel, and in the Second Restatement of Torts, which says, “The
p
publication is a libel rather than a slander.”  
 
                                                 
36 Varian Med. Sys., Inc., v. Delfino, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 325 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977). 
 
37
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    Courts have taken the lead in applying the single publication rule to the Web. The rule 
its origins in newspaper publication
has 
roadcasts, 
ence of 
e 
e 
n 
eficial promise.”43 Another 
n a 
paper page in a book lying on a shelf which is accessed by the reader when the book is 
                                              
38 and was eventually extended to individual b
several decades after the development of broadcast technologies.39 The mere pres
defamatory content online does not constitute a republication; instead, a republication will 
occur only if the content itself is edited.40 The mere presence of defamatory content onlin
does not constitute a republication; instead, a republication will occur only if the content 
itself is edited.41 The single publication rule also has been applied to the archival of 
newspaper articles online.42 
    In applying the single publication rule to the Internet, courts have noted the potentially 
limitless actions that could be filed due to the global nature of the Internet. The 
characteristics of the technology create “an even greater potential for endless retriggering of 
statute of limitations, multiplicity of suits, and harassment of defendants. Inevitably, ther
would be a seriously inhibitory effect on the open, pervasive dissemination of informatio
and ideas over the Internet, which is, of course, its greatest ben
court compared Web pages to pages in a book: “A statement electronically located on a 
server which is called up when a web page is accessed, is no different from a statement o
   
 See Firth v. New York, 706 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Ct. Cl. 2000), aff’d, 731 N.Y.S.2d 244 (App. Div. 2001), aff’d 
ptr. 3d. 353  (Ct. App. 2004); Churchill v. New Jersey, 876 A.2d 311 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
ndliss v. Cox Enters., 593 S.E.2d 856 (Ga.App. 2004). 
38 Wolfson v Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 4 N.Y.S.2d 640 (App. Div. 1938). 
 
39 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A (1977). 
 
40
775 N.E.2d 463 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2002). 
 
41 Id. See Mitan v. Davis, 243 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Ky. 2003); Traditional Cat Assn., Inc. v. Gilbreath, 13 Cal. 
R
 
42 McCa
 
43 Id. at 858. 
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opened.”44 Thus, while courts took the lead in applying the single publication rule to the 
Internet, they also simply applied traditional common law based on the potential 
consequences, such as a multiplicity of suits, and used analogies to older media. 
    Much of the furor over the current application of defamation law to the Internet relates
liability and, in particular, the broad immunity granted to providers and users of Internet
computer services for third-party defamatory content.
 to 
 
e out of two conflicting cases, one of which held an 
ternet Service Provider liable as a distributor 46 and the other as a publisher based on the 
fact tha CDA 
 whether 
45 As discussed, section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act aros
In
t the ISP, Prodigy, had advertised itself as editing content.47 The passage of the 
paved the way for providers and users of computer services to be immune for third-party 
defamatory content. Subsequent court decisions have maintained that, regardless of
the re-poster of content was considered a republisher or a distributor48 and regardless of 
whether the defendant was an Internet service provider or an individual,49 the immunity 
covers anybody who did not generate the defamatory content. 
    Courts have applied common-law defamation principles and the CDA in such a way that 
promotes a robust speech forum. For example, one of the reasons cited for applying the 
                                                 
44 Mitan v. Davis, 243 F. Supp. 719, 724 (W.D. Ky. 2003). 
 
NEXUS J. OP. 129, 129 (2006); Aaron Perzanowski, Comment, Relativ
45 See generally David L. Hudson, Jr., The Blogosphere and the Law: Blogs and the First Amendment, 11 
e Access to Corrective Speech: A New 
Test for Requiring Actual Malice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 833 (2006); Melissa A. Troiano, Comment, The New 
(2006). 
46
47 Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *1, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). 
 
48 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 
Journalism? Why Traditional Defamation Laws Should Apply to Internet Blogs, 55 AM. U.L. REV. 1447 
 
 Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 
1998). 
 
49 Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006). 
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single publication rule to the Internet is to protect libel defendants from endless suits and 
harassment.50 Furthermore, through the CDA, courts have allowed the creation of an 
environment on the Internet in which defamatory messages can be re-posted, whether 
intentionally or not, without liability. Both of these approaches unquestionably promote 
speech on the Internet by holding only those who create defamatory content liable and, 
through the single publication rule, limiting the time frame and number of actions in which 
tten or 
 broadcast as slander. Out of that challenge arose 
f 
they can be held liable.  
 
Trends and Patterns: The Internet as a New Model Built on an Old Foundation 
    What trends, in general, can be identified for each technology? Overall, the rulings of 
courts over the last century have built the foundation for the current application of 
defamation law to the Internet. First, broadcast technologies, in particular, challenged the 
traditional distinction between libel and slander based on whether the speech was wri
spoken. Courts went through an awkward phase of trying to adapt the distinction to radio and 
television. In spite of the transmission of messages using oral communication, courts were 
reluctant to treat defamation transmitted via
the perspective that determining libel versus slander rests on factors other than the mode o
the speech, including the scope of the dissemination, its permanence, and the premeditated 
intent of the publisher, a principle that functions today.51  
    Next, the single publication rule arose out of newspaper libel—ultimately out of the 
printing press—but the principles have persisted and been applied to other forms of 
                                                 
50 McCandliss, 593 S.E.2d at 858. 
 
51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977). 
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publication. The rule has been applied to treat single broadcasts as aggregate publications, 
and it has been applied to treat editions of broadcasts aired at different times as separate 
ants 
can be 
d 
n the Internet is always there, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 
 
e 
t 
dited. 
aw, 
he efficient and rapid dissemination of 
 
republications. The single publication rule serves to ease the burden on libel defend
through limiting the number actions that can be filed and the time frame in which they 
filed. Under the rule, editions of broadcasts, for example, are treated as republications base
on the assumption that the publisher intended to reach a new audience. 
    Whereas re-broadcasting defamatory material clearly constitutes a separate, finite 
publication, material o
barring its removal from a Web page. Therefore, for defamatory content to be republished on
the Web, it must be altered or edited in some way. Interestingly, the Web page hosting th
content may be altered, including where the content is accessed on that page, withou
retriggering the statute of limitations as long as the defamatory content itself is not e
Web publishing resembles book publishing, particularly the permanent nature of the 
publication. Just as editing a book and republishing it would constitute republication, so does 
the editing of content for publication by a Web site operator. In this area of defamation l
then, courts have relied on print principles. 
    Finally, courts have taken a variety of approaches in addressing liability for new mass 
communications technologies. From the beginning, courts viewed the telegraph as a public 
utility, a common carrier required to transmit messages but unable to censor them; in so 
doing, telegraph served the public interest through t
messages. Thus, while courts viewed defamation transmitted via telegraph as libel, not 
slander, they imposed liability on telegraph companies in such a way that companies were
 172
immune absent proof of malice, which was generally defined as failure to exerc
and/or transmitting material that was libelous on its face. 
    While courts initially attempted to hold broadcast stations strictly liable for the 
transmission of defamatory content, some questioned the appropriateness of holding a 
company strictly liable without fault; thus emerged the due care or negligence standard of 
liability. Overall, courts wrestled with the best way to balance promoting the speech 
by the technologies against the individual’s—and society’s—interest in preservin
name and reputation. 
    Courts have, for the most part, been generous in balancing s
ise due care 
provided 
g a good 
peech and reputation interests 
 
efamatory 
been both guided by the principles articulated in the Second Restatement of Torts and by 
statutes. While the CDA steals the spotlight as the reigning federal statute that critics love to 
in favor of speech on the Internet. As discussed, both the single publication rule and the 
immunity conferred by section 230 of the CDA work together to limit a defamation 
plaintiff’s claims, both through limiting the statute of limitations through the single 
publication rule and through holding that only those who generate content on the Web are 
liable; those providers or users who disseminate information from other content providers are
immune. While this approach is guided by a federal statute, courts have interpreted the 
statute broadly, conferring immunity even to individual users who re-post d
content. Courts have granted an extraordinary immunity to republishers and distributors of 
defamatory content online, particularly in comparison with broadcast technologies and even 
compared to the telegraph with its malice requirement; however, this immunity was granted 
by statute and did not develop out of common law. 
    In the light of that conclusion, the final trend identified in this thesis is that courts have 
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criticize, states also have addressed the application of defamation law to mass 
communications technologies through statutes. Georgia’s “defamacast” is a prime example 
-
ich the application of libel law to the Internet fits a 
e mid-nineteenth century; in defamation cases, the telegraph was not treated as a 
common carrier, liable only if the agent knew mitting 
a defamatory message, until the 1890s, and its status as a common carrier was not codified 
of a state legislature interceding to take over for common-law development. Statutes 
determining the liability of a broadcast station for non-employee speech serve as another 
prime example of state legislatures mandating an approach rather than relying on common
law evolution. Therefore, while the scope of the immunity conferred for third-party 
defamation on the Internet certainly exceeds that of other mass communications 
technologies, a definite trend over the last century has been for legislative bodies to step in 
with statutory solutions to common-law issues and questions. 
    To summarize, then, the extent to wh
historical pattern is mixed. The courts have not created any new principles but have simply 
applied existing principles in such a way that promotes speech on the Internet. Furthermore, 
it is clear that statutes have played an integral role in the application of defamation law to 
new communications technologies, and so in that sense, the Internet is no exception. Courts 
relied on a centuries-old mass communications technology—the printing press—in treating 
Web pages like book pages for the purposes of the single publication rule.  
    What is different is both the timeline of the application of defamation law to the Internet 
and the extent of the immunity provided for third-party defamation. The telegraph came into 
its own in th
or had reason to know that he was trans
 174
until 1910.52 Thus, it on-law approach to 
lia
    The radio developed in the 19 30s. Courts seemed to wrestle 
the 
 
olve 
ed a 
 
ogy is 
r 
 
 
 
 took more than a half-century to establish the comm
bility for defamation transmitted via telegraph.  
20s and the television in the 19
with the libel/slander distinction at least leading into the 1950s; however, cases decided after 
1977, post-Second Restatement, generally reflect the principle that broadcast defamation 
constitutes libel. The Uniform Single Publication Act of 1952 articulated the principles of 
single publication rule, which were later adopted in the Second Restatement; again, here, a 
number of decades passed before courts reached a generally unified common-law approach. 
Liability proved another area that initially confounded courts, but, as discussed earlier, many
states stepped in to legislate the issue. 
    The Internet, on the other hand, had less than a decade in which common law could ev
before the federal government stepped in to provide a uniform approach, one that conferr
broad immunity for third-party defamation. Certainly, the immunity conferred upon service 
providers and users for third-party defamatory content on the Internet exceeds that which is
provided to the other technologies discussed here. However, the nature of the technol
also vastly different. To publish content via broadcast stations, for example, requires eithe
access through ownership or employment, or it requires purchasing air time. On the Internet,
all you need is an Internet connection and you can instantly publish. It is a medium of and for 
the people. 
 
                                                 
52 Nichols, supra note 9, at 510. 
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Implications and Suggestions for Further Research 
“The single most important source of rights for electronic communications in the United 
of speech and of the press.”53 
    Defamation law seeks to balance an individual’s interest in a good reputation with the r
to free speech.54 Unquestionably, there are societal interests served by both—the 
preservation of one’s reputation and character certainly is a vital need for functioning in 
society, but a society that engages in a robust exchange of ideas, an ideal served by the user-
driven content on the Web, fits a democratic ideal in which every person has a voice. To b
sure, in granting a broad immunity for the re-posting of content online—including 
defamatory content—we are placing our faith in the technology and the people who 
that it will not be abused. Unquestionably, promoting speech at the expense of reputation 
results in harm to some individuals. But if a free and d
States is the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, which guarantees freedom 
 
ight 
e 
use it 
emocratic society is our goal, then the 
erhaps 
et 
                                                
Internet is a public forum in which anyone with access to a computer has a say. 
    Although Congress has provided a very broad immunity, very quickly in the lifespan of 
the Internet in comparison to the courts’ application of defamation law to new mass 
communications technologies, statutes have been used for years in place of common-law 
developments in defamation. Most of these statutes have been at the state level, but p
is it not entirely a bad thing to have one uniform approach that serves the entire U.S. Intern
community.  
 
53 Cynthia L. Counts & C. Amanda Martin, Libel in Cyberspace: A Framework for Addressing Liability and 
Jurisdictional Issues in this New Frontier, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1083, 1088 (1996). 
 
54 RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., THE RIGHT TO SPEAK ILL: DEFAMATION, REPUTATION AND FREE SPEECH 17 
(2006). 
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    While some authors have criticized Congress and the Communications Decency Act for 
providing too much immunity, too quickly, before common law had a real chance to ev
perhaps t
olve, 
he statutory solution is not all bad. Both a benefit and drawback to common law is 
ates, 
equences of 
 
t, as a medium widely accessible and capable of allowing a robust 
e 
 
 
that it is a slow process, which, as its application to previous technologies demonstr
takes many years to develop; enacting a statute, however, can be a relatively quick process—
as can repealing or amending a statute. If Congress decided that it was displeased with the 
way courts were interpreting the Communications Decency Act or with the cons
it, it could potentially amend the Act within a relatively short period of time. In addition, 
common law is not a uniform approach and varies by state; a federal statute provides a 
uniform approach either within a state or across the country so that the law is clear. 
Furthermore, courts still have a discretionary role in interpreting statutes so that the issue is
not necessarily completely set in stone by the statute. 
    The nature of the Interne
speech forum, is best served—for now, at least—by a laissez-faire policy that promotes th
use of the Internet. Should another few years or few decades reveal that speech is being 
promoted in such a way that it has become disruptive to society, the CDA can always be 
reevaluated. The Internet is a vastly different medium from the telegraph, radio, and 
television in the unparalleled access it provides for publication—there are no editors who 
must vet a story or check the facts; time or space typically does not need to be purchased.
With a computer and the know-how to use it, the lonely pamphleteer has a new forum. Let us
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allow time for free speech and for sel ternet before we assume the worst 
 people, that the Internet will function to the detriment of reputation and, ultimately, 
ciety. 
    The research undertaken here is not a comprehensive guide to the application of 
es. Instead, it provides a brief look 
el/slander distinction, the single publication 
those areas in the light of new 
t statutes have long played a role 
to new technologies, further research 
xploration of other 
 or fault requirements, could provide 
 and the single 
d publication based on 
ous technologies. While the 
efamation before the 
pply t he best fit for the Internet right now. The Internet 
d by the 
 
just what the people will do with it.  
f-regulation of the In
in
so
defamation law to new mass communications technologi
at three specific areas of defamation law—the lib
rule, and liability—and how courts have applied 
communications technologies. Considering the finding tha
in directing courts in the application of defamation law 
could place more emphasis on statutes, undertaking a comprehensive review of the role of 
statutes, thus providing more context for court decisions. In addition, e
areas of defamation law, such as jurisdiction, retractions,
a more complete picture. . 
    What this research does indicate is that with the libel/slander distinction
publication rule, courts have built a model for Internet defamation an
common law that has grown out of courts’ experiences with previ
courts had little chance to work through liability for third-party d
passage of the Communications Decency Act, perhaps the statutory approach—which had 
been used by states and the federal government to determine how defamation law would 
o new technologies in the past—is ta
is, more so than other mass communications technologies, a medium of, for, an
people. Before we assume that speech freedoms will be excessively abused, let us embrace
this opportunity of broad immunity to see 
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